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ASEAN countries have been moving at different speeds along the path 
of the so called Demographic transition and are at present at different stages 
of this complex process. As a consequence, starting in the very near future, 
some ASEAN countries will be affected by an increasing structural lack of 
labor supply, while in other a structural excess of labor supply will persist 
for at least 30-40 years. This situation has already contributed to divide 
ASEAN countries into two groups: departure countries and arrival countries. 
Data show that both departures and arrivals have been steadily increasing as 
well as labor mobility within ASEAN.  
Building on this demographic background, the paper proposes 
alternative labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-35. 
The scenarios outline manpower needs, migration flows and population 
growth on the basis of the trends in WAP and alternative hypothesis on 
employment growth. The main conclusion is that the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei (already relevant arrival countries), the higher their need of 
foreign labor. In fact, in a very near future the local labor supply of these 
countries will not be even sufficient to replace the workers that will leave 
for good the labor force due to retirement or death. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within ASEAN countries 
will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth and social 
development.   
A survey of economic growth model brings us to support the idea that 
economic growth is the result of a process of technological upgrading, of 
diversification and structural change driven by the accumulation of 
capabilities, on one hand, and the transformation of the production structure, 
on the other. It is the knowledge base of a country that defines and limits the 
technologies a country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, 
and therefore the possible paths to economic growth and social development. 
Speeding up economic growth and triggering successful catching up 
processes does require shifting production from low quality activities into 
“high quality activities”, to “jump” into new knowledge clusters. In order to 
do so a country also needs to drive the knowledge structure toward higher 
diversity and complexity, to endow its incoming labor force with new 
expertise and competences.  
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different knowledge base. The 
percentage of people between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education 
spans between the maximum of Singapore (91 per cent) and the minimum 
values that characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 
per cent).  A more detailed analysis of the national educational attainments 
shows that beside Singapore -that has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance- only Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their 
production structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster or 
are ready to do so. The more polarized education structure of Thailand and 
possibly Myanmar suggest that these two countries have limited options to 
3 
 
start the production of intermediate technology products, but could develop 
directly toward high technology sectors.  
In conclusion, the paper contends that in a very near future workers 
mobility within the ASEAN region will not be a choice, but a necessity 
imposed by demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of 
economic growth and the typology of development will determine the 
amount of labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills 
that will be required by arrival countries. At the same time, the other 
ASEAN countries will be characterized by a structural excess of labor 
supply that will not be able to find a productive occupation in the national 
markets, since the rate of economic growth requested to absorb it will 
remain out of reach. 
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong 
points. 
 
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, Thailand 
and, although in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks. 
In this situation the papers proposes a series of policy options.  
In the first place, a correct migration policy can be based only upon a 
serious evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by arrival 
countries. The paper stresses the fact that the more developed economies do 
not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -especially at the beginning 
of the migration process- they need mainly unskilled labor and only with 
time qualified workers and university graduates will become predominant.  
The other side of the coin is that the outflow of migrants presents both 
positive and negative aspects for departure countries. On one hand, it 
reduces the pressure on the labor market and provides remittances that could 
support productive investments.  On the other hand, it depletes the 
knowledge structure and the capabilities of the departure countries because 
migrants are always, by definition, the most dynamic element of their 
societies.  
A correct approach to economic growth and catching up suggests that 
educational policies and industrial policies can play a fundamental role. In 
order to do so educational policies must be designed and implemented in 
relations to the training needs of both departures and arrival countries, while 
industrial policies should provide a production structure capable of 
promoting economic growth and a labor demand coherent with the exits 
from the educational system. 
More specifically, at national level, education and training policies 
should: 1) in the short run, provide a correct response to the local labor 
demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products.  Moreover, the 
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educational policies of the departures countries should be coordinated also 
with the industrial policies of the arrival countries so that the structural 
excess of labor supply of departures countries will find productive 
employment or in the arrival countries or in their investment in departures 
countries.  
In order to face such complex set of task, ASEAN countries will need, 
as already clearly suggested by the last ALM Working Program, a Labor 
Market Information System providing comparable information on the main 
aspects of human resources management, from demography to education 
and vocational training, from macroeconomic to employment, 
unemployment and migration, together with a broad comparative view of 
their labor market legislation.  
Therefore, an extremely important objective of ASEAN could be the 
constitution of an ASEAN Labor Market Information System aimed to 
collects, store and analyze the data produced at the national level, better 
their quality, and promote their comparability.  
The paper proposes a second important measure that responds not 
only to principles of equity and competitiveness but could also foster 
economic growth and social development: the creation of an Employment 
Migration Fund.   
A migrant brings with him a set of capabilities that are the result not 
only of its personal investment, but also of the investment in education 
made by its country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant 
corresponds for the production system of the receiving country to the free 
acquisition of a factor of production. This is obviously true only if and when 
the migrant worker is needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have 
a substitute in the arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this 
situation will exist and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and will 
affect a number of workers largely in excess of those “forecasted” by 
international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being represented as people running away from misery and 
deprivation or just looking for higher wages and a better life. This 
perspective has brought to the proposal, almost 40 years ago, of the so-
called Bhagwati tax. 
If we abandon this point of view and more in tune with reality and 
empirical evidence we realize that many developed economies that have 
been affected already for long time by below replacement fertility do not 
have enough internally “produced” labor not only to expand, but even to 
keep the present level of production, then we have also to change our image 
of the migrants.  
The first obvious implication is that the arrival country should pay to 
the departure country for each migrant employed in a productive job a price 
proportional to the cost supported by the government of the country of 
origin for its education and training.  
The proposal is that  these contributions be collected in an  Education 
Migration Fund managed by ASEAN to be used only to improve the 
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education and training system of member countries by intervening on the 
infrastructures, training the teachers, providing equal opportunities, and 
promoting  gender equality, in coordination with the industrial and 
macroeconomic policies required to start effective catching up processes.  
This measure would not only respond to a principle of equity, 
eliminate market distortions deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries, but in the growth perspective we have 
introduced, it would also be beneficial to arrival countries by fostering the 
process of catching up of the weaker economies, increasing their level of 
income and therefore expanding the market for the products coming from 
the more developed neighbors.  
 
 
JEL Classification: F22, I25, J11, J24, 053  
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We shall work closely with workers, employers, 
civil society, and other organizations to provide a 
favorable environment for economic growth and 
employment creation, as a key strategy to 
accelerate economic recovery and growth. 
 
We shall give priority to capacity‐ building in 
order to develop a productive, competent, and 
competitive workforce. This will enable the people 
of ASEAN to meet the changing job demands and 
challenges in the face of the integration of regional 
and global labor markets. 
 
ASEAN Labor Ministers‟ Vision Statement, 2000 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 The Institutional background 
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 




Since 2000, ASEAN‟s activities on labor and human resources have 
been guided by ASEAN Labor Ministers (ALM) Work Programs. The first 
Work Program set five broad priorities in the areas of employment 
generation, labor market monitoring, labor mobility, social protection, and 
tripartite cooperation. In the ALM Joint Statement of 2006 a sixth priority 
area, namely occupational safety and health (OSH), was added to in the 
Work Program. Since then new areas of work have emerged, including 
protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, HIV prevention 
and control in the work place, employment and labor law, as expressed in 
the ASEAN community blueprints. 
A Ad-hoc Working Group on Progressive Labor Practices to Enhance 
the Competitiveness of ASEAN was established in 2006. In 2009, the 
ASEAN leaders adopted the Cha Am Hua Hin Declaration on Strengthening 
Cooperation on Education to Achieve a Caring and Sharing Community. 
The 17
th
 ASEAN summit, held in Hanoi in 2010, focused on skills 
development and life-long learning. In that occasion the Leaders of ASEAN 
adopted a Joint Statement on Human resources and Skills Development for 
Economic Recovery and Growth. 
The Joint Statement affirmed that: “HR development should be an 
integral part of a country‟s development strategy”, the rational being that 
“Human resources development correlates with productivity and higher 
productivity leads to higher economic growth.” It suggested that in the 
                                                 
1
 The paper has been written in the context of the project STVET (Strengthening Technical 
Vocational Education and Training) of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) 
financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB Grant Number: 0178-CAM) in which the author 
acted as Labor Market Information and Statistic Specialist. The views and opinions expressed in the 
paper are strictly those of the author. 
2 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint. 
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medium-and long-term regional countries should take measures, among 
others, to upgrade the quality of the workforce through improving the 
relevance and quality of education and training. It further suggested that the 
gradual shift from an export-oriented economy to a more internal 
consumption base economy that many ASEAN countries will experience 
will need a greater capacity to rapidly intervene in the development of HR. 
Finally it reminded that the social dialogue between employers and 
employees should be strengthened to better the matching between the skill 
needed by the employers and the training provided to the workers. The 
document concluded stating that the “ ... globalization, technological 
development and demographic change have added a sense of urgency to 
improving quality of HR as they change the workplace, the nature and 
organization of work.” 
According to the last ALM Work Program covering the period 2010-
2015: “ The overall objective of ASEAN cooperation on labor is to build 
towards the vision of a better quality of life, productive employment, and 
adequate social protection for ASEAN peoples through enhancing 
workforce competitiveness, creating a harmonious and progressive 
workplace, and promotion of decent work for all.” The work plan indicates 
four strategic priorities: i) Legal foundation; ii) Institutional capacity; iii) 
Social partners; iv) Labor market and workforce development. 
The first priority implies the protection of labor right and conditions, 
including those of migrant workers; the second the capacity of the 
Government bodies to oversee the enforcement of labor laws and regulation; 
the third the establishment of informed social dialogue among labor sector 
partners at the national and regional level. The fourth priority includes a set 
of goals that will be at the center of the present paper:  
1. Creating systems that will promote the mobility of skilled labor 
within ASEAN; 
2. Anticipating, analyzing, monitoring and communicating to labor 
sector stakeholders and the public the impact of trade liberalization 
and of other global economic challenges on employment, wages, 
working condition, skills demand, etc.; 
3. Promoting progressive labor practices with regard to workforce 
development, skills training and standards, labor productivity, and 
labor law in order to enhance the competitiveness of firms and 
workforces, and thus of the ASEAN Member States and the region 
overall; 
4. Generating, regularly updating, and effectively disseminating 
labor market information. 
 
 
1.2 The structure of the paper 
The paper is structured in four parts. The first part analyses the impact 
of the Demographic transition (that we will prefer to call Demographic 
revolution) on the demographic tendencies and indicators of ASEAN 
countries. It will document the fact that the members of ASEAN have 
proceeded at different speeds along the path of the Demographic revolution 
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and have reached different stages of this complex process. As a consequence, 
while some countries are already (or will be soon) characterized by a 
declining Working Age Population (WAP), in other WAP will continue to 
grow. This will create a structural lack of labor supply in some countries 
and an excess of labor supply in the others.  
In the second part of the paper a model is introduced that allows 
estimating manpower needs, migration flows, and population trends as a 
function of the evolution in WAP and alternative hypothesis on employment 
growth. The model is used to build alternative labor market and 
demographic scenarios for ASEAN arrival countries. The exercise clearly 
shows that the future economic growth of Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia will hinge on the arrival of very relevant numbers of foreign 
workers. The results are discussed on the basis of the tendencies exhibited in 
previous periods by migration flows in the Asian continent and more 
specifically in ASEAN countries and of a critical appraisal of the 
projections made by the United Nations Population Division.  
The third part of the paper discusses alternative growth theories and 
their implications in terms of industrial and educational policies. It will be 
shown that according to the New evolutionary economics, growth is lead by 
the accumulation of capabilities that allows, in a first phase, to diversify 
production inside a given knowledge cluster, and then to jump to new 
knowledge clusters, i.e. to move to higher quality products. 
The fourth part of the paper reviews the educational attainments of 
ASEAN countries. It then discusses the relationship between their education 
structure and the stage of growth they have reached and outlines their 
present options for technology and product diversification. 
The conclusion will bring together the main results reached in the four 
parts of the paper and spell out a series of policy suggestions.  
 
 
2 THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 In 1950 the total population of ASEAN countries amounted to around 
172 million; after 60 years it reached almost 593 million and by now it 
should have passed the 600 million mark
3
. The average growth of 7 million 
per year registered in this long time interval is the result of 11 million births, 
4 million deaths, and of around 150,000 net migrants per year (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
3 Percentage rates of growth above the regional average (243.7 per cent) have been registered by the 
four smallest countries (Brunei, Singapore, Laos and Malaysia), together with Philippines, that 
register an astonishing demographic growth of 407%. As a consequence, Philippines are now the 
second most populous country in ASEAN after Indonesia that remains the most populous one with 





Rather surprisingly, these long-run yearly average values are almost 
identical to those of the 2005-2010 period, the only notable difference being 
represented by the average number of net migrants that has soared to almost 




Between 1950 and 2010 the largest migration flows were originated by 
Philippines (more than 5 million), followed by Indonesia (4.6 million), Vietnam 
(3.2 million), Myanmar (1.8 million), Cambodia (0.8 million) and Laos (0.5 
million). Positive migration balances were registered by Thailand (2.6 million), 
Malaysia and Singapore, with 1.8 million each, and Brunei with 0.5 million
4
. 
Therefore, in 60 years six ASEAN countries have generated a little more than 16 
million migrants (267,000 per year); of these 6.8 million (42.6 per cent) have 
                                                 












Brunei 47 345 35 310 496 806 853
Cambodia 4,346 18,650 8,055 10,595 -803 9,792 14,138
Indonesia 74,838 271,095 101,475 169,620 -4,590 165,030 239,868
Laos 1,683 7,910 2,850 5,060 -540 4,520 6,203
Malaysia 6,112 26,105 5,670 20,435 1,855 22,290 28,402
Myanmar 17,156 58,600 25,970 32,630 -1,810 30,820 47,976
Philippines 18,395 102,395 22,400 79,995 -5,135 74,860 93,255
Singapore 1,025 3,010 815 2,195 1,865 4,060 5,085
Thailand 20,608 67,210 21,340 45,870 2,615 48,485 69,093
Vietnam 28,263 101,205 38,440 62,765 -3,170 59,595 87,858
Total 172,473 656,525 227,050 429,475 -9,218 420,258 592,731
10,942 3,784 7,158 -154 7,004
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 1 - ASEAN countries; population, births, deaths and migration balance; 













Brunei 809 40 5 35 9 44 853
Cambodia 13,358 1,605 565 1,040 -260 780 14,138
Indonesia 227,303 22,320 8,460 13,860 -1,295 12,565 239,868
Laos 5,753 720 195 525 -75 450 6,203
Malaysia 26,097 2,855 635 2,220 85 2,305 28,402
Myanmar 46,331 4,230 2,085 2,145 -500 1,645 47,976
Philippines 85,540 11,590 2,640 8,950 -1,235 7,715 93,255
Singapore 4,270 205 110 95 720 815 5,085
Thailand 66,668 4,365 2,430 1,935 490 2,425 69,093
Vietnam 83,168 7,360 2,240 5,120 -430 4,690 87,858
Total 559,297 55,290 19,365 35,925 -2,491 33,434 592,731
11,058 3,873 7,185 -498 6,687
Source - United Nations, 2011a





moved to other ASEAN countries
5
), while 9.2 million have left the ASEAN region 
(57.4 per cent).  
 
 
 Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
In the last 5 years, the yearly average number of migrants has grown 
to 759,000, 261,000 of which headed toward some ASEAN countries, while 
the other 498,000 left the region (Graph.1). The departure countries have 
remained the same, but out-migration is now very concentrated, with 
Indonesia and Philippines accounting respectively for 34.1% and 32.5% of 
the total. At the same time two countries, Singapore and Thailand, 
accounted for 92.8 per cent of the total positive migration balance.  It must 
also be underlined that the percentage of migrants that have moved within 
ASEAN has diminished from 42.7 per cent over the total period to 34.4 per 
cent in the last 5-year period. 
The demographic boom registered by all ASEAN countries has been 
the result of the so-called “demographic transition” that is also going to 
have a very strong impact on their demographic future. The demographic 
transition has been defined as the passage from a traditional demographic 
regime, characterized by high fertility and high mortality, to a modern 
demographic regime, characterized by low fertility and low mortality. The 
drop in fertility below replacement level that by now has already taken place 
in around 50 developed and developing countries puts in serious doubt that 
what we are witnessing is a transition, i.e. the passage from an equilibrium 
regime to another equilibrium regime. Therefore, from now on we will use 
the terminology demographic revolution that is much more suggestive of the 
creative demographic disorder that is presently affecting the world.  
In 1950-55, in all ASEAN countries, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) – 
that we can loosely define as the total number of children per woman- was 
well above world average (4.95) (Table 3). Only two countries, Laos and 
Indonesia, registered a TFR below 6, while in the Philippines the TFR was 
                                                 
5 In this context, it should be underlined that 62% of the extraordinary demographic growth of Brunei 
is due to immigration. 
1950 -2010 2005-2010 Diff.
Total migration flows 267 759 492
Within ASEAN 114 261 147










Graph 1 - ASEAN  countries; total migration flows by destination; 
1950-2010 and 2005-2010; yearly values; thousand 
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above 7 and in Brunei exactly 7. In the other six countries the TFR ranged 
from 6.61, registered by Singapore, and 6 registered by Myanmar. After 60 
years only Philippines and Laos register TFR above 3 and four countries 
(Myannar, Vietnam, Thailand and  Singapore) are already below 
replacement level
6
, while Indonesia and Brunei could reach this historical 
borderline during the present decade. In all these countries the TFR has 
dimished by more than 60%, with record values registered by Singapore (-




A declining trend has characterized also mortality. Life expectancy 
has increased in all ASEAN countries, the most spectacular results having 
being achieved by Vietnam and Indonesia whose life expectancy at birth has 
increased respectively by 6.8 and 5.8 months per year. The spread between 
the maximum value (80.6, Singapore) and the minimum value (61.5, 
Cambodia) remains, however, very large
7
 (Table 4).   
 
. 
                                                 
6 The replacement level is the level at which total population remains constant and is approximately 
2.1children per woman 
7 The main determinant of this large difference is represented by infant mortality.  
Table 3 - ASEAN countries; total fertility rate; 1950-55 and 2005-10
1950-55 2005-10 Abs. change % change
Philippines 7.42 3.27 4.15 55.9
Laos 5.94 3.02 2.92 49.2
Cambodia 6.29 2.80 3.49 55.5
Malaysia 6.23 2.72 3.51 56.3
Indonesia 5.49 2.19 3.30 60.1
Brunei 7.00 2.11 4.89 69.9
Myanmar 6.00 2.08 3.92 65.3
Vietnam 6.20 1.89 4.31 69.5
Thailand 6.14 1.63 4.51 73.5
Singapore 6.61 1.25 5.36 81.1








Cambodia 39.4 61.5 22.1 4.4
Myanmar 36.0 63.5 27.5 5.5
Laos 42.4 66.1 23.7 4.7
Philippines 55.4 67.8 12.4 2.5
Indonesia 38.8 67.9 29.1 5.8
Malaysia 55.4 73.4 18.0 3.6
Thailand 50.7 73.6 22.9 4.6
Vietnam 40.4 74.3 33.9 6.8
Brunei 57.7 77.5 19.8 4.0
Singapore 60.2 80.6 20.4 4.1
Max - Min -18.3 -19.1 0.8 0.2
Source - United Nations, 2011a





These data do clearly show that ASEAN countries have been moving 
along the path of the demographic revolution at different speed, due to the 
political, economic and social events that have characterized their history in 
the second half of the XX century and in the beginning of the XXI century. 
The different position of each ASEAN country along the path of the 
demographic revolution can be captured and further documented with the 
help of other demographic indicators such as the Infant mortality rate and 
the structure of population by main age group. 
The Infant mortality rate (IMR) plays a very important role in 
determining the level and the trend of life expectancy at birth (Table 5). In 
1950, the Infant mortality rate (the number of children that die before 
reaching one year of age per thousand) presented a wide range of values that 
were reflected by life expectancy data. The most dramatic situation was that 
of Myanmar, where more than one child out of 5 died before age one; 
Singapore presented the best situation, but also in Singapore 1 child out of 




In the following 60 years, all ASEAN countries have made substantial 
improvements so that the worst-case scenario registered in 2010 is similar to 
the best-case scenario in 1950. Infant mortality has been completely 
eradicated in Singapore, and values of the IMR below 10 per thousand are 
registered in Brunei and Malaysia, with Thailand at 12.4. Vietnam, 
Philippines and Indonesia present values between 20 and 30, Vietnam and 
Indonesia being between the countries that have accomplished the biggest 
improvements, and Philippines the one with the worst performance.  Laos, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia occupy the last three positions in the ranking.  
In a first phase, the demographic revolution generates waves of births 
of increasing magnitude and then waves of declining magnitude. The 
passage of time makes each cohort move orderly along the path of life, 
2010 1950 Dff.
Singapore 1.9 60.7 -58.8
Brunei 4.8 90.2 -85.4
Malaysia 7.7 96.4 -88.7
Thailand 12.4 130.3 -117.9
Vietnam 20.4 157.9 -137.5
Philippines 23.0 96.8 -73.8
Indonesia 28.8 191.9 -163.1
Laos 44.5 167.1 -122.6
Myannar 55.0 212.8 -157.8
Cambodia 62.4 165.1 -102.7
Max-Min 60.5 152.1 -91.6
Table 5 -ASEAN countries; Infant mortality 
rate; 1950 and 2010
Source - United Nations, 2011a
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determining first a huge expansion of the proportion of children and then an 
increasing proportion of people in working age.  
The different stage reached by each ASEAN countries along the path 
of the demographic revolution is therefore illustrated also by the percentage 
of young people and of WAP (Table 6). The percentage of the former is 
included between a minimum of 17.4 per cent in Singapore and a maximum 
of 35.5 per cent in the Philippines, with other three countries registering 
values above 30 per cent: Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. At the same time 
Singapore presents the highest percentage of WAP (73.6 per cent), and other 
three countries (Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei) are characterized by values 
above 70 per cent. At the opposite end of the ranking we find as expected 
the Philippines, where WAP weights only 60.9 per cent, preceded by Laos, 





3 THE EVOLUTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION  
3.1 ASEAN 
Given the scope of this paper, we will now concentrate our attention 
on the effects of the Demographic revolution on WAP that is the source of 
labor supply, a first necessary step to analyze labor mobility and the role of 
education and vocational training.  
As we have already seen, from this perspective, one of the first 
impacts of the Demographic revolution is that of provoking an extremely 
relevant increase in WAP
8
, a phenomenon that has initially characterized the 
                                                 
8 The first manifestation of the demographic transition is the reduction of the infant mortality rate that 
will then be translated into an increase in the size of the cohorts entering reproductive age, while the 
TFR is still at the traditional level. This will, in its turn, provoke a progressive increase in the number 
of yearly births, a trend that will continue also when the fertility rate will start to drop, due to the 
increasing dimension of the cohorts in reproductive age. This is the chain of events that has 
0-14 15-64 65+ 80+
Singapore 17.4 73.6 9.0 1.8
Thailand 20.5 70.6 8.9 1.7
Vietnam 23.6 70.4 6.0 1.2
Brunei 26.2 70.2 3.6 0.7
Myanmar 25.8 69.2 5.0 0.8
Indonesia 27.0 67.4 5.6 0.7
Malaysia 30.3 64.9 4.8 0.6
Cambodia 31.9 64.3 3.8 0.4
Laos 34.5 61.6 3.9 0.5
Philippines 35.5 60.9 3.6 0.4
Max - Min 18.1 12.7 5.4 1.4
Table 6 - ASEAN countries; total population; 
percentage composition by main age group; 2010
Source - author elaboration on United Nations data, 
United Nation,  2011a
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developed countries -the firsts to enter the demographic revolution in the 
XVIII and XIX century- then the developing countries from the middle of 
the XIX century, and is now starting to affect the least developed countries.  
Graph 2 shows the impact of the demographic revolution on the total 
WAP of ASEAN. Initially, the expansion in WAP has been driven by an 
extraordinary increase in generational entries
9
 that grew from an average 
yearly value of around 4 million in the fifties to record values of above 11 
million between 1995 and 2010. Generational exits have started to register 
relevant increases only at the beginning of the „90s when bigger cohorts 
have reached “retirement age”. As a consequence of these events as well of 
the migration flows we have previously documented, the WAP of ASEAN 
has increased from 100 million in 1950 to 398 million in 2010. We can, 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
At the beginning of the new century ASEAN WAP starts to exhibit 
the second effect of the demographic revolution: a progressive, but rather 
fast slowdown in its rate of growth, due mainly to the increase in 
generational exits, but also to the smaller number of young people reaching 
working age. According to the U.N. Population Division, in about 30 year, 
generational exits from WAP will begin to exceed generational entries and 
WAP will start to decline. On the basis of the hypotheses adopted by the 
Population Division for the Medium variant scenario, inclusive of the 
assumptions on migration that we will discuss in a later paragraph, ASEAN 
                                                                                                                            
determined the explosion of WAP in developed countries in the second half of the XIX century and at 
the beginning of the XX. 
9  Generational entries are equal to the number of people who become 15 in the time interval 
considered, while generational exits are equal to the number of people who become 65 in the same 













































































































































Graph 2 - ASEAN; Working age population; generational entries, generational 
exits and natural balance; 1950-55/2055-60 
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Graphs 3a and 3b present the evolution of the yearly average absolute 
change and of the yearly average rate of growth of WAP registered between 
1950 and 2010 and the values forecasted for the following 50 years.  
 
 
Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The absolute growth of ASEAN WAP did reach a maximum value of 
7.2 million in the 1995-2000 interval, and is now down to around 6 million; 
it is expected to decline to 3.5 million at the beginning of the 2020s, to 1.5 
million at the beginning of the 2030s, and to become negative in the 2040s. 
The percentage rate of growth did peak earlier, in the 1980-85 period, at 3.1 
per cent. It is now down to 1.4 per cent, and is expected to decline by 
around 60 per cent every ten years.  
These data show that the pressure to create additional jobs in order to 
accommodate the incoming generations is already declining and it will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This trend will, on one hand, 
facilitate the ongoing process of modernization, i.e. the substitution of 
employment in the agricultural sector with employment in the modern 
sectors, but on the other will make unavoidable a marked increase in the 
exchange of Labor force within ASEAN.  
 
 
3.2 The country level  
As we have already discussed, the ten countries that constitute 
ASEAN have been moving along the path of the demographic revolution at 
different speed and, therefore, they are presently located in different stages 
of this process. As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, this has very 
important implications with respect to internal and external mobility.   
WAP, net of migrations, is forecasted to continue to grow until 2060 
in only two of the ten ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Philippines. In all 
the other eight, an historical maximum will be reached at or before 2050. 
The first country whose WAP would peak in absence of migration is 
Singapore, in 2015; Thailand will follow in 2020; Myanmar, Vietnam and 
Indonesia in 2035; Brunei in 2040; Cambodia in 2045; Laos in 2050 (Table 
7).  
 
                                                 







































































































































































































































































































As a consequence, in absence of migration, these eight countries will 
register very substantial declines in WAP although over different time 
intervals, the duration of the interval obviously playing a central role in 
determining the amount of the decline. Singapore, the most advanced 
country along the demographic revolution and the first to register the 
historical peak of WAP, is forecasted to lose almost 50 per cent of its WAP, 
Thailand 27.1 per cent, Vietnam 17.3 per cent, Myanmar 10.7 per cent and 
the other countries percentages between 4 and 7 per cent (Graph 4) All 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The most suggestive aspect is, however, that from 2015 ASEAN will 
start to include an increasing number of countries that will be characterized 
by a declining WAP and others where WAP will still be growing, but at a 
diminishing pace.   
Table 7 -ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute values; 1950 -2060
Singapore Thailand Myanmar Vietnam Indonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos Malaysia Philippines ASEAN
1950 585 11,257 10,704 18,063 42,561 29 2,395 966 3,305 9,717 99,582
1960 897 14,770 11,709 19,520 51,944 43 2,980 1,174 4,167 12,985 120,189
1970 1,202 19,395 14,241 22,891 63,349 68 3,746 1,481 5,666 18,085 150,124
1980 1,647 27,045 18,301 29,361 83,461 112 3,778 1,699 7,946 25,188 198,538
1990 2,200 37,259 23,418 38,242 110,202 157 5,086 2,209 10,796 34,334 263,903
2000 2,791 43,654 28,970 49,079 137,966 218 6,893 2,873 14,715 45,079 332,238
2005 3,068 46,417 31,053 55,554 150,282 247 8,058 3,287 16,572 50,877 365,415
2010 3,742 48,786 33,206 61,842 161,699 282 9,090 3,821 18,432 56,819 397,719
2015 3,783 49,935 35,428 65,930 173,599 302 10,083 4,389 20,191 64,315 427,955
2020 3,669 50,071 36,773 68,438 184,564 320 10,892 4,872 21,799 71,721 453,119
2025 3,421 49,211 37,799 70,570 192,514 335 11,641 5,296 23,044 78,505 472,336
2030 3,176 47,794 38,519 71,714 197,661 345 12,308 5,669 24,117 85,162 486,465
2035 2,898 45,855 38,792 71,924 199,921 353 12,884 6,004 25,203 91,690 495,524
2040 2,705 43,870 38,484 70,955 199,899 355 13,339 6,272 26,191 97,971 500,041
2045 2,529 41,918 37,950 69,193 198,032 352 13,775 6,440 27,031 103,607 500,827
2050 2,356 39,966 37,063 66,263 194,648 351 13,500 6,493 27,623 108,480 496,743
2055 2,201 38,084 35,827 62,866 190,939 345 13,275 6,408 28,010 112,377 490,332
2060 1,981 36,171 34,632 59,515 186,766 339 12,876 6,212 28,207 115,439 482,138
1950-2010 3,157 37,529 22,502 43,779 119,138 253 6,695 2,855 15,127 47,102 298,137
2010 -2060 -1,761 -12,615 1,426 -2,327 25,067 57 3,786 2,391 9,775 58,620 84,419
Max - 2010 41 1,285 5,586 10,082 38,222 73 4,685 2,672 9,775 58,620 103,108
2060-Max -1,802 -13,900 -4,160 -12,409 -13,155 -16 -899 -281 9,775 58,620 -18,689



















Graph 4 -ASEAN countries; Working age population ; percentage 








Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
Graph 5 shows how the progressive reduction in ASEAN WAP 
growth and its becoming negative starting in 2040 will be brought about by 
the fact that an increasing number of countries will register a negative trend 
in their WAP. 
 
 
4 THE CAUSES OF ECONOMIC MIGRATIONS  
International migration flows are largely explained by the co-presence 
of countries characterized by a structural lack of labor supply and countries 
characterized by a structural excess of labor supply
11
, the thesis being that 
migrations are demand driven, but take place only when excess supply is 
present in other countries
12
.  
                                                 
11 For a detailed presentation of the model and an application to a series of countries and areas with 
below replacement fertility see M. Bruni, 2009; for an application to China see M. Bruni 2013 and  
2011, and M. Bruni and C. Tabacchi, 2011.  
12 According to this perspective the Migration Balance of arrival countries are determined by their 
Total Manpower Needs. As a consequence the world total migration flows are largely determined by 
the need of labor in arrival countries.  
Singapore Thailand Myanmar VietnamIndonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos MalaysiaPhilippines ASEAN
2010-2015 8 230 444 818 2,380 4 199 114 352 1,499 6,047
2015-2020 -23 27 269 502 2,193 4 162 97 322 1,481 5,033
2020-2025 -50 -172 205 426 1,590 3 150 85 249 1,357 3,843
2025-2030 -49 -283 144 229 1,029 2 133 75 215 1,331 2,826
2030-2035 -56 -388 55 42 452 2 115 67 217 1,306 1,812
2035-2040 -39 -397 -62 -194 -4 0 91 54 198 1,256 903
2040-2045 -35 -390 -107 -352 -373 -1 87 34 168 1,127 157
2045-2050 -35 -390 -177 -586 -677 0 -55 11 118 975 -817
2050-2055 -31 -376 -247 -679 -742 -1 -45 -17 77 779 -1,282
2055-2060 -44 -318 -239 -670 -835 -1 -80 -39 39 612 -1,574
Absolute yearly change 
Table 8 - ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute yearly change; 2010-2060; thousand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United Nations, 2011a
2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2025-30 2030-35 2035-40 2040-45 2045-50 2050-55 2055-60
Balance 6,047 5,033 3,843 2,826 1,812 903 157 -817 -1,282 -1,574
Pos 6,047 5,056 4,065 3,158 2,255 1,599 1,416 1,104 857 652















We will say that a country is characterized by a structural lack of labor 
supply, when a relevant share of the available jobs cannot be covered by the 
local labor supply. Analogously, we will say that a country is characterized 
by a structural excess of labor supply when a relevant and growing share of 
its labor supply cannot find employment. The countries characterized by a 
structural lack of labor supply are potential countries of arrival, while the 
countries characterized by a structural excess of labor supply are potential 
countries of departure. 
Let‟s define Total Manpower Needs as the difference between the 
increase in labor supply and the increase in labor demand, over a given time 
interval. Taking an operational perspective, the change in labor supply can 
be identified with the change in the level of the local Labor force (ΔLF) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1). The increase in labor 
demand can be identified with the change in the level of employment (ΔE) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1).  
The absolute change in the Labor force is the results of two 
components, one of demographic origin, the second connected to the 
propensity of the people in working age to participate in labor market 
activities. The former is identified in the change of the level of the Labor 
force due to the change in the level of Working age population, keeping the 
participation rate constant. Therefore, it is equal to the product between the 
change in WAP (ΔWAP)
13
 and the rate of participation (rop) at the 
beginning of the period. The latter is the result of the change in participation 
behavior taking place during the interval considered, and it is equal to the 
product between the change in the rate of participation and the level of the 
Labor force at the end of the period.  
 
1] tTMN(t+1) = tΔLF(t+1)  - tΔE(t+1) 
                                 = [(ropt * tΔWAP(t+1)) +( tΔropt+1 * LF(t+1))] -  tΔE(t+1)   
 
All three components of [1] can be positive or negative, depending on 
the trends in Employment, Labor force and Rate of participation. This 
implies that also Manpower Needs can be positive or negative.  
A negative value of TMN implies that the growth in labor supply has 
been (or is forecasted to be) smaller than the growth in employment. As we 
have already stated, a negative difference between the change in labor 
supply and labor demand identifies a situation of structural lack of labor 
supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting phenomenon. In a first phase the 
difference can be, at least partially, satisfied by the unemployed, by an 
increase in Labor force participation, especially women, by internal 
migrations from more underdeveloped internal areas. Sooner or later, these 
additional sources of labor supply will necessarily be exhausted and 
international migrations will represent the only possible solution. 
By converse, a positive value does imply that the country is 
accumulating an excess of labor supply that cannot be satisfied by local 
                                                 
13 What we will consider is in fact the natural balance of WAP, which is equal to the difference 






. As in the previous case, this situation can be identified as 
Structural excess of labor supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting 
phenomenon. In this case, the situation initially can be dealt with by an 
expansion of the informal economy, a widening of the average dimension of 
the family and by a reduction in the participation rate, especially of women. 
However, in the long run, only massive migration flows can solve the 
problem. In their absence, a growing number of young people will find 
themselves without any perspective for the future, and could be willing to 
do anything because a life without job is also a life without value. Also in 
this case, in the long run only migration can provide a solution to the 
problem  
A few final considerations are needed. In the first place what we are 
considering are the very special situations that have been created, are 
created and will inevitably be created by the demographic revolution. They 
are characterized by changes in the level of WAP of such a dimension that 
cannot be dealt with, on one hand, by wage adjustments or increases in 
productivity and, on the other, by high rates of growth of employment.  
The declines in WAP brought about by the demographic revolution 
have often such a dimension and will span over such a long period that it is 
totally unrealistic to assume that labor productivity could grow enough to 
both offset the decline in labor supply and allow production to grow. Let‟s 
for instance consider the case of Japan. According to the Population 
Division medium variant scenario, between 2010 and 2060, the WAP (15-
64) of Japan is expected to decline by 34.8 per cent, from 81 to 53 million. 
The direct implication is that in order to avoid more immigrants than the 2.8 
million hypothesized by the UNPD, labor productivity should increase by 
34.8 percentage points more
15
 than the percentage growth in production
16
.  
Given that the increase in labor productivity does not represent a 
viable alternative to migration, do other alternatives exist? The only 
economically viable alternative is to move production abroad. However it 
has been rightly observed: “As its economy matured and its population aged, 
a country could safely become a rentier state, boosting its economic product, 
and in particular paying its pensions, with the income from its international 
investments. The more youthful countries on the receiving end would no 
doubt prefer the inflow of capital to an outflow of labor. In the world as it is, 
however, that may be a less prudent portfolio diversification by an ageing 
society of retirees than an hostage to fortune.”
17
 In practice, the 
delocalization of production is a viable economic solution, but it presents 
risks that a country could not be willing to take. 
                                                 
14 It should be obvious that in all the countries that find themselves in this situation the real wage 
already at or below the subsistence level cannot be an answer to the problem.  
15 In the last 50 years production has increased more than productivity in all industrialized countries 
as shown by the fact that in the long run employment has increased in all of them, declining only in 
periods of heavy restructuring of the production structure or of economic crisis.  It must also be 
recalled that the larger the service sector the more difficult is to achieve high rate of growth of 
productivity or, stated in another way, the employment-income elasticity tends to be low in post 
industrial economies.  
16 This is implicit in the fact that the growth in employment is identically equal to the difference 
between the rate of growth in production an the rate of growth in productivity.  
17 McNicoll, D. 2000 
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The situation of excess labor supply generated by the Demographic 
revolution normally takes place in countries still largely dominated by the 
agricultural sector and in which the process of modernization requires not 
only the expansion in the employment level of Industry and Services, but 
also a growth in the employment level of these two sectors sufficient to 
replace non productive jobs in agriculture. Initially, the most probable 
outcome is that agriculture absorbs the excess of labor supply determining 
the situation described in Lewis seminal article in which the real wage is at 
subsistence level. However, with time large migration flows could be the 
only available mean to avoid the spread of poverty and income inequality.  
The last point we have to consider is the relationship between 
Manpower needs and migration flows.  In general we can say that the level 
of migration is positively related to manpower needs: 
 
2] Migr = B TMN 
 
where B is equal to or greater than 1. At the beginning of any economic emigration 
process, only workers will move to the destination country. With time, they will be 
eventually reached by some members of the family. Therefore, at the initial stage B 
is equal to 1 and will then progressively increase. Previous analyses have shown 





5 ASEAN MIGRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
ASEAN includes countries like Philippines and Indonesia whose 
workers are migrating not only within ASEAN and to other Asian countries, 
but also to Europe, America and Australia, while Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia are becoming prominent arrival countries. To provide some more 
solid reference points to the forecasting exercise we are going to present in 
the following paragraphs, we deem relevant to present a concise overview of 
the tendencies in international migrations and project the migratory behavior 
of ASEAN countries against the general background of the Asian continent.  
Between 1950 and 2010, international migration flows have been 
characterized by three main trends: i) a substantial increase in the total level; 
ii) a notable increase in the percentage of intercontinental flows; iii) very 
relevant changes in the structures of both arrival and departures flows by 
area and continent.  
Between 1950-55 and 1990-95 international migration flows have 
increased almost fourfold, from 6 to 28.6 million, a value that still marks the 
historical maximum. After a small contraction registered in the last five 
years of the century, between 2000 and 2010, around 54 million people have 
left their native countries, bringing the total number of world migrants in the 
last sixty years above the 200 million mark (Table A1).  
Between 1950 and 1960, intercontinental migration flows represented 
48 per cent of total international migration flows (6.7 million out of 14 
million); between 2000 and 2010 the percentage has increased to 62 per cent 
(34 out of 54 million) (Table A1).  
                                                 
18 M. Bruni,  2009 
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In the former period, intercontinental migration flows were generated, 
in order of importance, by Europe, Africa and South America, while the 
main areas of arrival were the New World Countries (NWC: USA, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand) and Asia. In the latter period, departures were 
generated mostly by Asia, Central and South America, and Africa, while the 
main areas of arrival were Europe, NWC and Gulf Countries (GC). 
Therefore, in only sixty years, Europe has become the main area of arrival, 
while Asia has become the world major supplier of labor. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the NWC were the main pole of attraction of 
international migration flows. They received around half a million migrants 
per year, i.e. 36.4 per cent of total migration flows. Western Europe (with 
France and Germany, but also Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden) was the 
second pole of attraction. Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela represented the 
third pole of attraction (Table A2).  
Fifty years later the situation has radically changed. As we have 
already seen, Europe has become the main port of arrival, while the 
Countries of the Gulf have become the third largest pole of attraction after 
the NWC. Eastern, Central and especially Southern Asia, Central and 
Southern America, Northern, Eastern and Western Africa are now the areas 
that provide labor to the rest of the world. More specifically, on one hand: 
 Europe has received 20.1 million migrants 19; 
 Arrivals in the NWC have been in excess of 15 million; 72.8 per 
cent have chosen the US, 11.7 per cent Australia, 4.3 per cent 
Canada and 1.3 per cent New Zealand;  
 The GCs have attracted 8.7 million immigrants, 3.9 million of 
which went to the Arab Emirates and 2.8 million to Saudi Arabia.  
On the other hand, both Latin America and Africa had negative 
migration balances of respectively 11.2 million
20
 and 6.3 million
21
. 
Beside the six Gulf countries, other 15 Asian countries have registered 
positive migration balances so that the total number of arrivals has exceeded 
14 million, while 27 countries have been affected by negative migration 
balances for a total amount of 30.6 million. Therefore, the continental 
migration balance has been negative and equal to around 16 million (Table 
A3).  
After the two largest gulf countries (Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), 
the main arrival country has been Thailand, followed by Qatar and 
Singapore. The list of Asian arrival countries includes other 5 countries in 
                                                 
19 Of the 40 European countries 27 are arrival countries and 13 departure countries. The main arrival 
countries have been, in order of relevance, Spain, Italy, the Russian Federation, and the United 
Kingdom, followed by the more traditional arrival countries such as France and Germany, together 
with Sweden, Belgium and Austria. Exits from the departures countries have been only 1.8 million.  
20  Between 2000 and 2010 only 8 Latin America countries have registered a positive migration 
balance, and for a very modest total value of 0.4 million. Negative migration balances, for a total 
value of 11,6 million, have been registered by the other 28 countries. Mexico with 4.4 million (37.9 
per cent of the total) leads the ranking followed by Peru, Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
21 In Africa 16 countries have registered positive migration balances for a total value of almost 4 
million; 36 have registered negative migration balances summing to more than 10 million. South 
Africa (1.6 million) has been the most important arrival country followed by Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, both accounting for more than half a million immigrants. The ranking of arrival countries is 
lead by Zimbabwe, followed by Morocco, Ivory Cost, Guinea and Egypt.   
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Eastern Asia, (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon), but also 
Afghanistan and Bhutan, Hong Kong and Macao, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Japan. If the main country of departure has been India -that has generated 
almost half a million migrants per year- other 5 countries have registered 
more or about 250,000 departures per year: Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Philippines. These six countries are between the seven most 
important departure countries, the other being Mexico, that ranks second 
after India (Table A2).  
In conclusion, of the 21 Asian arrival countries, 4 are ASEAN 
countries, Thailand and Singapore being respectively the third and fifth 
more relevant arrival countries in Asia. At the same time, other two ASEAN 
countries, Philippines and Indonesia, are fifth and sixth in the Asian ranking 





6 LABOR MARKET AND DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS  
We will now propose some Manpower Needs and Migration scenarios 
for the three ASEAN countries that have registered the largest positive 
migration balances during the 2005-2010 period: Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia
23
. The scenarios have been constructed on the basis of the model 
we have previously introduced.  
The scenarios are relevant not only because Singapore and Thailand 
are the two ASEAN countries that have reached the most advanced stage of 
the demographic revolution, but because they will be the firsts to register a 
negative natural balance of WAP (15-64) that will then progressively 
increase in absolute value. Malaysia, while having progressed a lot in terms 
of life expectancy and infant mortality is still characterized by a rather high 
TFR and, according to the Population Division, its TFR is expected to 
decline at much lower speed than those of the other ASEAN countries. 
However, as we have already seen, Malaysia has already been receiving a 
relevant, although smaller than in the past, number of migrants.  
 
 
6.1 Main tendencies of the labor market in Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia  
Between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered notable percentage increases in the level of employment (Table 9), 
the record value (34.4 per cent) being that of Singapore, followed by 
Malaysia (10.8 per cent), and Thailand (7.9 per cent). Despite the positive 
migration flows registered during the same period, in Singapore and 
Thailand the Labor force has grown less than employment. Therefore, both 
countries have registered a decline in the level of unemployment, and 
obviously an even more pronounced decline in the rate of unemployment. In 
Malaysia, Labor force has increased slightly more than employment, but the 
unemployment rate has declined. Taken together, the 3 countries have 
                                                 
22  The average yearly values have been: 144,000 (Singapore), 98,000 (Thailand) and 17,000 
(Malaysia).  
23 The other country to register a positive migration balance has been Brunei. 
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generated, over the five-year period, 4.6 million jobs, equal to a percentage 




As we have already seen, according to the United Nation Population 
Division, between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered net migration balances of respectively 720,000, 490,000 and 
85,000 people, for a grand total of 1,295,000, a value that, as we will see 
later, does probably largely underestimate the real value. It is therefore 
evident that without migrants the growth in labor supply would have been 
insufficient to face the growth in labor demand: in Singapore migrants have 
covered almost the total increase in labor demand (95.2 per cent), in 
Thailand 17.6 per cent and in Malaysia around 11 per cent. Therefore, 
migrants have covered 30 per cent of the 4.6 million total increase in 
employment registered by the three countries taken together.  
 
 
6.2 Hypothesis and computational procedures  
In order to provide some indications on the probable trends in the 
number and typology of migrants that will be needed by Singapore, 
Thailand and Malaysia in the next 25 years, we have proceeded to build for 
each countries labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-
35, articulated on five-year periods. As indicated in a previous paragraph, 
the future level of the Migration balance of these three countries will depend 
mainly on their Manpower needs that, in their turn, will be the result of the 
trends in labor supply and labor demand.  
We recall, first of all, that our scenarios will be based on population, 
employment and labor force 15 years and older. This choice has been 
imposed by the fact that all three countries are characterized by a large labor 
market participation of people above 64 years of age, and by the 
consideration that this segment of potential supply is going to increase 
enormously in the next 25 years, as shown in table 10.  
Due to its high TFR Malaysia has remained the youngest of the three 
countries we are considering with a percentage of elderly of only 4.8 per 
Table 9 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; main labour market variables and indicators; 2005 ad 2010
2005 2010 Abs. change % change 2005 2010 Abs. change % change 
Employment 2,267 3,047 781 34.4 35,257 38,037 2780 7.9
Unemployment 101 89 -12 -11.6 663 402 -261 -39.3
Labour force 2,367 3,136 769 32.5 35,920 38,440 2519 7.0
WAP (65 +) 3,376 4,198 822 24.4 48,942 52,856 3914 8.0
roa 70.1 74.7 4.6 6.5 73.4 72.7 -0.7 -0.9
roe 67.1 72.6 5.4 8.1 72.0 72.0 -0.1 -0.1
rou 4.2 2.8 -1.4 -33.3 1.8 1.0 -0.8 -43.3
Employment 10,045 11,129 1084 10.8 47,569 52,214 4645 9.8
Unemployment 368 388 20 5.4 1,132 879 -253 -22.3
Labour force 10,414 11,517 1104 10.6 48,701 53,093 4392 9.0
WAP (65 +) 16,451 18,369 1918 11.7 68,769 75,423 6654 9.7
roa 63.3 62.7 -0.6 -0.9 70.8 70.4 -0.4 -0.6
roe 61.1 60.6 -0.5 -0.8 69.2 69.2 0.1 0.1
rou 3.5 3.4 -0.2 -4.7 2.3 1.7 -0.7 -28.8





cent versus values of 8.9 and 8.7 per cent in Singapore and Thailand. 
According to the Medium variant projection of the Population Division, in 
the next 25 years, the percentage of elderly will reach 14.5 per cent in 




Coming now to our computations, the absolute change in labor supply 
for each of the five year period from 2010-2035 has been estimated by i) 
computing the absolute change in WAP for each period and ii) multiplying 
it by the 2010 rate of participation. We must point out that: 
 We have considered only one demographic scenario based on the 
Medium variant projection of the Population Division, the reason 
being that the other scenarios do not present notable differences 
since: i) the people who will enter WAP in the next fifteen years are 
already born; ii) those that will enter WAP in the following 10 years 
are those that will be born in the next 8 years and no dramatic 
changes in the TFR are at present foreseeable; iii) all the UN 
scenarios adopt the same hypotheses on mortality.  
 According to the previous model, another element that affects the 
trend in the level of labor supply is the rate of participation, or more 
specifically its changes over time. As we have already suggested, 
Singapore and Thailand boost extremely high participation rates 
(74.7 and 72.7 per cent) that have been increasing under the pressure 
of and expanding demand. In Malaysia the rate of participation is 
about ten points lower (62.7 per cent) due to the limited presence of 
women in the labor market. Are these national rates going to 
converge? Up to now, in developed countries the process of 
modernization has brought strong reduction in the labor market 
presence of the elderly; however, it is already evident that the 
lengthening of the training phase, the ageing process together with 
the improvement in health conditions and the restriction in the 
welfare system imposed by much tighter economic situations are 
going to push in the opposite direction and keep older people in the 
labor market longer than at present. This would seem to suggest that 
in Singapore and Thailand opposite forces could maintain the rate of 
participation at around the present value. In Malaysia the situation 
presents an additional factor, the behavior of the cohorts of young 
girls entering the labor market in the next years. If it is possible that 
Abs. value % Abs. value % Abs. value %
2010 454 8.9 6,002 8.7 1,368 4.8
2035 1,634 26.9 14,284 19.6 4,461 14.5
Diff. 1,180 17.9 8,282 10.9 3,093 9.7
Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United 
Nations, 2011a




the rate of participation of the next cohorts will be higher than that of 
the previous generations, their contribution to labor market 
participation could be countered by the fact that both boys and girls 
will tend to remain longer in the training phase of life. In conclusion, 
due to the lack of strong evidences in one direction or on the other 
we have assumed a constant rate of participation.  
For Thailand and Malaysia, the absolute change in labor demand has 
been computed on the basis of two alternative hypotheses: i) a constant rate 
of growth equal to the one registered between 2005 and 2010 (scenario A); 
ii) a constant employment growth equal to the absolute growth registered in 
the same period (Scenario B). In scenario A the absolute change in 
employment increases progressively, in scenario B the percentage rate of 
growth declines progressively. In substance, the first scenario is more 
optimistic, but probably less realistic.  
In Thailand, in Scenario A, employment increases of around 17.5 
million (46.2 per cent) over 25 years, while in Scenario B employment 
grows by little less than 14 million (36.5 per cent) (Table A4). In Malaysia, 
in Scenario A, employment grows by 7.5 million (66.9 per cent), in 
Scenario B by 5.4 million (48.7 per cent) (Table A8). 
In the case of Singapore the construction of the scenario had to 
acknowledge the fact that between 2005 and 2010 employment has grown 
by an astounding 34.4 per cent. The adoption of such a rate would produce 
what appears as a totally unrealistic growth in employment (from a little 
more than 3 million in 2010 to around 11.5 million in 2035). For Scenario A 
we have therefore assumed a constant average growth rate equal to half that 
registered between 2000 and 2010. Such a rate, 22.5 per cent, is still more 
than the double of that adopted for Malaysia (10.8 per cent) and that adopted 
for Thailand (7.9 per cent). With this assumption Employment grows to 
around 8.5 million, i.e. 179 per cent. 
In analogy with what was done for Thailand and Malaysia, Scenario B 
assumes a growth in the level of employment equal to that registered 
between 2005 and 2010 (781,000). In this scenario the rate of growth 
progressively declines from an initial value of 25.6 per cent during the first 
five-year period, to 12.7 per cent between 2030 and 2035 and total 
employment increases from 3 to almost 7 million.   
Since in the long run both scenarios could be too optimistic, a third 
Scenario (Scenario C) is proposed. In this scenario the initial growth rate of 
employment, taken equal to the one used in Scenario A, is progressively 
halved down to a value of 1.4 per cent in the last five-year period. In this 
Scenario the growth in employment is obviously much more limited and 
equal to 1.5 million over the entire period, a value which however 
corresponds to a 51 per cent increase over the 2010 value.  
The following step has been that of comparing the increase in supply 
with the increase in labor demand proposed by each scenario in order to 
estimate whether and how much of the additional labor demand can be 





6.3 Manpower Needs 
The results of the exercise are summarized in table 11 that presents the 
Total Manpower Needs that Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia will have to 
face in the next 25 years in the two scenarios we have previously described. 
The detailed analysis is presented in the Statistical Annex (Table A4 for 
Thailand, Table A6 for Singapore, and Table A8 for Malaysia).  
Let‟s observe first of all that in both Singapore and Thailand the 
absolute changes in labor supply will progressively decrease to become 
negative in the 2030-35 period. The situation is totally different in Malaysia 
where the absolute change in Labor force will peak around 2020 and will 






                                                 
24 If we had used WAP (15-64) the change of sign in Singapore and Thailand would have taken place 
in the 2015-20 period. The difference we register is due to the ageing process we have previously 
discussed. 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2005-2010 -720 -490 -85 -1,295
2010-2015 -535 -1,452 43 -1,944
2015-2020 -768 -2,043 -68 -2,879
2020-2025 -1,026 -2,775 -358 -4,159
2025-2030 -1,272 -3,444 -559 -5,275
2030-2035 -1,587 -4,138 -788 -6,512
Total -5,188 -13,851 -1,730 -20,769
Yearly average values -208 -554 -69 -831
% distribution 25.0 66.7 8.3 100.0
2010-2015 -623 -1,233 160 -1,695
2015-2020 -698 -1,588 178 -2,108
2020-2025 -763 -2,064 32 -2,795
2025-2030 -772 -2,457 -10 -3,239
2030-2035 -795 -2,854 -62 -3,712
Total -3,652 -10,196 298 -13,549
Yearly average values -146 -408 12 -542
% distribution 26.9 75.3 -2.2 100.0
Sources - National data from various sources
Scenario A: Constant rate of employment  growth
Scenario B: Constant  employ.  growth






The growth in employment hypothesized in scenario A provokes very 
large and increasing Manpower needs that sum up to almost 21 million over 
the 2010-2035 period. Sixty seven per cent would be originated by Thailand 
(13.9 million), 25 per cent by Singapore (5.2 million), and 8.3 per cent by 
Malaysia (1.7 million). In Singapore the ratio between Manpower needs (in 
absolute value) and changes in employment surges from 77.2 per cent in 
2010-15 to 90.3 per cent in 2015-20, to then progressively increase to a 
value of 101 per cent in 2030-35 (Graph 6). In Thailand this ratio is always 
smaller than in Singapore until the end of the 2020s, but then leaps to 101.8 
in the 2030-35 period. As we have already underlined, in Malaysia the 
growth in labor supply will be relatively much more pronounced since the 
drop in fertility has been more limited than in Singapore and Thailand. As a 
consequence, the local Labor force should be more than sufficient to cover 
the additional jobs created in the 2010-15 period. Manpower needs become 
negative in the following interval and will then progressively increase to 
represent 43.5 per cent of additional employment in 2030-35.  
Scenario B (that assume a constant growth in the level of employment 
and therefore a declining rate of growth) generates a lower amount of 
Manpower needs (13.5 million) and some other qualitative differences. The 
distribution of Manpower needs between the three countries is more skewed, 
with Thailand accounting for 75.3 per cent, Singapore for 26.9 per cent and 




In the case of Thailand the results of Scenario B are very similar to 
those of Scenario A, the percentage of manpower needs with respect to 
labor demand progressively increasing to reach a value above 100 in 2035. 
In the case of Malaysia local labor supply appears to be sufficient to face the 
growth in employment outlined in Scenario B until 2030. Finally, in 
Singapore manpower needs represent around 95 per cent of the increase in 











Singapore 77.2 90.3 98.4 99.3 101.0
Thailand 48.4 63.1 79.5 91.4 101.8









Graph 6 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
A; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
31 
 




Source: Author elaboration on National data  
 
In Singapore, scenario C produces a much more conservative forecast 
of Manpower needs that would be equal to only around 1.3 million for the 
entire period. Moreover, they would be decreasing through time in parallel 
with the rate of growth in employment. Also in this case, however, 
manpower needs will end up being in excess of the increase in employment 
in the 2030-35 time-interval.  
  
 
6.4 A clarification of the previous results from a flow perspective  
Before summarizing the conclusion suggested by the previous analysis, 
it is important to clarify the exact meaning of the percentages of Manpower 
needs we have just presented and more specifically why this percentage can 
exceed 100 per cent and what does it mean. In order to do so we have to 
move from a stock to a flow representation of the labor market. This 
clarification provides some relevant inputs also for the analysis of the 
relationship between education and vocational training, on one hand, and 
economic growth and development, on the other.  
The increase in employment represents just one part of the number of 
“new” young people that are needed in any given interval by the labor 
market, the total number being equal to the sum of i) the people needed to 
substitute the employed that have definitely left the Labor force for one of 
the following three reasons: retirement, death, and migration, and ii) the 
people needed to cover the additional jobs created by the market as a 
consequence of the increase in production. In other terms, the Labor demand 
in terms of flows (LDF) (which is measured by generational entries, i.e. first 











Singapore 95.2 79.8 89.5 97.8 98.9
Thailand 44.3 57.1 74.2 88.4 102.7










 Graph 7 -Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
B; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
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(RD) (that is measured by the number of people needed to substitute 
definitive exits from employment) and Additional demand (AD) (measured 
by the people needed to cover the Additional jobs created in the interval).  
  
3] LDF = RD + AD 
 
In substance, the ratio between Manpower needs and increase in 
employment tells us which quota of Additional demand cannot be covered 
by the local labor supply in terms of flows, i.e. by the people that have 
entered the labor market for the first time during the interval we are 
considering.   
To exemplify the previous statements, let‟s consider Singapore in 
Scenario A. As we have already seen, in the 2010-15 period manpower 
needs represent 77.2 per cent of the increase in the level of employment. 
This means that the local labor supply in terms of flow is sufficient i) to 
fully replace definitive exits from the market (RD), and ii) to satisfy 22.8 
per cent of the Additional demand. When we reach the 2030-35 interval, the 
ratio between the manpower needs and the growth in employment is equal 
to 101 per cent. In substance, at that time the local labor supply will not be 
sufficient even to fully cover Replacement demand.  
 
 
7 MANPOWER NEEDS AND MIGRATION FLOWS  
7.1 The stock of migrants in ASEAN countries  
The presence of a structural need of migrants is by now extremely 
evident in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei. Table 12 reports the 
data on the stock of migrants present in ASEAN countries according to the 






Malaysia 2,358 35.2 82.0 45.2
Singapore 1,967 29.4 83.4 56.0
Thailand 1,157 17.3 81.9 48.4
Philippines 435 6.5 57.1 51.1
Cambodia 336 5.0 62.9 51.7
Brunei 148 2.2 84.7 45.5
Indonesia 123 1.8 78.3 44.5
Myanmar 89 1.3 75.8 48.7
Viet Nam 69 1.0 72.1 36.6
Laos 19 0.3 72.0 48.0
Total 6,701 100.0 79.6 49.6
Table 12 - ASEAN countries; stock of migrants, 














According to this source, of the 6.7 million migrants present in 
ASEAN 84 per cent are in the four arrival countries and, more specifically, 
35.2 per cent in Malaysia, 29.4 per cent in Singapore, 17.3 per cent in 
Thailand and 2.2 per cent in Brunei. Since these migrations have been 
determined by economic reasons, the four countries are also characterized 
by the highest percentages (all well above 80 per cent) of migrants in 
working age. In Brunei and Singapore migrants (or more specifically 
foreign citizens in Brunei and foreign born population in Singapore) 
represent almost 50 per cent of the population in the 20-64 age group, the 
value for Malaysia being 11.2 per cent, while according to the same source 
in Thailand the foreign born population in this age group represent only 2 
per cent of the total (Graph. 8). It is also interesting to observe that Brunei 
has the highest incidence of foreign elderly (a fact that signal that 
immigration in this country is a old phenomenon), while Singapore has the 
highest percentage of children showing that recent immigration is made up 
mainly of young people in reproductive age.   
 As a matter of fact available information suggests that while estimates 
for Singapore are sufficiently correct, the data for Thailand and Malaysia 
largely underestimate the number of migrants.  
 
 
Source – our elaboration on Population Division 2011b 
 
According to the 2011 Thailand Migration Report
25
, the foreign 
population working and residing in Thailand is in excess of 3.5 million, 
three times as much as the Population Division estimate
26
. This would bring 
                                                 
25 “There are more than 3.5 million persons without Thai nationality living in the country, including 
many long-term residents and children of migrants born in Thailand. More than 3.0 million of them 
are working in the country; ”Jerrold W. Huguet and Aphichat Chamratrithirong (eds), 2011; p. XII  
26 According to the Report: “In recent decades Thailand has evolved into a regional migration hub in 
South-East Asia, and is concurrently a country of origin, transit and destination for large numbers of 
both regular and irregular international migrants. With a dynamic economy, there is also a great deal 
0-19 20-64 65+
Brunei Darussalam 15.9 48.3 32.1
Singapore 29.0 47.3 24.0
Malaysia 3.9 11.2 12.5








Graph 8 - Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 




the percentage of the foreign population to around 4 per cent. More 
specifically, according to the Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI), there are a 
total of 2.46 million low-skilled migrants from the three neighboring 
countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos). According to the same source, 
some two million migrants are currently enrolled at some stage of the 
country's complex registration process for migrant workers and an estimated 
one million migrants and family members are unregistered. Women account 
for around 45 per cent and children for 11 per cent of the migrant population. 
For what relates to Malaysia the figure presented above refers to legal 
immigrants. There is however a general consensus that at present Malaysia 
hosts around two million migrants that should be legalized by an ongoing 
procedure that started in July 2011. Also in this case the number of migrants 
would then double with respect to the official figures.   
 
 
7.2 The migration scenarios 
The previous data provide the necessary background for an evaluation 
of the migration scenarios. As we have already suggested, the number of 
migrants that a country receives does depend not only on the number of jobs 
that cannot be covered by the local Labor force, but also on the number of 
dependents that will accompany, or join in a second moment, the workers. 
We can, at one extreme, imagine that the number of migrants will be exactly 
equal to the amount of workers needed by the arrival country. This situation 
characterizes the initial phase of the immigration process and also 
subsequent phases if the migration quotas set by the arrival country are not 
coherent with labor markets needs and, therefore, a very large number of 
arrivals takes place in risky, illegal situations. Subsequently, when more 
proper quotas are decided or workers start to be legalized and the possibility 
of family reunion allowed by the local legislation, the number of dependants 
tends to increase. It has been estimated that at present in developed 
countries we can expect 1.5 arrivals
27
 for each job position that needs to be 
covered by an immigrant worker.  
Since Southeast Asia countries can be considered in the initial phase 
of the migration process, the number of immigrants has been computed, 
both for Scenario A and B, on three alternative hypothesis:  
i) B=1  
ii) B=1.15      
iii) B=1.3 
Considering the six cases reported in table 13, the number of 
immigrants will range: 
 In Singapore, from 3.6 million (B1) to 6.7 million (A3) 
 In Thailand, from 10.2 million (B1) to 18 million (A3) 
 In Malaysia, from a slightly negative value with positive inflows 
starting in 2025 (B1) to 2.2 million (A3)  
                                                                                                                            
of internal migration, including circular and seasonal migration. However, the highly dynamic nature 
of migration trends and patterns in Thailand makes the timely formation of comprehensive and 
coherent migration policies very challenging.” 






The net inflow in the three countries over the next 25 years is 
therefore forecasted between 13.5 (B1) and 27 million (A3). Since at this 
point of the game, the supply of local labor cannot be manipulated by state 
intervention and our Labor force forecast has been designed in such a way 
to represent an over-estimate, the amount of immigrants will depend on two 
variables: the development path chosen by each country and the growth in 
employment that will be generated.  
We can, moreover, observe that the amount of immigrants we are 
forecasting is basically on line with what has happened in the last 25 years 
once we take into consideration that local WAP was expanding at that time, 
while in the next 25 it will decline.  
It could be objected that the most important international Institution 
that provides demographic forecasts, the Population Division, has published 
much lower migration estimates. These data that we have reported in Table 




We observe, first of all that the Migration balance for ASEAN as a 
whole, with respect to the 2010-2035 period, is slightly higher in absolute 
value than that registered between 1985 and 2010 (-7.6 million versus -7.4 
million), but the overall mobility is forecasted to decline as a result of a 
sharp contraction of both the inflows in arrival countries and the outflows 
from departures countries. The firsts decline from 4.8 million to 3 million, 
the seconds from 12.2 to 10.7 million. More specifically for what relates to 
arrival countries, inflows are expected to decline in Malaysia (-1.3 million) 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2010-15 535 1,452 -43 1,944 615 1,670 -50 2,235 696 1,888 -56 2,527
2015-20 768 2,043 68 2,879 883 2,350 78 3,311 998 2,656 89 3,743
2020-25 1,026 2,775 358 4,159 1,180 3,191 412 4,783 1,334 3,607 466 5,407
2025-30 1,272 3,444 559 5,275 1,462 3,960 643 6,066 1,653 4,477 727 6,857
2030-35 1,587 4,138 788 6,512 1,825 4,758 906 7,489 2,063 5,379 1,024 8,466
Total 5,188 13,851 1,730 20,769 5,966 15,929 1,990 23,885 6,744 18,007 2,249 27,000
2010-15 743 1,233 -160 1,815 855 1,418 -184 2,088 966 1,603 -209 2,360
2015-20 623 1,588 -178 2,032 716 1,826 -205 2,337 810 2,064 -232 2,642
2020-25 698 2,064 -32 2,730 803 2,373 -37 3,140 908 2,683 -41 3,549
2025-30 763 2,457 10 3,231 878 2,826 12 3,715 992 3,195 13 4,200
2030-35 772 2,854 62 3,688 887 3,283 72 4,242 1,003 3,711 81 4,795
Total 3,599 10,196 -298 13,497 4,139 11,726 -343 15,522 4,679 13,255 -388 17,546
Source - Author elaboration on National data 
Table 13 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; number of migrants (thousand) in alternative scenarios of manpower needs and 






Arrival countr. Depat. countr. Balance 
1985-90 460 505 120 5 -265 -300 -330 -135 0 150 1,090 -880 210
1990-95 320 -1,110 230 5 -720 -695 -315 -125 -30 155 -555 -1,730 -2,285
1995-00 420 595 255 5 -775 -775 -285 5 -85 95 1,275 -1,820 -545
2000-05 395 1,105 230 5 -1,185 -1,130 -430 -1,000 -115 -120 1,735 -3,980 -2,245
2005-10 85 490 720 5 -1,295 -1,235 -430 -500 -75 -255 1,300 -3,790 -2,490
1985-2010 1,680 1,585 1,555 25 -4,240 -4,135 -1,790 -1,755 -305 25 4,845 -12,200 -7,355
2010-15 85 395 175 5 -1,005 -1,000 -210 -100 -75 -130 660 -2,520 -1,860
2015-20 85 390 125 5 -950 -940 -200 -50 -75 -65 605 -2,280 -1,675
2020-25 85 385 125 5 -895 -890 -200 -50 -75 -35 600 -2,145 -1,545
2025-30 85 385 120 5 -805 -800 -200 -50 -75 -10 595 -1,940 -1,345
2030-35 85 380 120 5 -720 -720 -200 -50 -75 -10 590 -1,775 -1,185
2010-2035 425 1,935 665 25 -4,375 -4,350 -1,010 -300 -375 -250 3,050 -10,660 -7,610
Diff. -1,255 350 -890 0 -135 -215 780 1,455 -70 -275 -1,795 1,540 -255
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 14 -ASEAN countries; number of migrants 1985-2010 and estimates 2010-35,  medium variant scenario of the Population Division; thousand; 1985-2035
Laos Malaysia Philippines Brunei
ASEAN 
Singapore Thailand  MyanmarVietnamIndonesia Cambodia
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and Singapore (-0.9 million), and to increase, although very marginally, in 
Thailand (+350,000). Outflows are expected to decline in all departure 
countries, but Vietnam.  
In order to understand these data, we must keep in mind that they are 
not a forecasts based on a model or an extrapolation of past values, but a 
hypothesis (an educated guess) made on the basis of two considerations:  1) 
past international migration estimates, and 2) consideration of the policy 
stance of each country with regard to future international migration flows. It 
is also evident that in the case of Singapore and Malaysia the policy stands 




7.3 The impact of migration on total population    
We have just seen that, over the next 25 years, the Population Division 
forecasts the arrival of 3 million migrants in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia 
and Brunei, while our scenarios suggest that the value will be between 13 
and 27 million, depending on the rate of employment growth. As a 
consequence, we also forecast very different demographic trends 
It has been stated (and the demographic scenarios proposed by the 
Population Division endorse this statement as shown in Table 15) that the 
drop in fertility below replacement level that is affecting an increasing 
number of developed and developing countries will produce a decline in 
Total population, an even more pronounced decline in Working Age 
Population and progressive ageing phenomena that will seriously threaten 
the sustainability of the present level of production and of the welfare 




This does necessarily happen in a closed population or in a situation in 
which the migration balance is not assumed (or allowed) to cover the 
manpower needs created by the contraction in labor supply and the 
expansion in demand generated by economic growth.    
The demographic forecasts for Singapore and Thailand, whose 
fertility is already below replacement level, are in line with this position. 
 0-14  15-64 65+ totale
2010 884 3,742 454 5,080
2060 854 3,196 1,962 6,012
2010 14,195 48,786 6,002 68,983
2060 9,900 39,871 18,357 68,128
2010 8,617 18,432 1,368 28,417
2060 8,421 29,032 7,924 45,377
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 15 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 
population by main age group;  Medium variant 






WAP (15-64) is expected to notably decline in both countries, while the 
percentage of elderly is expected to dramatically increase. The situation is 
obviously different for Malaysia where the TFR is still largely above 
replacement.   
The experience of developed countries does, on the contrary, show 
that the end result of fertility decline is to prompt unprecedented and above 
replacement net migration flows that increase WAP, raise fertility, and 
therefore determine significant Total population growth
28
.  
The model we have proposed, coherently with empirical evidence, 
brings to the conclusion that the WAP of ASEAN arrival countries will 
increase, the change being directly related to the rate of growth of 
employment and inversely related to the rate of natural decline of local 
WAP (Tables A5, A7, and A9).   
 
 
8 HUMAN RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Education and training have always been considered a fundamental 
factor in promoting economic growth and social development. However, 
alternative growth theories have given industrial policies as well as 
education and vocational training different importance and role
29
.  
Classical growth models focus on the productivity-enhancing role of 
technology and human capital. They assume that investments in education 
and training result in skills, competences and increased capabilities of the 
workforce and that developing countries have the same capabilities to 
absorb technologies as the developed countries. The process does 
automatically take place through spillovers, trade and FDI, learning and 
increased productivity being a function of the time spent in production 
(learning by doing). In this context industrial policies play a very limited 
role, liberalization of the product market representing the main drive to 
growth. No specific educational or vocational training policies are called for 
to foster economic growth, education and training being only functional to 
match the skills supply and demand. 
In the institutional approach
30
 the key factor to reach high growth is 
diversification of the production structure, a structural transformation from 
low productivity, traditional (rural) activities to high productivity, (urban) 
modern activities, mostly, although not exclusively, in the industrial sector. 
Productivity grows not because of productivity increases within sectors, but 
as a result of shifting resources from low productivity to high productivity 
activities
31
. It has also been argued that the product space and the structure 
of goods produced determine the capabilities a country has developed, and 
these capabilities indicate which products or industries a country may easily 
develop in the future
32
. Industrial policies are, therefore, called upon to 
                                                 
28 M. Bruni, 2009 
29 For the drafting of this paragraph I am strongly indebted to the following papers: I. Nubler, 2011; 
M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, and J.E. Stiglitz (eds), 2009, and the presentation of the same book by J. M. 
Salazar-Xirinachs and I. Nubler, 2010; pp 135-140. 
30 W. Lewis 1954; J. Fei and G. Ranis, 1964.  
31 D. Rodrik, 2009. 
32 C.A. Hidalgo, and R. Hausmann, 2009.  
38 
 
facilitate a “growth enhancing structural transformation”. The challenge is 
getting the policy approach right by adopting an experimental and creative 
approach to institutional reforms
33
. 
According to New evolutionary economics, economic development 
is defined as a process of technological upgrading, of diversification and 
structural change driven, on one hand, by the accumulation of capabilities 
and, on the other, by the transformation of the production structure. It is the 
accumulation of domestic capabilities (that include the development of 
workers competences, the accumulation of technological and organizational 
know how in firms, training institutes and governments), which allows 
moving from the existing knowledge clusters to new knowledge clusters. 
34
 
It is then evident that, according to this approach, not only industrial 
policies and educational policies can play a central role in fostering 
economic growth and social development, but they must be designed and 
implemented in a coordinated way.  
In every moment of time the Labor force of a country disposes of a 
given knowledge structure. The knowledge structure is the result of past 
formal learning processes inside the education and vocational training 
system and of the training on the job provided by the production structure. 
In any given moment of time, the knowledge structure defines, the dynamic 
capabilities of an economy, i.e. determines and limits the technologies the 
country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, and therefore 






                                                 
33 It is however been suggested that: “Although this approach recognizes the role of learning and 
capabilities they are not integrated into the analytical framework and therefore fail to raise policy 
issues”. I. Nubler, 2011; p.8. 





(On the job training) 
Knowledge base
It defines and limits 
Technologies  the 
country can adopt, 
the production 
structure that can 
evolve, the possible 
development paths  
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In a first phase economic development can be based upon the 
incremental diversification of production inside the existing knowledge 
clusters, i.e. producing more products that require available competences or 
complementary competences that can be easily acquired.  
However, this is not sufficient to speed up development or to start a 
process of rapid catching up. In order to do so, a country must be able to 
shift production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, to 
jump into new knowledge clusters. Empirical and theoretical arguments 
suggest that the evolution of the knowledge base can play a fundamental 
role in the catching up process and that successful countries have been able 
to drive productive transformation by deliberately driving their knowledge 
structure toward higher diversity and complexity.   
Some countries have been inspired by egalitarian principles and have 
focused on equal access to education, while others have produced polarized 
educational patterns. The countries of the first type have first increased the 
share of primary, then of lower and higher secondary and finally of post-
secondary education. More importantly they have developed a significant 
share of higher and post-secondary education even at low levels of 
economic development. In so doing they have been able to shift production 
into medium technology manufacturing, then diversify production within 
clusters and finally move to higher technology goods
35
. The second type of 
countries
36
 have generated an educational structure with high shares of 
people with no-schooling or primary education, on one hand, and of people 
with post secondary education, on the other. This educational structure 
provides options in the development of high technology products or 
advanced services, but limited options for the development of medium 
technologies. It is also evident that this kind of educational structure cannot 
produce a relevant economic middle class.   
 
 
9 THE EDUCATIONA ATTAINMENTS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES  
As we have just seen, it is the knowledge structure of the country that 
defines the options and the dynamic capabilities of an economy, 
determining which production structure can evolve. The education structure 
of the population can be used as a proxy of the available capabilities since it 
provides an indication of the technologies and of the level of complexities 
that the Labor force can manage.  
More specifically, we can assume that a country with a strong share of 
(young) population with lower or upper secondary education embodies 
strong options to shift its production structure into low and medium 
technology products since this educational level provides the basis for 
training craft people, machine operators, technician and clerks which are 
required by more complex manufacturing sectors. However, it is only a high 
share of post-secondary education that will allow developing the economic, 
administrative, technical competencies together with the managerial skills 
                                                 
35 China and Korea belong to this group. 
36 This group includes many Latin America countries including Argentina, Brazil and Chile, but also 
India and Thailand.  
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and business leadership required to shift the economy toward medium and 
high technology goods and advanced services 
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different educational 
attainment. Graph 9 reports for all ASEAN countries, with the exception of 
Brunei
37
, the percentage of men and women in the age group 15-44 with at 
least secondary education
38
. The ranking is lead by Singapore followed by 
Malaysia and Philippines. Intermediate positions are occupied by Indonesia 







Source – IIASA 2008 
 
Men register higher values in all countries with the only notable 
exception of Philippines where women percentage is 7 points higher than 
that of men. In Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam the 
gender differential is absent or extremely low. A gender differential equal or 
higher than 5 percentage points is registered by Indonesia, Laos and 
Cambodia.   
In order to better evaluate the knowledge structure of each country and 
the different options it opens for the future, it is important to consider 
separately the percentages of men and women with secondary and tertiary 
education (Graphs 10 and 11).  
The two rankings suggest that Singapore
40
 and Philippines (and in 
some measure also Laos) have been specializing in tertiary education, while 
Malaysia and Indonesia have directed their efforts mainly toward secondary 
                                                 
37 The source we have used (IIASA) does not provide data for Brunei and similar data are not 
available at the national level. 
38 More data for men and women, in 1970 and 2007, together with mean number of year of study is 
reported in table 10 of the Statistical Annex.  
39 The ranking of Vietnam is penalized by its gender unbiased approach to education. Laos and 
Cambodia are in fact characterized by a slight higher percentage of men, but by a much lower 
percentage of women with at least secondary education. 
40 To better evaluate the attainment of Singapore we recall that in Korea and Japan the percentages of 




Indonesia Thailand Myanmar Laos Cambodia Vietnam
Men 91 85 73 66 56 50 44 41 40












Graph 9 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with at least 
secondary education;  percentage values; 2007 
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education. Thailand and Myanmar are slightly behind, but seem to be 
proceeding in a balanced way, while Cambodia and Vietnam are still 
characterized by a heavy delay particularly relevant for tertiary education.  
In conclusion, these data suggest that in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam the Labor force is still characterized by capabilities that provide 
options mainly in low and medium technology clusters, while Malaysia and 
also, although in a more limited way, Indonesia have already shifted or are 
ready to shift to higher technology cluster. The educational attainment of 
Singapore and Philippines suggests that tertiary activities are the best 
options for both countries that however are also equipped for high 
technology manufacturing clusters. Finally, Thailand and possibly Myanmar 
seem to have the option to operate in services and manufacturing sectors adopting 












Laos Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Myanmar Vietnam Cambodia
Men 36 19 13 12 11 8 6 3 2










Graph 10 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with tertiary 










Men 74 58 55 54 44 44 39 37 31










Graph 11 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with secondary 
education;  percentage values; 2007 
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Although not too recent, UNIDO data on competitiveness and on the 
share of medium-high tech value added in manufacturing give support to 
this analysis (Table 16). Singapore (that is world leader in competiveness) 
has by far the largest share of high technology products, followed in both 
ranking by Malaysia. The next two countries are Philippines and Thailand, 
followed by Indonesia. It is of interest to observe that these ranking 




A final element to complete the picture of educational attainment and 
its future evolution is offered by public expenditure on education and its 
distribution by educational level (table 17). Malaysia is the country that at 
present devotes it largest share of GDP to education, followed by Vietnam, 
both countries boasting a percentage above 5 per cent. With percentages 
between 4 and 5 we find Indonesia and Thailand, the only two ASEAN 
countries that devote more than 1/5 of government expenditures to 
education.   
To appreciate the countries‟ perception of their educational needs we 
can also observe that Cambodia, whose primary schools are affected by a 
very high dropout rate, are giving high priority to this educational level.  A 
similar balanced vision of an education structure progressively built from 
the bottom, seems to be followed also by Indonesia and Philippine. Brunei 
and Malaysia are now concentrating their effort primarily on secondary 












high tech Value 
Added in 
Manufacturing 
Singapore 0.895 1 Singapore 77.58
Malaysia 0.474 19 Malaysia 49.85
Thailand 0.407 28 Philippines 40.09
Philippines 0.400 32 Thailand 37.84
Indonesia 0.264 47 Indonesia 29.79
Viet Nam 0.193 72 Viet Nam 21.86
Cambodia 0.155 90 Cambodia 0.26
Table 16 -  ASEAN countries; Competitive Industrial Performance Index 








10 SUMMARY AND POLICY SUGGESTIONE   
10.1 The main conclusions  
In the first part of the paper we have shown that the demographic 
revolution has already been affecting all ASEAN countries for a 
considerable period of time. The different intensity of economic growth, 
historical circumstances, prevailing values and customs have, however, 
interacted with demographic trends so that each country is at a different 
stage of this complex process. From our perspective the most interesting 
element is that Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei have already been 
characterized by a relevant lack of labor supply that has provoked -and has 
been compensated by- the arrival of at least 10 million migrants, many of 
them from other ASEAN countries. At the same time, other migrants have 
left ASEAN countries, mainly Indonesia and Philippines, for non-ASEAN 
arrival countries.  
We have also argued that in ASEAN arrival countries the need of 
foreign labor will progressively increase. This will depend both on the 
supply and on the demand side of the labor market. In the first place, the 
supply of local labor will necessarily decline for at least thirty, forty years. 
This will be caused by the decline in WAP brought about, on one hand, by 
the contraction in generational entries and, on the other, by the increase in 
generational exits. Both trends are unavoidable, being generated by 
structural phenomena, respectively the decline in fertility and ageing
41
. The 
exact dimension of the manpower needs and of the amount of migrants will, 
however, depend on the rate of growth of GDP that each economy will 
register and on the development path they will choose, which will determine 
the employment-income elasticity.  
                                                 
41 The young people that will enter the Labor force in the next 20 years are already born and not big 
changes in the number of births can be forecasted in the next 10-15 years. The age structure of the 
Labor force is known and therefore generational exits from the labor market can also be easily 
estimated. 
GDP Gov. Expend. Pre-primary Primary SecondaryTetiary Unknown
Malaysia 5.8 18.9 1 35 46 18
Viet Nam 5.3 19.8 5 38 26 22 9
Indonesia 4.6 26.0 1 57 32 10
Thailand 4.1 20.8 7 48 16 17 13
Laos 3.3 13.2 3 46 51
Singapore 3.1 11.6 0 20 33 36 11
Philippines 2.7 16.9 2 52 27 10 10
Cambodia 2.6 12.4 1 73 21 5
Brunei Darussalam 2.1 13.7 0 29 47 24
Myanmar 1.3 18.1 0 48 40 12
Source - IIASA
Public expenditure on 
education as % of 
 Percentage of Public Expenditure by 
Educational Level




Finally, we have shown that in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia the 
structural lack of labor supply: 
 In the short run, cannot be counterbalanced by absorbing 
unemployment or increasing labor market participation, since 
unemployment is very low and participation very high or not 
expandable for cultural reasons;  
 In the long run, it cannot be dealt with by delocalizing production 
and/or by increasing productivity, given the size and the expected 
duration of the phenomenon. 
On the basis of the previous line of reasoning we have proposed and 
estimated labor market and demographic scenarios in which the migration 
flows and the demographic evolution of the arrival countries depend on their 
manpower needs. The results project a demographic future very different 
from that proposed by the Population Division, whose estimates appear to 
be more sensitive to the political stance of the interested countries than to 
economic logic.  
The main conclusion is rather straightforward:  the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei, the higher their need of foreign labor, not only in absolute terms, 
but also as a percentage of the labor demand in terms of flow. 
42
 Our model 
shows that in a very near future the local supply of labor will not be 
sufficient even to offset Replacement demand. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within the ASEAN 
community will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth 
and social development.   
In the following section of the paper, a survey of the relevant literature 
has brought us to support the idea that economic growth is the result of a 
process of technological upgrading, of diversification and structural change 
driven by the accumulation of capabilities, on one hand, and the 
transformation of the production structure, on the other. In substance, 
according to this perspective, it is the knowledge base of a country that 
defines and limits the technologies a country can adopt, the production 
structure it may evolve, and therefore the possible paths to economic growth 
and social development. More specifically, speeding up economic growth 
and triggering successful catching up processes does require shifting 
production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, in other 
words to jump into new knowledge clusters. In order to do so a country 
needs to drive its knowledge structure toward higher diversity and 
complexity; in other words to endow its incoming labor force with the 
expertise and competences that will be required by the economic 
development triggered by industrial policies, and this in coordination with 
the necessary industrial policies.   
Finally the paper has provided some information on the educational 
attainment of the younger components of WAP in each ASEAN country. 
Data show that, also in this case, ASEAN presents a very articulated reality, 
                                                 
42 The labor demand in terms of flow is measured by the new entries in the labor market necessary i) 
to substitute the people that leave the Labor force for good and ii) to occupy the additional jobs 
generated by economic growth 
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but also a remarkable coherence between, on one hand, the educational 
attainment structure and, on the other, the level of development as well as 
the structure of the industrial and service sectors. The percentage of people 
between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education spans between the 
maximum of Singapore (around 90 per cent) and the minimum values that 
characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 per cent). 
Coherently, while Singapore has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance, Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their production 
structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster, or are ready 
to do so. On the other end, Cambodia and Vietnam are still attracting 
foreign investments mainly in labor intensive, low technology sectors.    
In conclusion, the paper contends that, in a very near future, workers 
mobility within ASEAN will not be a choice, but a necessity imposed by 
demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of economic 
growth and the typology of development will determine the amount of 
Labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills requested 
by the arrival countries. At the same time, the other ASEAN countries will 
have a structural excess of labor supply that will not be able to find a 
productive occupation in the national markets because the rate of growth 
requested to absorb it will remain out of reach.  
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong points. 
 
 
10.2 Some policy suggestions  
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, 
Thailand and, in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks.  
A correct migration policy can be based only upon a serious 
evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by the arrival 
countries
43
. It must be underlined that the more economically and socially 
developed economies do not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -
especially at the beginning of the migration process- they need mainly 
unskilled labor. The reason is quite obvious. As income per-capita increases, 
families will tend to provide more education to their children. The result is 
that the young generations that will enter the labor market in the near future 
in the most developed areas of ASEAN will not be willing to accept low-
paid menial jobs, which remain abundant also in developed economies, 
especially in the service sectors. However, with time, the percentage of 
qualified workers and university graduates needed by these economies will 
progressively grow, as the percentage of migrants requested in order to face 
local labor demand will increase
44
.  
                                                 
43  Another extremely important element will be represented by a system of recognition of skill 
certificates and credentials within and among countries in the ASEAN region. 
44 For Singapore, see Brenda S.A. Yeoh, 2007 
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The other side of the coin is that migrations have both positive and 
negative impacts on the socio-economic systems of departure countries. On 
one hand, it can reduce the pressure on the supply side of the labor market 
and provide remittances that could, if properly directed, support productive 
investments.  On the other hand, migration depletes the knowledge structure 
and the capabilities of departure countries because migrants are by 
definition the most dynamic elements of their societies.  
As it has already been suggested, a correct approach to economic 
growth and catching up requires that educational policies and industrial 
policies be called to play a fundamental role. At national level, this implies 
that education and training policies should have both a short-run and a long-
run objective: 1) in the short-run, provide a correct response to the local 
labor demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long-run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products. In order to 
avoid unemployment and frustrations, this second objective does however 
need a coordinated set of industrial policies that will create the demand for 
graduates with higher skills. In substance, education and vocational training 
policies should prepare the people for the production structure that is going 
to be promoted by industrial policies.  
 At ASEAN level the implication is that the educational policies of 
the departures countries should be coordinated also with the industrial 
policies of the arrival countries so that the unavoidable structural excess of 
labor of departures countries will find productive employment or in the 
arrival countries or in their investment in departures countries. These 




A basic element for designing and implementing the previous 
complex set of measures is information. Many ASEAN countries still lack 
the statistical information on demography, education, vocational training, 
labor market and migration
46
 that represents the necessary prerequisite to 
design and implement the policies we have just outlined. Moreover, this 
information needs to be comparable and based upon best international 
practices. 
This suggests that a fist important measure that could be implemented 
by ASEAN is the creation of an ASEAN Labor Market Information 
System
47
. As shown in Figure 2, a LMIS can be thought as: 
 A network of producers and consumers of Labor Market Information 
 A store of Labor Market Information  
                                                 
45  Already the “ASEAN Labor Ministers’ Work Program 2000 to 2005” stated that ASEAN 
countries need to enhance capacity for formulating and implementing a comprehensive and integrated 
human resource development (HRD) strategy on a continuous basis in order to adjust to global 
competition. This will include, among other things, a coordinated employment, manpower education 
and training programs, planning, labor policy measures and labor market information programs. 
46 The problem is fully recognized by the ALM last Work program that states: “Although human 
resource development planning and labor market information and analysis is a stated priority area for 
ASEAN, comprehensive information on the structure of ASEAN Member States‟ labor sectors 
remains of limited availability. 










The first element put the accent on the fact that the ASEAN LMIS 
should be the expression of its stakeholders, i.e. the national producers and 
consumers of data. The former will provide the necessary statistical 
information and support their correct interpretation; the latter will indicate 
their needs and cooperate in directing the collection of data and the 
management of the system.   
The second element indicates that the ASEAN LMIS should be the 
physical place where all the relevant national labor market information will 
be mapped, collected, evaluated, organized and stored.  
Finally, the real justification of the ASEAN LMIS is that of providing 
a flow of structural and short-run analyses needed to design, implement and 
monitor the educational, industrial, and migration policies of ASEAN 
countries. Between the more relevant areas of analysis we can indicate:    
 The education and vocational training systems of the ASEAN 
countries: in order to assess their structural characteristics and their 
evolution; estimate their production in terms of students outflows 
classified in regular and irregular, and by educational level;  
 The transition process from the Educational and Vocational Training 
System, on one hand, and the Labor Market, on the other; 
 The labor markets of the ASEAN countries in a comparative 
perspective; 
 Internal and external migration flows.  
 In a more specific way the LMIS should provide the necessary inputs  












 To design a framework of educational policies and industrial policies 
to be proposed to member countries for approval and 
implementation;  
 To create and up-keep labor market and demographic scenarios of 
the type we have just shown; 
 To design a map of the excess of labor supply in departures 
countries; 
 To define the manpower needs of arrival countries, by occupations 
and skills.  
In particular, the scenarios should provide estimates, over a 5-10 year 
sliding horizon, of the level and skill structure of the manpower needs of 
arrival countries, on one hand, and of the structural excess of labor supply of 
departures countries, on the other. 
 
 
10.3 The Education Migration Fund  
There is a final suggestion we deem relevant to advance on the eve of 
the creation of an integrated economic community that will progressively 
allow the free movement of capital and labor.  
A migrant bring with him a “capital” of capabilities that is the result 
not only of its personal investment, but also of the public investments of its 
country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant corresponds for the 
production system of the receiving country to the free acquisition of a factor 
of production. This is obviously true only if and when the migrant worker is 
needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have a substitute in the 
arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this situation will exist 
and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and for a number of workers 
largely in excess of those “forecasted” by international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being seen as people running away from misery and deprivation, if 
unskilled and with low education, and as people in search of a higher 
income and better life, if educated and skilled. This brings to stress the cost 
that the countries of arrival have to bear or to promote ideas of brotherhood 
toward the migrants and their needs.  
If we abandon this perspective to realistically accept that in an 
increasing number of countries labor internally produced is not sufficient to 
carry on and expand production, and therefore that these countries need to 
acquire labor from other countries in the same way as they need to acquire 
raw materials and capital goods, then it logically follows that arrival 
countries should pay for each migrant that is going to have a job position a 
price proportional to its education and skill level and at least equal to the 
cost the departure country has supported to educate and train him
48
.  
Keeping in mind that: 
 Migrants represent a depletion of the knowledge base of the departures 
countries; 
                                                 
48  This would also eliminate market distortion deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries.   
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 A more educated and better trained labor force is the key for economic 
growth;  
 The need for foreign labor will dramatically increase at least for the next 
forty years; 
 Population explosion will make more and more difficult if not impossible 
the development of the poorest countries in the world where the excess of 
labor supply will be progressively concentrated; 
the creation and correct utilization of an Education Migration Fund could 
activate a relevant, correct, and equitable transfer of money from the rich to 
the poor countries to be invested in the most important factor of economic 
growth and social development: education
49
.  
It is evident that even if accepted the implementation of this proposal 
would have to face a series of complicated issues that cannot be confronted 
in this paper. Here we can limit ourselves to a few suggestions.  
In a global perspective we could envisage the constitution of an 
Education Migration Fund (EMF) with UNESCO that could be in charge 
to collect the payments from arrival countries and route them toward 
departure countries. This should be done in a fast and efficient way, and 
following a plan agreed upon with departure countries. The money should 
be directed to build new schools, improve the existing building, train the 
teachers, provide equal opportunities, and promote gender equality, in 
coordination with the industrial and macroeconomic policies required to 
start effective catching up processes.  
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 
would benefit from as well as cope with the challenges of regional 
integration”
50
. It is evident that in the less developed countries the necessary 
improvement of the educational and vocational training system finds an 
upper limit in the existing, largely insufficient resources. The adoption of 
the previous proposal could provide a correct and equitable solution to this 
problem. Moreover it could be argued that in the growth perspective we 
have adopted, arrival countries would be a final beneficiary of the transfers 
because the same transfers would foster the process of catching up of the 
weaker economies, increase their level of per-capita income and therefore 
expand their market for foreign high quality products and services.  
In this perspective ASEAN could represent an ideal testing ground of 
this measure. A specific working group of ASEAN experts could be 
entrusted with the development and implementation of the idea. Also in this 
case, the final goal would be the constitution of a EMF to which arrival 
                                                 
49  What we propose is totally different from the so-called Bhagwati tax. In the first place, the 
argument advanced, almost 40 years ago by Bhagwaty and Dellafar (Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and 
Dellafar, 1973) calls for a tax on the incomes of “professional emigrants” from developing countries 
into developed countries. In the second place, the Bhagwati proposal refers only to the so called brain 
drain. Finally it is a typical expression of a supply side vision of the migration process. It can also be 
reminded that initially, also Bhagwati discussed methods for transferring income from developed 
countries to developing countries to compensate the latter for losses caused by the brain drain 
(Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, 1975). For a more detailed discussion of the Bhagwati tax, see Wilson 
John Douglas, 2005  
50 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 
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countries would transfer their payments that would then be directed toward 
the departure countries, in accordance with educational plans agreed upon 
by ASEAN and the individual countries and in coherence with the national 
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Departure countries Migration balance Arrival countries Migration balance
United Arab Emirates 3,857 India -4,923
Saudi Arabia 2,781 Bangladesh -4,401
Thailand 1,595 China -4,182
Qatar 1,027 Pakistan -3,750
Singapore 954 Indonesia -2,477
Afghanistan 585 Philippines -2,361
Syrian Arab Republic 492 Myanmar -1,500
Malaysia 481 Uzbekistan -1,274
Bahrain 473 Viet Nam -863
Kuwait 439 Iraq -730
Israel 377 Tajikistan -718
Japan 322 Georgia -459
China, Hong Kong SAR 165 Kyrgyzstan -381
Jordan 109 Cambodia -373
Azerbaijan 107 Sri Lanka -350
Cyprus 106 Occupied Palestinian Territory -280
Oman 103 Yemen -235
China, Macao SAR 93 Kazakhstan -214
Lebanon 88 Nepal -200
Bhutan 52 Lao People's Democratic Republic -190
Brunei Darussalam 7 Armenia -175
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 0 Turkmenistan -168
Maldives 0 Turkey -150
Total 14,213 Republic of Korea -128




Table. A3 - Asia;  arrival and daparture countries; migration balance;  2000-2010; thousand
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2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2,523 395 2,128 1,547 7.9 2,999 41,037 1,452 290
2020 57408 2015-2020 2,030 390 1,640 1,193 7.9 3,236 44,273 2,043 409
2025 58778 2020-2025 1,370 385 985 716 7.9 3,491 47,764 2,775 555
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 7.9 3,766 51,530 3,444 689
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 7.9 4,063 55,593 4,138 828
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2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2523 395 2128 1547 7.3 2780 40818 1233 247
2020 57408 2015-2020 2030 390 1640 1193 6.8 2780 43598 1588 318
2025 58778 2020-2025 1370 385 985 716 6.4 2780 46378 2064 413
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 6.0 2780 49158 2457 491
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 5.7 2780 51938 2854 571












Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 21.2 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,436 56,973 57,510 69,762 70,299 70,836 19.1 19.0 18.8 72.7 72.0 71.4
2020 12,359 60,119 61,208 62,298 72,478 73,567 74,657 17.1 16.8 16.6 73.6 72.3 71.1
2025 11,592 63,879 65,532 67,185 75,471 77,124 78,777 15.4 15.0 14.7 74.8 72.9 71.1
2030 11,093 67,766 70,002 72,239 78,859 81,095 83,332 14.1 13.7 13.3 76.0 73.6 71.3
2035 10,831 71,801 74,643 77,485 82,632 85,474 88,316 13.1 12.7 12.3 77.4 74.5 71.7
Diff. -3,364 18,945 21,787 24,629 15,581 18,423 21,265
Scenario B
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 18.9 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,216 56,720 57,225 69,542 70,046 70,551 19.2 19.0 18.9 72.6 72.0 71.3
2020 12,359 59,444 60,432 61,420 71,803 72,791 73,779 17.2 17.0 16.8 73.3 72.1 71.0
2025 11,592 62,493 63,938 65,384 74,085 75,530 76,976 15.6 15.3 15.1 74.2 72.5 70.9
2030 11,093 65,394 67,275 69,155 76,487 78,368 80,248 14.5 14.2 13.8 75.2 73.1 71.1
2035 10,831 68,146 70,440 72,733 78,977 81,271 83,564 13.7 13.3 13.0 76.2 73.7 71.4
Diff. -3,364 15,290 17,584 19,877 11,926 14,220 16,513
0-14



















Rate of change 
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 22.7 850 4590 768 154
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 22.7 1043 5634 1026 205
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 22.7 1281 6914 1272 254
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 22.7 1572 8486 1587 317
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 25.6 781 3828 623 125
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 20.4 781 4608 698 140
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 16.9 781 5389 763 153
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 14.5 781 6169 772 154
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 12.7 781 6950 795 159















Rate of change 
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 11.4 425 4165 343 69
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 5.7 237 4402 220 44
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 2.8 125 4527 116 23
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 1.4 64 4591 79 16








Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 17.4 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,820 6,064 6,307 6,592 6,836 7,079 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,869 7,270 7,671 7,690 8,091 8,492 10.7 10.1 9.7 82.0 77.5 73.4
2030 866 8,153 8,747 9,340 9,019 9,613 10,206 9.6 9.0 8.5 84.8 79.0 74.0
2035 886 9,720 10,548 11,377 10,606 11,434 12,263 8.4 7.7 7.2 87.3 80.4 74.6
Diff. 2 5,524 6,352 7,181 5,526 6,354 7,183
Scenario B
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 12.9 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 5,030 5,155 5,280 5,813 5,938 6,063 13.5 13.2 12.9 76.1 74.3 72.5
2020 772 5,838 6,085 6,331 6,610 6,857 7,103 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,625 6,989 7,353 7,446 7,810 8,174 11.0 10.5 10.0 81.3 77.1 73.3
2030 866 7,408 7,890 8,372 8,274 8,756 9,238 10.5 9.9 9.4 83.3 78.2 73.7
2035 886 8,184 8,782 9,380 9,070 9,668 10,266 9.8 9.2 8.6 84.9 79.1 74.1
Diff. 2 3,988 4,586 5,184 3,990 4,588 5,186
Scenario C
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 13.2 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,395 5,575 5,755 6,167 6,347 6,527 12.5 12.2 11.8 77.2 74.7 72.4
2025 821 5,638 5,854 6,070 6,459 6,675 6,891 12.7 12.3 11.9 78.1 75.2 72.5
2030 866 5,766 6,001 6,237 6,632 6,867 7,103 13.1 12.6 12.2 78.5 75.4 72.6
2035 886 5,825 6,069 6,314 6,711 6,955 7,200 13.2 12.7 12.3 78.8 75.6 72.7
Diff. 2 1,629 1,873 2,118 1,631 1,875 2,120
0-14


















Rate of change in 
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2000 14612 Scenario A
2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776.2 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 10.8 1201 12330 -43 -9
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 10.8 1331 13661 68 14
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 10.8 1474 15135 358 72
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 10.8 1633 16768 559 112
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 10.8 1809 18578 788 158
9545 425 9120 5718 7448 1730 326
66.9254611
Malaysia 
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2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 9.7 1084 12233 -160 -32
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 8.9 1084 13337 -178 -36
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 8.1 1084 14441 -32 -6
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 7.5 1084 15545 10 2
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 7.0 1084 16648 62 12




Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,310 20,601 20,892 28,981 29,272 29,563 29.9 29.6 29.3 60.7 59.9 59.0
2020 8,674 22,392 22,995 23,598 31,066 31,669 32,272 27.9 27.4 26.9 61.0 59.4 57.9
2025 8,848 24,530 25,454 26,378 33,378 34,302 35,226 26.5 25.8 25.1 61.7 59.5 57.4
2030 8,971 26,802 28,067 29,332 35,773 37,038 38,303 25.1 24.2 23.4 62.6 59.7 57.2
2035 9,006 29,219 30,847 32,474 38,225 39,853 41,480 23.6 22.6 21.7 63.6 60.2 57.2
Diff. 389 10,850 12,478 14,105 11,239 12,867 14,494
Scenario B
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,193 20,467 20,740 28,864 29,138 29,411 30.0 29.8 29.5 60.6 59.8 59.0
2020 8,674 22,028 22,577 23,126 30,702 31,251 31,800 28.3 27.8 27.3 60.5 59.1 57.7
2025 8,848 23,776 24,587 25,398 32,624 33,435 34,246 27.1 26.5 25.8 60.7 58.7 56.9
2030 8,971 25,499 26,568 27,638 34,470 35,539 36,609 26.0 25.2 24.5 61.0 58.5 56.2
2035 9,006 27,191 28,514 29,837 36,197 37,520 38,843 24.9 24.0 23.2 61.2 58.4 55.8
Diff. 389 8,822 10,145 11,468 9,211 10,534 11,857
0-14












































Departure countries Migration balance Arrival countries Migration balance
United Arab Emirates 3,857 India -4,923
Saudi Arabia 2,781 Bangladesh -4,401
Thailand 1,595 China -4,182
Qatar 1,027 Pakistan -3,750
Singapore 954 Indonesia -2,477
Afghanistan 585 Philippines -2,361
Syrian Arab Republic 492 Myanmar -1,500
Malaysia 481 Uzbekistan -1,274
Bahrain 473 Viet Nam -863
Kuwait 439 Iraq -730
Israel 377 Tajikistan -718
Japan 322 Georgia -459
China, Hong Kong SAR 165 Kyrgyzstan -381
Jordan 109 Cambodia -373
Azerbaijan 107 Sri Lanka -350
Cyprus 106 Occupied Palestinian Territory -280
Oman 103 Yemen -235
China, Macao SAR 93 Kazakhstan -214
Lebanon 88 Nepal -200
Bhutan 52 Lao People's Democratic Republic -190
Brunei Darussalam 7 Armenia -175
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 0 Turkmenistan -168
Maldives 0 Turkey -150
Total 14,213 Republic of Korea -128




Table. A3 - Asia;  arrival and daparture countries; migration balance;  2000-2010; thousand
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2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2,523 395 2,128 1,547 7.9 2,999 41,037 1,452 290
2020 57408 2015-2020 2,030 390 1,640 1,193 7.9 3,236 44,273 2,043 409
2025 58778 2020-2025 1,370 385 985 716 7.9 3,491 47,764 2,775 555
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 7.9 3,766 51,530 3,444 689
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 7.9 4,063 55,593 4,138 828
















Rate of change 
in 
employment 
over a 5 year 
period











2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2523 395 2128 1547 7.3 2780 40818 1233 247
2020 57408 2015-2020 2030 390 1640 1193 6.8 2780 43598 1588 318
2025 58778 2020-2025 1370 385 985 716 6.4 2780 46378 2064 413
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 6.0 2780 49158 2457 491
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 5.7 2780 51938 2854 571












Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 21.2 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,436 56,973 57,510 69,762 70,299 70,836 19.1 19.0 18.8 72.7 72.0 71.4
2020 12,359 60,119 61,208 62,298 72,478 73,567 74,657 17.1 16.8 16.6 73.6 72.3 71.1
2025 11,592 63,879 65,532 67,185 75,471 77,124 78,777 15.4 15.0 14.7 74.8 72.9 71.1
2030 11,093 67,766 70,002 72,239 78,859 81,095 83,332 14.1 13.7 13.3 76.0 73.6 71.3
2035 10,831 71,801 74,643 77,485 82,632 85,474 88,316 13.1 12.7 12.3 77.4 74.5 71.7
Diff. -3,364 18,945 21,787 24,629 15,581 18,423 21,265
Scenario B
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 18.9 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,216 56,720 57,225 69,542 70,046 70,551 19.2 19.0 18.9 72.6 72.0 71.3
2020 12,359 59,444 60,432 61,420 71,803 72,791 73,779 17.2 17.0 16.8 73.3 72.1 71.0
2025 11,592 62,493 63,938 65,384 74,085 75,530 76,976 15.6 15.3 15.1 74.2 72.5 70.9
2030 11,093 65,394 67,275 69,155 76,487 78,368 80,248 14.5 14.2 13.8 75.2 73.1 71.1
2035 10,831 68,146 70,440 72,733 78,977 81,271 83,564 13.7 13.3 13.0 76.2 73.7 71.4
Diff. -3,364 15,290 17,584 19,877 11,926 14,220 16,513
0-14
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 22.7 850 4590 768 154
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 22.7 1043 5634 1026 205
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 22.7 1281 6914 1272 254
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 22.7 1572 8486 1587 317
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 25.6 781 3828 623 125
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 20.4 781 4608 698 140
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 16.9 781 5389 763 153
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 14.5 781 6169 772 154
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 12.7 781 6950 795 159
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 11.4 425 4165 343 69
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 5.7 237 4402 220 44
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 2.8 125 4527 116 23
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 1.4 64 4591 79 16








Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 17.4 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,820 6,064 6,307 6,592 6,836 7,079 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,869 7,270 7,671 7,690 8,091 8,492 10.7 10.1 9.7 82.0 77.5 73.4
2030 866 8,153 8,747 9,340 9,019 9,613 10,206 9.6 9.0 8.5 84.8 79.0 74.0
2035 886 9,720 10,548 11,377 10,606 11,434 12,263 8.4 7.7 7.2 87.3 80.4 74.6
Diff. 2 5,524 6,352 7,181 5,526 6,354 7,183
Scenario B
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 12.9 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 5,030 5,155 5,280 5,813 5,938 6,063 13.5 13.2 12.9 76.1 74.3 72.5
2020 772 5,838 6,085 6,331 6,610 6,857 7,103 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,625 6,989 7,353 7,446 7,810 8,174 11.0 10.5 10.0 81.3 77.1 73.3
2030 866 7,408 7,890 8,372 8,274 8,756 9,238 10.5 9.9 9.4 83.3 78.2 73.7
2035 886 8,184 8,782 9,380 9,070 9,668 10,266 9.8 9.2 8.6 84.9 79.1 74.1
Diff. 2 3,988 4,586 5,184 3,990 4,588 5,186
Scenario C
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 13.2 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,395 5,575 5,755 6,167 6,347 6,527 12.5 12.2 11.8 77.2 74.7 72.4
2025 821 5,638 5,854 6,070 6,459 6,675 6,891 12.7 12.3 11.9 78.1 75.2 72.5
2030 866 5,766 6,001 6,237 6,632 6,867 7,103 13.1 12.6 12.2 78.5 75.4 72.6
2035 886 5,825 6,069 6,314 6,711 6,955 7,200 13.2 12.7 12.3 78.8 75.6 72.7
Diff. 2 1,629 1,873 2,118 1,631 1,875 2,120
0-14
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2000 14612 Scenario A
2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776.2 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 10.8 1201 12330 -43 -9
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 10.8 1331 13661 68 14
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 10.8 1474 15135 358 72
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 10.8 1633 16768 559 112
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 10.8 1809 18578 788 158
9545 425 9120 5718 7448 1730 326
66.9254611
Malaysia 
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2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 9.7 1084 12233 -160 -32
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 8.9 1084 13337 -178 -36
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 8.1 1084 14441 -32 -6
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 7.5 1084 15545 10 2
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 7.0 1084 16648 62 12




Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,310 20,601 20,892 28,981 29,272 29,563 29.9 29.6 29.3 60.7 59.9 59.0
2020 8,674 22,392 22,995 23,598 31,066 31,669 32,272 27.9 27.4 26.9 61.0 59.4 57.9
2025 8,848 24,530 25,454 26,378 33,378 34,302 35,226 26.5 25.8 25.1 61.7 59.5 57.4
2030 8,971 26,802 28,067 29,332 35,773 37,038 38,303 25.1 24.2 23.4 62.6 59.7 57.2
2035 9,006 29,219 30,847 32,474 38,225 39,853 41,480 23.6 22.6 21.7 63.6 60.2 57.2
Diff. 389 10,850 12,478 14,105 11,239 12,867 14,494
Scenario B
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,193 20,467 20,740 28,864 29,138 29,411 30.0 29.8 29.5 60.6 59.8 59.0
2020 8,674 22,028 22,577 23,126 30,702 31,251 31,800 28.3 27.8 27.3 60.5 59.1 57.7
2025 8,848 23,776 24,587 25,398 32,624 33,435 34,246 27.1 26.5 25.8 60.7 58.7 56.9
2030 8,971 25,499 26,568 27,638 34,470 35,539 36,609 26.0 25.2 24.5 61.0 58.5 56.2
2035 9,006 27,191 28,514 29,837 36,197 37,520 38,843 24.9 24.0 23.2 61.2 58.4 55.8
Diff. 389 8,822 10,145 11,468 9,211 10,534 11,857
0-14
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ASEAN countries have been moving at different speeds along the path 
of the so called Demographic transition and are at present at different stages 
of this complex process. As a consequence, starting in the very near future, 
some ASEAN countries will be affected by an increasing structural lack of 
labor supply, while in other a structural excess of labor supply will persist 
for at least 30-40 years. This situation has already contributed to divide 
ASEAN countries into two groups: departure countries and arrival countries. 
Data show that both departures and arrivals have been steadily increasing as 
well as labor mobility within ASEAN.  
Building on this demographic background, the paper proposes 
alternative labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-35. 
The scenarios outline manpower needs, migration flows and population 
growth on the basis of the trends in WAP and alternative hypothesis on 
employment growth. The main conclusion is that the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei (already relevant arrival countries), the higher their need of 
foreign labor. In fact, in a very near future the local labor supply of these 
countries will not be even sufficient to replace the workers that will leave 
for good the labor force due to retirement or death. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within ASEAN countries 
will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth and social 
development.   
A survey of economic growth model brings us to support the idea that 
economic growth is the result of a process of technological upgrading, of 
diversification and structural change driven by the accumulation of 
capabilities, on one hand, and the transformation of the production structure, 
on the other. It is the knowledge base of a country that defines and limits the 
technologies a country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, 
and therefore the possible paths to economic growth and social development. 
Speeding up economic growth and triggering successful catching up 
processes does require shifting production from low quality activities into 
“high quality activities”, to “jump” into new knowledge clusters. In order to 
do so a country also needs to drive the knowledge structure toward higher 
diversity and complexity, to endow its incoming labor force with new 
expertise and competences.  
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different knowledge base. The 
percentage of people between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education 
spans between the maximum of Singapore (91 per cent) and the minimum 
values that characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 
per cent).  A more detailed analysis of the national educational attainments 
shows that beside Singapore -that has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance- only Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their 
production structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster or 
are ready to do so. The more polarized education structure of Thailand and 
possibly Myanmar suggest that these two countries have limited options to 
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start the production of intermediate technology products, but could develop 
directly toward high technology sectors.  
In conclusion, the paper contends that in a very near future workers 
mobility within the ASEAN region will not be a choice, but a necessity 
imposed by demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of 
economic growth and the typology of development will determine the 
amount of labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills 
that will be required by arrival countries. At the same time, the other 
ASEAN countries will be characterized by a structural excess of labor 
supply that will not be able to find a productive occupation in the national 
markets, since the rate of economic growth requested to absorb it will 
remain out of reach. 
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong 
points. 
 
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, Thailand 
and, although in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks. 
In this situation the papers proposes a series of policy options.  
In the first place, a correct migration policy can be based only upon a 
serious evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by arrival 
countries. The paper stresses the fact that the more developed economies do 
not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -especially at the beginning 
of the migration process- they need mainly unskilled labor and only with 
time qualified workers and university graduates will become predominant.  
The other side of the coin is that the outflow of migrants presents both 
positive and negative aspects for departure countries. On one hand, it 
reduces the pressure on the labor market and provides remittances that could 
support productive investments.  On the other hand, it depletes the 
knowledge structure and the capabilities of the departure countries because 
migrants are always, by definition, the most dynamic element of their 
societies.  
A correct approach to economic growth and catching up suggests that 
educational policies and industrial policies can play a fundamental role. In 
order to do so educational policies must be designed and implemented in 
relations to the training needs of both departures and arrival countries, while 
industrial policies should provide a production structure capable of 
promoting economic growth and a labor demand coherent with the exits 
from the educational system. 
More specifically, at national level, education and training policies 
should: 1) in the short run, provide a correct response to the local labor 
demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products.  Moreover, the 
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educational policies of the departures countries should be coordinated also 
with the industrial policies of the arrival countries so that the structural 
excess of labor supply of departures countries will find productive 
employment or in the arrival countries or in their investment in departures 
countries.  
In order to face such complex set of task, ASEAN countries will need, 
as already clearly suggested by the last ALM Working Program, a Labor 
Market Information System providing comparable information on the main 
aspects of human resources management, from demography to education 
and vocational training, from macroeconomic to employment, 
unemployment and migration, together with a broad comparative view of 
their labor market legislation.  
Therefore, an extremely important objective of ASEAN could be the 
constitution of an ASEAN Labor Market Information System aimed to 
collects, store and analyze the data produced at the national level, better 
their quality, and promote their comparability.  
The paper proposes a second important measure that responds not 
only to principles of equity and competitiveness but could also foster 
economic growth and social development: the creation of an Employment 
Migration Fund.   
A migrant brings with him a set of capabilities that are the result not 
only of its personal investment, but also of the investment in education 
made by its country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant 
corresponds for the production system of the receiving country to the free 
acquisition of a factor of production. This is obviously true only if and when 
the migrant worker is needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have 
a substitute in the arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this 
situation will exist and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and will 
affect a number of workers largely in excess of those “forecasted” by 
international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being represented as people running away from misery and 
deprivation or just looking for higher wages and a better life. This 
perspective has brought to the proposal, almost 40 years ago, of the so-
called Bhagwati tax. 
If we abandon this point of view and more in tune with reality and 
empirical evidence we realize that many developed economies that have 
been affected already for long time by below replacement fertility do not 
have enough internally “produced” labor not only to expand, but even to 
keep the present level of production, then we have also to change our image 
of the migrants.  
The first obvious implication is that the arrival country should pay to 
the departure country for each migrant employed in a productive job a price 
proportional to the cost supported by the government of the country of 
origin for its education and training.  
The proposal is that  these contributions be collected in an  Education 
Migration Fund managed by ASEAN to be used only to improve the 
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education and training system of member countries by intervening on the 
infrastructures, training the teachers, providing equal opportunities, and 
promoting  gender equality, in coordination with the industrial and 
macroeconomic policies required to start effective catching up processes.  
This measure would not only respond to a principle of equity, 
eliminate market distortions deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries, but in the growth perspective we have 
introduced, it would also be beneficial to arrival countries by fostering the 
process of catching up of the weaker economies, increasing their level of 
income and therefore expanding the market for the products coming from 
the more developed neighbors.  
 
 
JEL Classification: F22, I25, J11, J24, 053  
 
 






1. Introduction  
1.1 The Institutional background 
1.2 The structure of the paper 
 
2. The demographic background  
 
3. The evolution of Working Age Population 
3.1 ASEAN 
3.2 The country level  
 
4 The causes of economic migration 
 
5 ASEAN migration in the international context  
 
6 Labor market and demographic scenarios 
6.1  Main tendencies of the labor market in Singapore, Thailand 
and Malaysia  
6.2 Hypothesis and computational procedures 
6.3 Manpower needs 
6.4 A clarification of the previous results from a flow perspective  
 
7 Manpower needs and migration flows 
7.1 The stock of migrants in ASEAN countries  
7.2 The migration scenarios 
7.3 The impact of migration on total population    
 
8 Human resources and economic development 
 
9 The educational attainment of ASEAN countries  
 
10 Summary and policy suggestions 
10.1 The main conclusions  
10.2 Some policy suggestions 













Table 1 - ASEAN countries; population, births, deaths and migration 
balance; absolute values; 1950 - 2010 
Table 2 - ASEAN countries; population, births deaths and migration 
balance; absolute values; 2005-2010  
Table 3 - ASEAN countries; total fertility rate; 1950-55 and 2005-10 
Table 4 - ASEAN countries; life expectancy at birth; 1950 and 2010; years 
Table 5 -ASEAN countries; infant mortality rate; 1950 and 2010 
Table 6 - ASEAN countries; total population by main age group; percentage 
composition; 2010 
Table 7 -ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute values; 1950 
-2060 
Table 8 - ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute yearly 
change; 2010-2060; thousand 
Table 9 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; main labor market variables 
and indicators; 2005 ad 2010 
Table 10 -Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; Population 65 year and older; 
2010-35  
Table 11 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; Total manpower needs; 2010-
2035  
Table 12 - ASEAN countries; Stock of migrants, percentage of migrants 20 
and above, percentage of female migrants; 2010 
Table 13 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; number of migrants (thousand) in 
alternative scenarios of manpower needs and international labor 
supply reactivity; 2010-2035 
Table 14 -ASEAN countries; number of migrants 1985-2010 and estimates 
2010-35, medium variant scenario of the Population Division; 
thousand; 1985-2035 
Table 15 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; population by main age group 
2010, and 2060 medium variant projection Population Division  
Table 16 - ASEAN countries; Competitive Industrial Performance Index 
and Share of medium-high tech Value Added in manufacturing; 
2007  
Table 17 - ASEAN countries; Public expenditure on education and 




Tab. A1 - Number of arrival and departure countries; emigration and 
immigration by continent and area; values in million: 1950-60 and 
2000-10 
Tab. A2 -Migration balance of the first 25 arrival and departures countries; 
2000-2010; thousand 




Table A4 - Thailand - Labor market and demographic scenarios 2010-35 
Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment 
in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Table A6 -Singapore; Labor market and demographic scenarios 2010-35 
Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of 
employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Table A8 - Malaysia; Labor market and demographic scenarios 2010-35 
Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment 
in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Table A10 - ASEAN countries; men and women aged 15-44; educational 
attainment by sex; 2007 
 
 
List of graphs  
 
Graph 1 - ASEAN countries; total migration flows by destination; 1950-
2010 and 2005-2010; yearly values; thousand 
Graph 2 - ASEAN; Working age Population; generational entries, exits and 
balance n; 1950-55/2055-60 
Graph 3a - ASEAN countries; WAP; yearly average absolute change; 1950-
2060  
Graph 3b - ASEAN countries; WAP; yearly average percentage change; 
1950-2060 
Graph 4 -ASEAN countries; Working age population; percentage decline 
after reaching historical maximum; 2010-2060 
Graph 5 - ASEAN countries; national positive and negative migration 
balances; 2010-15/2055-60 
Graph 6 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario A; Manpower Needs 
/Additional Demand ratio 
Graph 7 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario B; Manpower Needs 
/Additional Demand ratio 
Graph 8 – Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; percentage of 
migrants on local population by main age group; 2010  
Graph 9 - ASEAN countries; percentage of men 15-44 with secondary or 
tertiary education; 2007 
Graph 10 - ASEAN countries; percentage of men 15-44 with tertiary 
education; 2007  
Graph 11; ASEAN countries; percentage of men 15-44 with secondary 




We shall work closely with workers, employers, 
civil society, and other organizations to provide a 
favorable environment for economic growth and 
employment creation, as a key strategy to 
accelerate economic recovery and growth. 
 
We shall give priority to capacity‐ building in 
order to develop a productive, competent, and 
competitive workforce. This will enable the people 
of ASEAN to meet the changing job demands and 
challenges in the face of the integration of regional 
and global labor markets. 
 
ASEAN Labor Ministers‟ Vision Statement, 2000 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 The Institutional background 
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 




Since 2000, ASEAN‟s activities on labor and human resources have 
been guided by ASEAN Labor Ministers (ALM) Work Programs. The first 
Work Program set five broad priorities in the areas of employment 
generation, labor market monitoring, labor mobility, social protection, and 
tripartite cooperation. In the ALM Joint Statement of 2006 a sixth priority 
area, namely occupational safety and health (OSH), was added to in the 
Work Program. Since then new areas of work have emerged, including 
protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, HIV prevention 
and control in the work place, employment and labor law, as expressed in 
the ASEAN community blueprints. 
A Ad-hoc Working Group on Progressive Labor Practices to Enhance 
the Competitiveness of ASEAN was established in 2006. In 2009, the 
ASEAN leaders adopted the Cha Am Hua Hin Declaration on Strengthening 
Cooperation on Education to Achieve a Caring and Sharing Community. 
The 17
th
 ASEAN summit, held in Hanoi in 2010, focused on skills 
development and life-long learning. In that occasion the Leaders of ASEAN 
adopted a Joint Statement on Human resources and Skills Development for 
Economic Recovery and Growth. 
The Joint Statement affirmed that: “HR development should be an 
integral part of a country‟s development strategy”, the rational being that 
“Human resources development correlates with productivity and higher 
productivity leads to higher economic growth.” It suggested that in the 
                                                 
1
 The paper has been written in the context of the project STVET (Strengthening Technical 
Vocational Education and Training) of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) 
financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB Grant Number: 0178-CAM) in which the author 
acted as Labor Market Information and Statistic Specialist. The views and opinions expressed in the 
paper are strictly those of the author. 
2 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint. 
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medium-and long-term regional countries should take measures, among 
others, to upgrade the quality of the workforce through improving the 
relevance and quality of education and training. It further suggested that the 
gradual shift from an export-oriented economy to a more internal 
consumption base economy that many ASEAN countries will experience 
will need a greater capacity to rapidly intervene in the development of HR. 
Finally it reminded that the social dialogue between employers and 
employees should be strengthened to better the matching between the skill 
needed by the employers and the training provided to the workers. The 
document concluded stating that the “ ... globalization, technological 
development and demographic change have added a sense of urgency to 
improving quality of HR as they change the workplace, the nature and 
organization of work.” 
According to the last ALM Work Program covering the period 2010-
2015: “ The overall objective of ASEAN cooperation on labor is to build 
towards the vision of a better quality of life, productive employment, and 
adequate social protection for ASEAN peoples through enhancing 
workforce competitiveness, creating a harmonious and progressive 
workplace, and promotion of decent work for all.” The work plan indicates 
four strategic priorities: i) Legal foundation; ii) Institutional capacity; iii) 
Social partners; iv) Labor market and workforce development. 
The first priority implies the protection of labor right and conditions, 
including those of migrant workers; the second the capacity of the 
Government bodies to oversee the enforcement of labor laws and regulation; 
the third the establishment of informed social dialogue among labor sector 
partners at the national and regional level. The fourth priority includes a set 
of goals that will be at the center of the present paper:  
1. Creating systems that will promote the mobility of skilled labor 
within ASEAN; 
2. Anticipating, analyzing, monitoring and communicating to labor 
sector stakeholders and the public the impact of trade liberalization 
and of other global economic challenges on employment, wages, 
working condition, skills demand, etc.; 
3. Promoting progressive labor practices with regard to workforce 
development, skills training and standards, labor productivity, and 
labor law in order to enhance the competitiveness of firms and 
workforces, and thus of the ASEAN Member States and the region 
overall; 
4. Generating, regularly updating, and effectively disseminating 
labor market information. 
 
 
1.2 The structure of the paper 
The paper is structured in four parts. The first part analyses the impact 
of the Demographic transition (that we will prefer to call Demographic 
revolution) on the demographic tendencies and indicators of ASEAN 
countries. It will document the fact that the members of ASEAN have 
proceeded at different speeds along the path of the Demographic revolution 
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and have reached different stages of this complex process. As a consequence, 
while some countries are already (or will be soon) characterized by a 
declining Working Age Population (WAP), in other WAP will continue to 
grow. This will create a structural lack of labor supply in some countries 
and an excess of labor supply in the others.  
In the second part of the paper a model is introduced that allows 
estimating manpower needs, migration flows, and population trends as a 
function of the evolution in WAP and alternative hypothesis on employment 
growth. The model is used to build alternative labor market and 
demographic scenarios for ASEAN arrival countries. The exercise clearly 
shows that the future economic growth of Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia will hinge on the arrival of very relevant numbers of foreign 
workers. The results are discussed on the basis of the tendencies exhibited in 
previous periods by migration flows in the Asian continent and more 
specifically in ASEAN countries and of a critical appraisal of the 
projections made by the United Nations Population Division.  
The third part of the paper discusses alternative growth theories and 
their implications in terms of industrial and educational policies. It will be 
shown that according to the New evolutionary economics, growth is lead by 
the accumulation of capabilities that allows, in a first phase, to diversify 
production inside a given knowledge cluster, and then to jump to new 
knowledge clusters, i.e. to move to higher quality products. 
The fourth part of the paper reviews the educational attainments of 
ASEAN countries. It then discusses the relationship between their education 
structure and the stage of growth they have reached and outlines their 
present options for technology and product diversification. 
The conclusion will bring together the main results reached in the four 
parts of the paper and spell out a series of policy suggestions.  
 
 
2 THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 In 1950 the total population of ASEAN countries amounted to around 
172 million; after 60 years it reached almost 593 million and by now it 
should have passed the 600 million mark
3
. The average growth of 7 million 
per year registered in this long time interval is the result of 11 million births, 
4 million deaths, and of around 150,000 net migrants per year (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
3 Percentage rates of growth above the regional average (243.7 per cent) have been registered by the 
four smallest countries (Brunei, Singapore, Laos and Malaysia), together with Philippines, that 
register an astonishing demographic growth of 407%. As a consequence, Philippines are now the 
second most populous country in ASEAN after Indonesia that remains the most populous one with 





Rather surprisingly, these long-run yearly average values are almost 
identical to those of the 2005-2010 period, the only notable difference being 
represented by the average number of net migrants that has soared to almost 




Between 1950 and 2010 the largest migration flows were originated by 
Philippines (more than 5 million), followed by Indonesia (4.6 million), Vietnam 
(3.2 million), Myanmar (1.8 million), Cambodia (0.8 million) and Laos (0.5 
million). Positive migration balances were registered by Thailand (2.6 million), 
Malaysia and Singapore, with 1.8 million each, and Brunei with 0.5 million
4
. 
Therefore, in 60 years six ASEAN countries have generated a little more than 16 
million migrants (267,000 per year); of these 6.8 million (42.6 per cent) have 
                                                 












Brunei 47 345 35 310 496 806 853
Cambodia 4,346 18,650 8,055 10,595 -803 9,792 14,138
Indonesia 74,838 271,095 101,475 169,620 -4,590 165,030 239,868
Laos 1,683 7,910 2,850 5,060 -540 4,520 6,203
Malaysia 6,112 26,105 5,670 20,435 1,855 22,290 28,402
Myanmar 17,156 58,600 25,970 32,630 -1,810 30,820 47,976
Philippines 18,395 102,395 22,400 79,995 -5,135 74,860 93,255
Singapore 1,025 3,010 815 2,195 1,865 4,060 5,085
Thailand 20,608 67,210 21,340 45,870 2,615 48,485 69,093
Vietnam 28,263 101,205 38,440 62,765 -3,170 59,595 87,858
Total 172,473 656,525 227,050 429,475 -9,218 420,258 592,731
10,942 3,784 7,158 -154 7,004
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 1 - ASEAN countries; population, births, deaths and migration balance; 













Brunei 809 40 5 35 9 44 853
Cambodia 13,358 1,605 565 1,040 -260 780 14,138
Indonesia 227,303 22,320 8,460 13,860 -1,295 12,565 239,868
Laos 5,753 720 195 525 -75 450 6,203
Malaysia 26,097 2,855 635 2,220 85 2,305 28,402
Myanmar 46,331 4,230 2,085 2,145 -500 1,645 47,976
Philippines 85,540 11,590 2,640 8,950 -1,235 7,715 93,255
Singapore 4,270 205 110 95 720 815 5,085
Thailand 66,668 4,365 2,430 1,935 490 2,425 69,093
Vietnam 83,168 7,360 2,240 5,120 -430 4,690 87,858
Total 559,297 55,290 19,365 35,925 -2,491 33,434 592,731
11,058 3,873 7,185 -498 6,687
Source - United Nations, 2011a





moved to other ASEAN countries
5
), while 9.2 million have left the ASEAN region 
(57.4 per cent).  
 
 
 Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
In the last 5 years, the yearly average number of migrants has grown 
to 759,000, 261,000 of which headed toward some ASEAN countries, while 
the other 498,000 left the region (Graph.1). The departure countries have 
remained the same, but out-migration is now very concentrated, with 
Indonesia and Philippines accounting respectively for 34.1% and 32.5% of 
the total. At the same time two countries, Singapore and Thailand, 
accounted for 92.8 per cent of the total positive migration balance.  It must 
also be underlined that the percentage of migrants that have moved within 
ASEAN has diminished from 42.7 per cent over the total period to 34.4 per 
cent in the last 5-year period. 
The demographic boom registered by all ASEAN countries has been 
the result of the so-called “demographic transition” that is also going to 
have a very strong impact on their demographic future. The demographic 
transition has been defined as the passage from a traditional demographic 
regime, characterized by high fertility and high mortality, to a modern 
demographic regime, characterized by low fertility and low mortality. The 
drop in fertility below replacement level that by now has already taken place 
in around 50 developed and developing countries puts in serious doubt that 
what we are witnessing is a transition, i.e. the passage from an equilibrium 
regime to another equilibrium regime. Therefore, from now on we will use 
the terminology demographic revolution that is much more suggestive of the 
creative demographic disorder that is presently affecting the world.  
In 1950-55, in all ASEAN countries, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) – 
that we can loosely define as the total number of children per woman- was 
well above world average (4.95) (Table 3). Only two countries, Laos and 
Indonesia, registered a TFR below 6, while in the Philippines the TFR was 
                                                 
5 In this context, it should be underlined that 62% of the extraordinary demographic growth of Brunei 
is due to immigration. 
1950 -2010 2005-2010 Diff.
Total migration flows 267 759 492
Within ASEAN 114 261 147










Graph 1 - ASEAN  countries; total migration flows by destination; 
1950-2010 and 2005-2010; yearly values; thousand 
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above 7 and in Brunei exactly 7. In the other six countries the TFR ranged 
from 6.61, registered by Singapore, and 6 registered by Myanmar. After 60 
years only Philippines and Laos register TFR above 3 and four countries 
(Myannar, Vietnam, Thailand and  Singapore) are already below 
replacement level
6
, while Indonesia and Brunei could reach this historical 
borderline during the present decade. In all these countries the TFR has 
dimished by more than 60%, with record values registered by Singapore (-




A declining trend has characterized also mortality. Life expectancy 
has increased in all ASEAN countries, the most spectacular results having 
being achieved by Vietnam and Indonesia whose life expectancy at birth has 
increased respectively by 6.8 and 5.8 months per year. The spread between 
the maximum value (80.6, Singapore) and the minimum value (61.5, 
Cambodia) remains, however, very large
7
 (Table 4).   
 
. 
                                                 
6 The replacement level is the level at which total population remains constant and is approximately 
2.1children per woman 
7 The main determinant of this large difference is represented by infant mortality.  
Table 3 - ASEAN countries; total fertility rate; 1950-55 and 2005-10
1950-55 2005-10 Abs. change % change
Philippines 7.42 3.27 4.15 55.9
Laos 5.94 3.02 2.92 49.2
Cambodia 6.29 2.80 3.49 55.5
Malaysia 6.23 2.72 3.51 56.3
Indonesia 5.49 2.19 3.30 60.1
Brunei 7.00 2.11 4.89 69.9
Myanmar 6.00 2.08 3.92 65.3
Vietnam 6.20 1.89 4.31 69.5
Thailand 6.14 1.63 4.51 73.5
Singapore 6.61 1.25 5.36 81.1








Cambodia 39.4 61.5 22.1 4.4
Myanmar 36.0 63.5 27.5 5.5
Laos 42.4 66.1 23.7 4.7
Philippines 55.4 67.8 12.4 2.5
Indonesia 38.8 67.9 29.1 5.8
Malaysia 55.4 73.4 18.0 3.6
Thailand 50.7 73.6 22.9 4.6
Vietnam 40.4 74.3 33.9 6.8
Brunei 57.7 77.5 19.8 4.0
Singapore 60.2 80.6 20.4 4.1
Max - Min -18.3 -19.1 0.8 0.2
Source - United Nations, 2011a





These data do clearly show that ASEAN countries have been moving 
along the path of the demographic revolution at different speed, due to the 
political, economic and social events that have characterized their history in 
the second half of the XX century and in the beginning of the XXI century. 
The different position of each ASEAN country along the path of the 
demographic revolution can be captured and further documented with the 
help of other demographic indicators such as the Infant mortality rate and 
the structure of population by main age group. 
The Infant mortality rate (IMR) plays a very important role in 
determining the level and the trend of life expectancy at birth (Table 5). In 
1950, the Infant mortality rate (the number of children that die before 
reaching one year of age per thousand) presented a wide range of values that 
were reflected by life expectancy data. The most dramatic situation was that 
of Myanmar, where more than one child out of 5 died before age one; 
Singapore presented the best situation, but also in Singapore 1 child out of 




In the following 60 years, all ASEAN countries have made substantial 
improvements so that the worst-case scenario registered in 2010 is similar to 
the best-case scenario in 1950. Infant mortality has been completely 
eradicated in Singapore, and values of the IMR below 10 per thousand are 
registered in Brunei and Malaysia, with Thailand at 12.4. Vietnam, 
Philippines and Indonesia present values between 20 and 30, Vietnam and 
Indonesia being between the countries that have accomplished the biggest 
improvements, and Philippines the one with the worst performance.  Laos, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia occupy the last three positions in the ranking.  
In a first phase, the demographic revolution generates waves of births 
of increasing magnitude and then waves of declining magnitude. The 
passage of time makes each cohort move orderly along the path of life, 
2010 1950 Dff.
Singapore 1.9 60.7 -58.8
Brunei 4.8 90.2 -85.4
Malaysia 7.7 96.4 -88.7
Thailand 12.4 130.3 -117.9
Vietnam 20.4 157.9 -137.5
Philippines 23.0 96.8 -73.8
Indonesia 28.8 191.9 -163.1
Laos 44.5 167.1 -122.6
Myannar 55.0 212.8 -157.8
Cambodia 62.4 165.1 -102.7
Max-Min 60.5 152.1 -91.6
Table 5 -ASEAN countries; Infant mortality 
rate; 1950 and 2010
Source - United Nations, 2011a
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determining first a huge expansion of the proportion of children and then an 
increasing proportion of people in working age.  
The different stage reached by each ASEAN countries along the path 
of the demographic revolution is therefore illustrated also by the percentage 
of young people and of WAP (Table 6). The percentage of the former is 
included between a minimum of 17.4 per cent in Singapore and a maximum 
of 35.5 per cent in the Philippines, with other three countries registering 
values above 30 per cent: Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. At the same time 
Singapore presents the highest percentage of WAP (73.6 per cent), and other 
three countries (Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei) are characterized by values 
above 70 per cent. At the opposite end of the ranking we find as expected 
the Philippines, where WAP weights only 60.9 per cent, preceded by Laos, 





3 THE EVOLUTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION  
3.1 ASEAN 
Given the scope of this paper, we will now concentrate our attention 
on the effects of the Demographic revolution on WAP that is the source of 
labor supply, a first necessary step to analyze labor mobility and the role of 
education and vocational training.  
As we have already seen, from this perspective, one of the first 
impacts of the Demographic revolution is that of provoking an extremely 
relevant increase in WAP
8
, a phenomenon that has initially characterized the 
                                                 
8 The first manifestation of the demographic transition is the reduction of the infant mortality rate that 
will then be translated into an increase in the size of the cohorts entering reproductive age, while the 
TFR is still at the traditional level. This will, in its turn, provoke a progressive increase in the number 
of yearly births, a trend that will continue also when the fertility rate will start to drop, due to the 
increasing dimension of the cohorts in reproductive age. This is the chain of events that has 
0-14 15-64 65+ 80+
Singapore 17.4 73.6 9.0 1.8
Thailand 20.5 70.6 8.9 1.7
Vietnam 23.6 70.4 6.0 1.2
Brunei 26.2 70.2 3.6 0.7
Myanmar 25.8 69.2 5.0 0.8
Indonesia 27.0 67.4 5.6 0.7
Malaysia 30.3 64.9 4.8 0.6
Cambodia 31.9 64.3 3.8 0.4
Laos 34.5 61.6 3.9 0.5
Philippines 35.5 60.9 3.6 0.4
Max - Min 18.1 12.7 5.4 1.4
Table 6 - ASEAN countries; total population; 
percentage composition by main age group; 2010
Source - author elaboration on United Nations data, 
United Nation,  2011a
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developed countries -the firsts to enter the demographic revolution in the 
XVIII and XIX century- then the developing countries from the middle of 
the XIX century, and is now starting to affect the least developed countries.  
Graph 2 shows the impact of the demographic revolution on the total 
WAP of ASEAN. Initially, the expansion in WAP has been driven by an 
extraordinary increase in generational entries
9
 that grew from an average 
yearly value of around 4 million in the fifties to record values of above 11 
million between 1995 and 2010. Generational exits have started to register 
relevant increases only at the beginning of the „90s when bigger cohorts 
have reached “retirement age”. As a consequence of these events as well of 
the migration flows we have previously documented, the WAP of ASEAN 
has increased from 100 million in 1950 to 398 million in 2010. We can, 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
At the beginning of the new century ASEAN WAP starts to exhibit 
the second effect of the demographic revolution: a progressive, but rather 
fast slowdown in its rate of growth, due mainly to the increase in 
generational exits, but also to the smaller number of young people reaching 
working age. According to the U.N. Population Division, in about 30 year, 
generational exits from WAP will begin to exceed generational entries and 
WAP will start to decline. On the basis of the hypotheses adopted by the 
Population Division for the Medium variant scenario, inclusive of the 
assumptions on migration that we will discuss in a later paragraph, ASEAN 
                                                                                                                            
determined the explosion of WAP in developed countries in the second half of the XIX century and at 
the beginning of the XX. 
9  Generational entries are equal to the number of people who become 15 in the time interval 
considered, while generational exits are equal to the number of people who become 65 in the same 













































































































































Graph 2 - ASEAN; Working age population; generational entries, generational 
exits and natural balance; 1950-55/2055-60 
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Graphs 3a and 3b present the evolution of the yearly average absolute 
change and of the yearly average rate of growth of WAP registered between 
1950 and 2010 and the values forecasted for the following 50 years.  
 
 
Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The absolute growth of ASEAN WAP did reach a maximum value of 
7.2 million in the 1995-2000 interval, and is now down to around 6 million; 
it is expected to decline to 3.5 million at the beginning of the 2020s, to 1.5 
million at the beginning of the 2030s, and to become negative in the 2040s. 
The percentage rate of growth did peak earlier, in the 1980-85 period, at 3.1 
per cent. It is now down to 1.4 per cent, and is expected to decline by 
around 60 per cent every ten years.  
These data show that the pressure to create additional jobs in order to 
accommodate the incoming generations is already declining and it will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This trend will, on one hand, 
facilitate the ongoing process of modernization, i.e. the substitution of 
employment in the agricultural sector with employment in the modern 
sectors, but on the other will make unavoidable a marked increase in the 
exchange of Labor force within ASEAN.  
 
 
3.2 The country level  
As we have already discussed, the ten countries that constitute 
ASEAN have been moving along the path of the demographic revolution at 
different speed and, therefore, they are presently located in different stages 
of this process. As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, this has very 
important implications with respect to internal and external mobility.   
WAP, net of migrations, is forecasted to continue to grow until 2060 
in only two of the ten ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Philippines. In all 
the other eight, an historical maximum will be reached at or before 2050. 
The first country whose WAP would peak in absence of migration is 
Singapore, in 2015; Thailand will follow in 2020; Myanmar, Vietnam and 
Indonesia in 2035; Brunei in 2040; Cambodia in 2045; Laos in 2050 (Table 
7).  
 
                                                 







































































































































































































































































































As a consequence, in absence of migration, these eight countries will 
register very substantial declines in WAP although over different time 
intervals, the duration of the interval obviously playing a central role in 
determining the amount of the decline. Singapore, the most advanced 
country along the demographic revolution and the first to register the 
historical peak of WAP, is forecasted to lose almost 50 per cent of its WAP, 
Thailand 27.1 per cent, Vietnam 17.3 per cent, Myanmar 10.7 per cent and 
the other countries percentages between 4 and 7 per cent (Graph 4) All 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The most suggestive aspect is, however, that from 2015 ASEAN will 
start to include an increasing number of countries that will be characterized 
by a declining WAP and others where WAP will still be growing, but at a 
diminishing pace.   
Table 7 -ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute values; 1950 -2060
Singapore Thailand Myanmar Vietnam Indonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos Malaysia Philippines ASEAN
1950 585 11,257 10,704 18,063 42,561 29 2,395 966 3,305 9,717 99,582
1960 897 14,770 11,709 19,520 51,944 43 2,980 1,174 4,167 12,985 120,189
1970 1,202 19,395 14,241 22,891 63,349 68 3,746 1,481 5,666 18,085 150,124
1980 1,647 27,045 18,301 29,361 83,461 112 3,778 1,699 7,946 25,188 198,538
1990 2,200 37,259 23,418 38,242 110,202 157 5,086 2,209 10,796 34,334 263,903
2000 2,791 43,654 28,970 49,079 137,966 218 6,893 2,873 14,715 45,079 332,238
2005 3,068 46,417 31,053 55,554 150,282 247 8,058 3,287 16,572 50,877 365,415
2010 3,742 48,786 33,206 61,842 161,699 282 9,090 3,821 18,432 56,819 397,719
2015 3,783 49,935 35,428 65,930 173,599 302 10,083 4,389 20,191 64,315 427,955
2020 3,669 50,071 36,773 68,438 184,564 320 10,892 4,872 21,799 71,721 453,119
2025 3,421 49,211 37,799 70,570 192,514 335 11,641 5,296 23,044 78,505 472,336
2030 3,176 47,794 38,519 71,714 197,661 345 12,308 5,669 24,117 85,162 486,465
2035 2,898 45,855 38,792 71,924 199,921 353 12,884 6,004 25,203 91,690 495,524
2040 2,705 43,870 38,484 70,955 199,899 355 13,339 6,272 26,191 97,971 500,041
2045 2,529 41,918 37,950 69,193 198,032 352 13,775 6,440 27,031 103,607 500,827
2050 2,356 39,966 37,063 66,263 194,648 351 13,500 6,493 27,623 108,480 496,743
2055 2,201 38,084 35,827 62,866 190,939 345 13,275 6,408 28,010 112,377 490,332
2060 1,981 36,171 34,632 59,515 186,766 339 12,876 6,212 28,207 115,439 482,138
1950-2010 3,157 37,529 22,502 43,779 119,138 253 6,695 2,855 15,127 47,102 298,137
2010 -2060 -1,761 -12,615 1,426 -2,327 25,067 57 3,786 2,391 9,775 58,620 84,419
Max - 2010 41 1,285 5,586 10,082 38,222 73 4,685 2,672 9,775 58,620 103,108
2060-Max -1,802 -13,900 -4,160 -12,409 -13,155 -16 -899 -281 9,775 58,620 -18,689



















Graph 4 -ASEAN countries; Working age population ; percentage 








Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
Graph 5 shows how the progressive reduction in ASEAN WAP 
growth and its becoming negative starting in 2040 will be brought about by 
the fact that an increasing number of countries will register a negative trend 
in their WAP. 
 
 
4 THE CAUSES OF ECONOMIC MIGRATIONS  
International migration flows are largely explained by the co-presence 
of countries characterized by a structural lack of labor supply and countries 
characterized by a structural excess of labor supply
11
, the thesis being that 
migrations are demand driven, but take place only when excess supply is 
present in other countries
12
.  
                                                 
11 For a detailed presentation of the model and an application to a series of countries and areas with 
below replacement fertility see M. Bruni, 2009; for an application to China see M. Bruni 2013 and  
2011, and M. Bruni and C. Tabacchi, 2011.  
12 According to this perspective the Migration Balance of arrival countries are determined by their 
Total Manpower Needs. As a consequence the world total migration flows are largely determined by 
the need of labor in arrival countries.  
Singapore Thailand Myanmar VietnamIndonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos MalaysiaPhilippines ASEAN
2010-2015 8 230 444 818 2,380 4 199 114 352 1,499 6,047
2015-2020 -23 27 269 502 2,193 4 162 97 322 1,481 5,033
2020-2025 -50 -172 205 426 1,590 3 150 85 249 1,357 3,843
2025-2030 -49 -283 144 229 1,029 2 133 75 215 1,331 2,826
2030-2035 -56 -388 55 42 452 2 115 67 217 1,306 1,812
2035-2040 -39 -397 -62 -194 -4 0 91 54 198 1,256 903
2040-2045 -35 -390 -107 -352 -373 -1 87 34 168 1,127 157
2045-2050 -35 -390 -177 -586 -677 0 -55 11 118 975 -817
2050-2055 -31 -376 -247 -679 -742 -1 -45 -17 77 779 -1,282
2055-2060 -44 -318 -239 -670 -835 -1 -80 -39 39 612 -1,574
Absolute yearly change 
Table 8 - ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute yearly change; 2010-2060; thousand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United Nations, 2011a
2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2025-30 2030-35 2035-40 2040-45 2045-50 2050-55 2055-60
Balance 6,047 5,033 3,843 2,826 1,812 903 157 -817 -1,282 -1,574
Pos 6,047 5,056 4,065 3,158 2,255 1,599 1,416 1,104 857 652















We will say that a country is characterized by a structural lack of labor 
supply, when a relevant share of the available jobs cannot be covered by the 
local labor supply. Analogously, we will say that a country is characterized 
by a structural excess of labor supply when a relevant and growing share of 
its labor supply cannot find employment. The countries characterized by a 
structural lack of labor supply are potential countries of arrival, while the 
countries characterized by a structural excess of labor supply are potential 
countries of departure. 
Let‟s define Total Manpower Needs as the difference between the 
increase in labor supply and the increase in labor demand, over a given time 
interval. Taking an operational perspective, the change in labor supply can 
be identified with the change in the level of the local Labor force (ΔLF) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1). The increase in labor 
demand can be identified with the change in the level of employment (ΔE) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1).  
The absolute change in the Labor force is the results of two 
components, one of demographic origin, the second connected to the 
propensity of the people in working age to participate in labor market 
activities. The former is identified in the change of the level of the Labor 
force due to the change in the level of Working age population, keeping the 
participation rate constant. Therefore, it is equal to the product between the 
change in WAP (ΔWAP)
13
 and the rate of participation (rop) at the 
beginning of the period. The latter is the result of the change in participation 
behavior taking place during the interval considered, and it is equal to the 
product between the change in the rate of participation and the level of the 
Labor force at the end of the period.  
 
1] tTMN(t+1) = tΔLF(t+1)  - tΔE(t+1) 
                                 = [(ropt * tΔWAP(t+1)) +( tΔropt+1 * LF(t+1))] -  tΔE(t+1)   
 
All three components of [1] can be positive or negative, depending on 
the trends in Employment, Labor force and Rate of participation. This 
implies that also Manpower Needs can be positive or negative.  
A negative value of TMN implies that the growth in labor supply has 
been (or is forecasted to be) smaller than the growth in employment. As we 
have already stated, a negative difference between the change in labor 
supply and labor demand identifies a situation of structural lack of labor 
supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting phenomenon. In a first phase the 
difference can be, at least partially, satisfied by the unemployed, by an 
increase in Labor force participation, especially women, by internal 
migrations from more underdeveloped internal areas. Sooner or later, these 
additional sources of labor supply will necessarily be exhausted and 
international migrations will represent the only possible solution. 
By converse, a positive value does imply that the country is 
accumulating an excess of labor supply that cannot be satisfied by local 
                                                 
13 What we will consider is in fact the natural balance of WAP, which is equal to the difference 






. As in the previous case, this situation can be identified as 
Structural excess of labor supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting 
phenomenon. In this case, the situation initially can be dealt with by an 
expansion of the informal economy, a widening of the average dimension of 
the family and by a reduction in the participation rate, especially of women. 
However, in the long run, only massive migration flows can solve the 
problem. In their absence, a growing number of young people will find 
themselves without any perspective for the future, and could be willing to 
do anything because a life without job is also a life without value. Also in 
this case, in the long run only migration can provide a solution to the 
problem  
A few final considerations are needed. In the first place what we are 
considering are the very special situations that have been created, are 
created and will inevitably be created by the demographic revolution. They 
are characterized by changes in the level of WAP of such a dimension that 
cannot be dealt with, on one hand, by wage adjustments or increases in 
productivity and, on the other, by high rates of growth of employment.  
The declines in WAP brought about by the demographic revolution 
have often such a dimension and will span over such a long period that it is 
totally unrealistic to assume that labor productivity could grow enough to 
both offset the decline in labor supply and allow production to grow. Let‟s 
for instance consider the case of Japan. According to the Population 
Division medium variant scenario, between 2010 and 2060, the WAP (15-
64) of Japan is expected to decline by 34.8 per cent, from 81 to 53 million. 
The direct implication is that in order to avoid more immigrants than the 2.8 
million hypothesized by the UNPD, labor productivity should increase by 
34.8 percentage points more
15
 than the percentage growth in production
16
.  
Given that the increase in labor productivity does not represent a 
viable alternative to migration, do other alternatives exist? The only 
economically viable alternative is to move production abroad. However it 
has been rightly observed: “As its economy matured and its population aged, 
a country could safely become a rentier state, boosting its economic product, 
and in particular paying its pensions, with the income from its international 
investments. The more youthful countries on the receiving end would no 
doubt prefer the inflow of capital to an outflow of labor. In the world as it is, 
however, that may be a less prudent portfolio diversification by an ageing 
society of retirees than an hostage to fortune.”
17
 In practice, the 
delocalization of production is a viable economic solution, but it presents 
risks that a country could not be willing to take. 
                                                 
14 It should be obvious that in all the countries that find themselves in this situation the real wage 
already at or below the subsistence level cannot be an answer to the problem.  
15 In the last 50 years production has increased more than productivity in all industrialized countries 
as shown by the fact that in the long run employment has increased in all of them, declining only in 
periods of heavy restructuring of the production structure or of economic crisis.  It must also be 
recalled that the larger the service sector the more difficult is to achieve high rate of growth of 
productivity or, stated in another way, the employment-income elasticity tends to be low in post 
industrial economies.  
16 This is implicit in the fact that the growth in employment is identically equal to the difference 
between the rate of growth in production an the rate of growth in productivity.  
17 McNicoll, D. 2000 
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The situation of excess labor supply generated by the Demographic 
revolution normally takes place in countries still largely dominated by the 
agricultural sector and in which the process of modernization requires not 
only the expansion in the employment level of Industry and Services, but 
also a growth in the employment level of these two sectors sufficient to 
replace non productive jobs in agriculture. Initially, the most probable 
outcome is that agriculture absorbs the excess of labor supply determining 
the situation described in Lewis seminal article in which the real wage is at 
subsistence level. However, with time large migration flows could be the 
only available mean to avoid the spread of poverty and income inequality.  
The last point we have to consider is the relationship between 
Manpower needs and migration flows.  In general we can say that the level 
of migration is positively related to manpower needs: 
 
2] Migr = B TMN 
 
where B is equal to or greater than 1. At the beginning of any economic emigration 
process, only workers will move to the destination country. With time, they will be 
eventually reached by some members of the family. Therefore, at the initial stage B 
is equal to 1 and will then progressively increase. Previous analyses have shown 





5 ASEAN MIGRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
ASEAN includes countries like Philippines and Indonesia whose 
workers are migrating not only within ASEAN and to other Asian countries, 
but also to Europe, America and Australia, while Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia are becoming prominent arrival countries. To provide some more 
solid reference points to the forecasting exercise we are going to present in 
the following paragraphs, we deem relevant to present a concise overview of 
the tendencies in international migrations and project the migratory behavior 
of ASEAN countries against the general background of the Asian continent.  
Between 1950 and 2010, international migration flows have been 
characterized by three main trends: i) a substantial increase in the total level; 
ii) a notable increase in the percentage of intercontinental flows; iii) very 
relevant changes in the structures of both arrival and departures flows by 
area and continent.  
Between 1950-55 and 1990-95 international migration flows have 
increased almost fourfold, from 6 to 28.6 million, a value that still marks the 
historical maximum. After a small contraction registered in the last five 
years of the century, between 2000 and 2010, around 54 million people have 
left their native countries, bringing the total number of world migrants in the 
last sixty years above the 200 million mark (Table A1).  
Between 1950 and 1960, intercontinental migration flows represented 
48 per cent of total international migration flows (6.7 million out of 14 
million); between 2000 and 2010 the percentage has increased to 62 per cent 
(34 out of 54 million) (Table A1).  
                                                 
18 M. Bruni,  2009 
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In the former period, intercontinental migration flows were generated, 
in order of importance, by Europe, Africa and South America, while the 
main areas of arrival were the New World Countries (NWC: USA, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand) and Asia. In the latter period, departures were 
generated mostly by Asia, Central and South America, and Africa, while the 
main areas of arrival were Europe, NWC and Gulf Countries (GC). 
Therefore, in only sixty years, Europe has become the main area of arrival, 
while Asia has become the world major supplier of labor. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the NWC were the main pole of attraction of 
international migration flows. They received around half a million migrants 
per year, i.e. 36.4 per cent of total migration flows. Western Europe (with 
France and Germany, but also Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden) was the 
second pole of attraction. Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela represented the 
third pole of attraction (Table A2).  
Fifty years later the situation has radically changed. As we have 
already seen, Europe has become the main port of arrival, while the 
Countries of the Gulf have become the third largest pole of attraction after 
the NWC. Eastern, Central and especially Southern Asia, Central and 
Southern America, Northern, Eastern and Western Africa are now the areas 
that provide labor to the rest of the world. More specifically, on one hand: 
 Europe has received 20.1 million migrants 19; 
 Arrivals in the NWC have been in excess of 15 million; 72.8 per 
cent have chosen the US, 11.7 per cent Australia, 4.3 per cent 
Canada and 1.3 per cent New Zealand;  
 The GCs have attracted 8.7 million immigrants, 3.9 million of 
which went to the Arab Emirates and 2.8 million to Saudi Arabia.  
On the other hand, both Latin America and Africa had negative 
migration balances of respectively 11.2 million
20
 and 6.3 million
21
. 
Beside the six Gulf countries, other 15 Asian countries have registered 
positive migration balances so that the total number of arrivals has exceeded 
14 million, while 27 countries have been affected by negative migration 
balances for a total amount of 30.6 million. Therefore, the continental 
migration balance has been negative and equal to around 16 million (Table 
A3).  
After the two largest gulf countries (Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), 
the main arrival country has been Thailand, followed by Qatar and 
Singapore. The list of Asian arrival countries includes other 5 countries in 
                                                 
19 Of the 40 European countries 27 are arrival countries and 13 departure countries. The main arrival 
countries have been, in order of relevance, Spain, Italy, the Russian Federation, and the United 
Kingdom, followed by the more traditional arrival countries such as France and Germany, together 
with Sweden, Belgium and Austria. Exits from the departures countries have been only 1.8 million.  
20  Between 2000 and 2010 only 8 Latin America countries have registered a positive migration 
balance, and for a very modest total value of 0.4 million. Negative migration balances, for a total 
value of 11,6 million, have been registered by the other 28 countries. Mexico with 4.4 million (37.9 
per cent of the total) leads the ranking followed by Peru, Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
21 In Africa 16 countries have registered positive migration balances for a total value of almost 4 
million; 36 have registered negative migration balances summing to more than 10 million. South 
Africa (1.6 million) has been the most important arrival country followed by Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, both accounting for more than half a million immigrants. The ranking of arrival countries is 
lead by Zimbabwe, followed by Morocco, Ivory Cost, Guinea and Egypt.   
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Eastern Asia, (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon), but also 
Afghanistan and Bhutan, Hong Kong and Macao, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Japan. If the main country of departure has been India -that has generated 
almost half a million migrants per year- other 5 countries have registered 
more or about 250,000 departures per year: Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Philippines. These six countries are between the seven most 
important departure countries, the other being Mexico, that ranks second 
after India (Table A2).  
In conclusion, of the 21 Asian arrival countries, 4 are ASEAN 
countries, Thailand and Singapore being respectively the third and fifth 
more relevant arrival countries in Asia. At the same time, other two ASEAN 
countries, Philippines and Indonesia, are fifth and sixth in the Asian ranking 





6 LABOR MARKET AND DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS  
We will now propose some Manpower Needs and Migration scenarios 
for the three ASEAN countries that have registered the largest positive 
migration balances during the 2005-2010 period: Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia
23
. The scenarios have been constructed on the basis of the model 
we have previously introduced.  
The scenarios are relevant not only because Singapore and Thailand 
are the two ASEAN countries that have reached the most advanced stage of 
the demographic revolution, but because they will be the firsts to register a 
negative natural balance of WAP (15-64) that will then progressively 
increase in absolute value. Malaysia, while having progressed a lot in terms 
of life expectancy and infant mortality is still characterized by a rather high 
TFR and, according to the Population Division, its TFR is expected to 
decline at much lower speed than those of the other ASEAN countries. 
However, as we have already seen, Malaysia has already been receiving a 
relevant, although smaller than in the past, number of migrants.  
 
 
6.1 Main tendencies of the labor market in Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia  
Between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered notable percentage increases in the level of employment (Table 9), 
the record value (34.4 per cent) being that of Singapore, followed by 
Malaysia (10.8 per cent), and Thailand (7.9 per cent). Despite the positive 
migration flows registered during the same period, in Singapore and 
Thailand the Labor force has grown less than employment. Therefore, both 
countries have registered a decline in the level of unemployment, and 
obviously an even more pronounced decline in the rate of unemployment. In 
Malaysia, Labor force has increased slightly more than employment, but the 
unemployment rate has declined. Taken together, the 3 countries have 
                                                 
22  The average yearly values have been: 144,000 (Singapore), 98,000 (Thailand) and 17,000 
(Malaysia).  
23 The other country to register a positive migration balance has been Brunei. 
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generated, over the five-year period, 4.6 million jobs, equal to a percentage 




As we have already seen, according to the United Nation Population 
Division, between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered net migration balances of respectively 720,000, 490,000 and 
85,000 people, for a grand total of 1,295,000, a value that, as we will see 
later, does probably largely underestimate the real value. It is therefore 
evident that without migrants the growth in labor supply would have been 
insufficient to face the growth in labor demand: in Singapore migrants have 
covered almost the total increase in labor demand (95.2 per cent), in 
Thailand 17.6 per cent and in Malaysia around 11 per cent. Therefore, 
migrants have covered 30 per cent of the 4.6 million total increase in 
employment registered by the three countries taken together.  
 
 
6.2 Hypothesis and computational procedures  
In order to provide some indications on the probable trends in the 
number and typology of migrants that will be needed by Singapore, 
Thailand and Malaysia in the next 25 years, we have proceeded to build for 
each countries labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-
35, articulated on five-year periods. As indicated in a previous paragraph, 
the future level of the Migration balance of these three countries will depend 
mainly on their Manpower needs that, in their turn, will be the result of the 
trends in labor supply and labor demand.  
We recall, first of all, that our scenarios will be based on population, 
employment and labor force 15 years and older. This choice has been 
imposed by the fact that all three countries are characterized by a large labor 
market participation of people above 64 years of age, and by the 
consideration that this segment of potential supply is going to increase 
enormously in the next 25 years, as shown in table 10.  
Due to its high TFR Malaysia has remained the youngest of the three 
countries we are considering with a percentage of elderly of only 4.8 per 
Table 9 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; main labour market variables and indicators; 2005 ad 2010
2005 2010 Abs. change % change 2005 2010 Abs. change % change 
Employment 2,267 3,047 781 34.4 35,257 38,037 2780 7.9
Unemployment 101 89 -12 -11.6 663 402 -261 -39.3
Labour force 2,367 3,136 769 32.5 35,920 38,440 2519 7.0
WAP (65 +) 3,376 4,198 822 24.4 48,942 52,856 3914 8.0
roa 70.1 74.7 4.6 6.5 73.4 72.7 -0.7 -0.9
roe 67.1 72.6 5.4 8.1 72.0 72.0 -0.1 -0.1
rou 4.2 2.8 -1.4 -33.3 1.8 1.0 -0.8 -43.3
Employment 10,045 11,129 1084 10.8 47,569 52,214 4645 9.8
Unemployment 368 388 20 5.4 1,132 879 -253 -22.3
Labour force 10,414 11,517 1104 10.6 48,701 53,093 4392 9.0
WAP (65 +) 16,451 18,369 1918 11.7 68,769 75,423 6654 9.7
roa 63.3 62.7 -0.6 -0.9 70.8 70.4 -0.4 -0.6
roe 61.1 60.6 -0.5 -0.8 69.2 69.2 0.1 0.1
rou 3.5 3.4 -0.2 -4.7 2.3 1.7 -0.7 -28.8





cent versus values of 8.9 and 8.7 per cent in Singapore and Thailand. 
According to the Medium variant projection of the Population Division, in 
the next 25 years, the percentage of elderly will reach 14.5 per cent in 




Coming now to our computations, the absolute change in labor supply 
for each of the five year period from 2010-2035 has been estimated by i) 
computing the absolute change in WAP for each period and ii) multiplying 
it by the 2010 rate of participation. We must point out that: 
 We have considered only one demographic scenario based on the 
Medium variant projection of the Population Division, the reason 
being that the other scenarios do not present notable differences 
since: i) the people who will enter WAP in the next fifteen years are 
already born; ii) those that will enter WAP in the following 10 years 
are those that will be born in the next 8 years and no dramatic 
changes in the TFR are at present foreseeable; iii) all the UN 
scenarios adopt the same hypotheses on mortality.  
 According to the previous model, another element that affects the 
trend in the level of labor supply is the rate of participation, or more 
specifically its changes over time. As we have already suggested, 
Singapore and Thailand boost extremely high participation rates 
(74.7 and 72.7 per cent) that have been increasing under the pressure 
of and expanding demand. In Malaysia the rate of participation is 
about ten points lower (62.7 per cent) due to the limited presence of 
women in the labor market. Are these national rates going to 
converge? Up to now, in developed countries the process of 
modernization has brought strong reduction in the labor market 
presence of the elderly; however, it is already evident that the 
lengthening of the training phase, the ageing process together with 
the improvement in health conditions and the restriction in the 
welfare system imposed by much tighter economic situations are 
going to push in the opposite direction and keep older people in the 
labor market longer than at present. This would seem to suggest that 
in Singapore and Thailand opposite forces could maintain the rate of 
participation at around the present value. In Malaysia the situation 
presents an additional factor, the behavior of the cohorts of young 
girls entering the labor market in the next years. If it is possible that 
Abs. value % Abs. value % Abs. value %
2010 454 8.9 6,002 8.7 1,368 4.8
2035 1,634 26.9 14,284 19.6 4,461 14.5
Diff. 1,180 17.9 8,282 10.9 3,093 9.7
Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United 
Nations, 2011a




the rate of participation of the next cohorts will be higher than that of 
the previous generations, their contribution to labor market 
participation could be countered by the fact that both boys and girls 
will tend to remain longer in the training phase of life. In conclusion, 
due to the lack of strong evidences in one direction or on the other 
we have assumed a constant rate of participation.  
For Thailand and Malaysia, the absolute change in labor demand has 
been computed on the basis of two alternative hypotheses: i) a constant rate 
of growth equal to the one registered between 2005 and 2010 (scenario A); 
ii) a constant employment growth equal to the absolute growth registered in 
the same period (Scenario B). In scenario A the absolute change in 
employment increases progressively, in scenario B the percentage rate of 
growth declines progressively. In substance, the first scenario is more 
optimistic, but probably less realistic.  
In Thailand, in Scenario A, employment increases of around 17.5 
million (46.2 per cent) over 25 years, while in Scenario B employment 
grows by little less than 14 million (36.5 per cent) (Table A4). In Malaysia, 
in Scenario A, employment grows by 7.5 million (66.9 per cent), in 
Scenario B by 5.4 million (48.7 per cent) (Table A8). 
In the case of Singapore the construction of the scenario had to 
acknowledge the fact that between 2005 and 2010 employment has grown 
by an astounding 34.4 per cent. The adoption of such a rate would produce 
what appears as a totally unrealistic growth in employment (from a little 
more than 3 million in 2010 to around 11.5 million in 2035). For Scenario A 
we have therefore assumed a constant average growth rate equal to half that 
registered between 2000 and 2010. Such a rate, 22.5 per cent, is still more 
than the double of that adopted for Malaysia (10.8 per cent) and that adopted 
for Thailand (7.9 per cent). With this assumption Employment grows to 
around 8.5 million, i.e. 179 per cent. 
In analogy with what was done for Thailand and Malaysia, Scenario B 
assumes a growth in the level of employment equal to that registered 
between 2005 and 2010 (781,000). In this scenario the rate of growth 
progressively declines from an initial value of 25.6 per cent during the first 
five-year period, to 12.7 per cent between 2030 and 2035 and total 
employment increases from 3 to almost 7 million.   
Since in the long run both scenarios could be too optimistic, a third 
Scenario (Scenario C) is proposed. In this scenario the initial growth rate of 
employment, taken equal to the one used in Scenario A, is progressively 
halved down to a value of 1.4 per cent in the last five-year period. In this 
Scenario the growth in employment is obviously much more limited and 
equal to 1.5 million over the entire period, a value which however 
corresponds to a 51 per cent increase over the 2010 value.  
The following step has been that of comparing the increase in supply 
with the increase in labor demand proposed by each scenario in order to 
estimate whether and how much of the additional labor demand can be 





6.3 Manpower Needs 
The results of the exercise are summarized in table 11 that presents the 
Total Manpower Needs that Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia will have to 
face in the next 25 years in the two scenarios we have previously described. 
The detailed analysis is presented in the Statistical Annex (Table A4 for 
Thailand, Table A6 for Singapore, and Table A8 for Malaysia).  
Let‟s observe first of all that in both Singapore and Thailand the 
absolute changes in labor supply will progressively decrease to become 
negative in the 2030-35 period. The situation is totally different in Malaysia 
where the absolute change in Labor force will peak around 2020 and will 






                                                 
24 If we had used WAP (15-64) the change of sign in Singapore and Thailand would have taken place 
in the 2015-20 period. The difference we register is due to the ageing process we have previously 
discussed. 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2005-2010 -720 -490 -85 -1,295
2010-2015 -535 -1,452 43 -1,944
2015-2020 -768 -2,043 -68 -2,879
2020-2025 -1,026 -2,775 -358 -4,159
2025-2030 -1,272 -3,444 -559 -5,275
2030-2035 -1,587 -4,138 -788 -6,512
Total -5,188 -13,851 -1,730 -20,769
Yearly average values -208 -554 -69 -831
% distribution 25.0 66.7 8.3 100.0
2010-2015 -623 -1,233 160 -1,695
2015-2020 -698 -1,588 178 -2,108
2020-2025 -763 -2,064 32 -2,795
2025-2030 -772 -2,457 -10 -3,239
2030-2035 -795 -2,854 -62 -3,712
Total -3,652 -10,196 298 -13,549
Yearly average values -146 -408 12 -542
% distribution 26.9 75.3 -2.2 100.0
Sources - National data from various sources
Scenario A: Constant rate of employment  growth
Scenario B: Constant  employ.  growth






The growth in employment hypothesized in scenario A provokes very 
large and increasing Manpower needs that sum up to almost 21 million over 
the 2010-2035 period. Sixty seven per cent would be originated by Thailand 
(13.9 million), 25 per cent by Singapore (5.2 million), and 8.3 per cent by 
Malaysia (1.7 million). In Singapore the ratio between Manpower needs (in 
absolute value) and changes in employment surges from 77.2 per cent in 
2010-15 to 90.3 per cent in 2015-20, to then progressively increase to a 
value of 101 per cent in 2030-35 (Graph 6). In Thailand this ratio is always 
smaller than in Singapore until the end of the 2020s, but then leaps to 101.8 
in the 2030-35 period. As we have already underlined, in Malaysia the 
growth in labor supply will be relatively much more pronounced since the 
drop in fertility has been more limited than in Singapore and Thailand. As a 
consequence, the local Labor force should be more than sufficient to cover 
the additional jobs created in the 2010-15 period. Manpower needs become 
negative in the following interval and will then progressively increase to 
represent 43.5 per cent of additional employment in 2030-35.  
Scenario B (that assume a constant growth in the level of employment 
and therefore a declining rate of growth) generates a lower amount of 
Manpower needs (13.5 million) and some other qualitative differences. The 
distribution of Manpower needs between the three countries is more skewed, 
with Thailand accounting for 75.3 per cent, Singapore for 26.9 per cent and 




In the case of Thailand the results of Scenario B are very similar to 
those of Scenario A, the percentage of manpower needs with respect to 
labor demand progressively increasing to reach a value above 100 in 2035. 
In the case of Malaysia local labor supply appears to be sufficient to face the 
growth in employment outlined in Scenario B until 2030. Finally, in 
Singapore manpower needs represent around 95 per cent of the increase in 











Singapore 77.2 90.3 98.4 99.3 101.0
Thailand 48.4 63.1 79.5 91.4 101.8









Graph 6 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
A; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
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Source: Author elaboration on National data  
 
In Singapore, scenario C produces a much more conservative forecast 
of Manpower needs that would be equal to only around 1.3 million for the 
entire period. Moreover, they would be decreasing through time in parallel 
with the rate of growth in employment. Also in this case, however, 
manpower needs will end up being in excess of the increase in employment 
in the 2030-35 time-interval.  
  
 
6.4 A clarification of the previous results from a flow perspective  
Before summarizing the conclusion suggested by the previous analysis, 
it is important to clarify the exact meaning of the percentages of Manpower 
needs we have just presented and more specifically why this percentage can 
exceed 100 per cent and what does it mean. In order to do so we have to 
move from a stock to a flow representation of the labor market. This 
clarification provides some relevant inputs also for the analysis of the 
relationship between education and vocational training, on one hand, and 
economic growth and development, on the other.  
The increase in employment represents just one part of the number of 
“new” young people that are needed in any given interval by the labor 
market, the total number being equal to the sum of i) the people needed to 
substitute the employed that have definitely left the Labor force for one of 
the following three reasons: retirement, death, and migration, and ii) the 
people needed to cover the additional jobs created by the market as a 
consequence of the increase in production. In other terms, the Labor demand 
in terms of flows (LDF) (which is measured by generational entries, i.e. first 











Singapore 95.2 79.8 89.5 97.8 98.9
Thailand 44.3 57.1 74.2 88.4 102.7










 Graph 7 -Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
B; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
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(RD) (that is measured by the number of people needed to substitute 
definitive exits from employment) and Additional demand (AD) (measured 
by the people needed to cover the Additional jobs created in the interval).  
  
3] LDF = RD + AD 
 
In substance, the ratio between Manpower needs and increase in 
employment tells us which quota of Additional demand cannot be covered 
by the local labor supply in terms of flows, i.e. by the people that have 
entered the labor market for the first time during the interval we are 
considering.   
To exemplify the previous statements, let‟s consider Singapore in 
Scenario A. As we have already seen, in the 2010-15 period manpower 
needs represent 77.2 per cent of the increase in the level of employment. 
This means that the local labor supply in terms of flow is sufficient i) to 
fully replace definitive exits from the market (RD), and ii) to satisfy 22.8 
per cent of the Additional demand. When we reach the 2030-35 interval, the 
ratio between the manpower needs and the growth in employment is equal 
to 101 per cent. In substance, at that time the local labor supply will not be 
sufficient even to fully cover Replacement demand.  
 
 
7 MANPOWER NEEDS AND MIGRATION FLOWS  
7.1 The stock of migrants in ASEAN countries  
The presence of a structural need of migrants is by now extremely 
evident in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei. Table 12 reports the 
data on the stock of migrants present in ASEAN countries according to the 






Malaysia 2,358 35.2 82.0 45.2
Singapore 1,967 29.4 83.4 56.0
Thailand 1,157 17.3 81.9 48.4
Philippines 435 6.5 57.1 51.1
Cambodia 336 5.0 62.9 51.7
Brunei 148 2.2 84.7 45.5
Indonesia 123 1.8 78.3 44.5
Myanmar 89 1.3 75.8 48.7
Viet Nam 69 1.0 72.1 36.6
Laos 19 0.3 72.0 48.0
Total 6,701 100.0 79.6 49.6
Table 12 - ASEAN countries; stock of migrants, 














According to this source, of the 6.7 million migrants present in 
ASEAN 84 per cent are in the four arrival countries and, more specifically, 
35.2 per cent in Malaysia, 29.4 per cent in Singapore, 17.3 per cent in 
Thailand and 2.2 per cent in Brunei. Since these migrations have been 
determined by economic reasons, the four countries are also characterized 
by the highest percentages (all well above 80 per cent) of migrants in 
working age. In Brunei and Singapore migrants (or more specifically 
foreign citizens in Brunei and foreign born population in Singapore) 
represent almost 50 per cent of the population in the 20-64 age group, the 
value for Malaysia being 11.2 per cent, while according to the same source 
in Thailand the foreign born population in this age group represent only 2 
per cent of the total (Graph. 8). It is also interesting to observe that Brunei 
has the highest incidence of foreign elderly (a fact that signal that 
immigration in this country is a old phenomenon), while Singapore has the 
highest percentage of children showing that recent immigration is made up 
mainly of young people in reproductive age.   
 As a matter of fact available information suggests that while estimates 
for Singapore are sufficiently correct, the data for Thailand and Malaysia 
largely underestimate the number of migrants.  
 
 
Source – our elaboration on Population Division 2011b 
 
According to the 2011 Thailand Migration Report
25
, the foreign 
population working and residing in Thailand is in excess of 3.5 million, 
three times as much as the Population Division estimate
26
. This would bring 
                                                 
25 “There are more than 3.5 million persons without Thai nationality living in the country, including 
many long-term residents and children of migrants born in Thailand. More than 3.0 million of them 
are working in the country; ”Jerrold W. Huguet and Aphichat Chamratrithirong (eds), 2011; p. XII  
26 According to the Report: “In recent decades Thailand has evolved into a regional migration hub in 
South-East Asia, and is concurrently a country of origin, transit and destination for large numbers of 
both regular and irregular international migrants. With a dynamic economy, there is also a great deal 
0-19 20-64 65+
Brunei Darussalam 15.9 48.3 32.1
Singapore 29.0 47.3 24.0
Malaysia 3.9 11.2 12.5








Graph 8 - Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 




the percentage of the foreign population to around 4 per cent. More 
specifically, according to the Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI), there are a 
total of 2.46 million low-skilled migrants from the three neighboring 
countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos). According to the same source, 
some two million migrants are currently enrolled at some stage of the 
country's complex registration process for migrant workers and an estimated 
one million migrants and family members are unregistered. Women account 
for around 45 per cent and children for 11 per cent of the migrant population. 
For what relates to Malaysia the figure presented above refers to legal 
immigrants. There is however a general consensus that at present Malaysia 
hosts around two million migrants that should be legalized by an ongoing 
procedure that started in July 2011. Also in this case the number of migrants 
would then double with respect to the official figures.   
 
 
7.2 The migration scenarios 
The previous data provide the necessary background for an evaluation 
of the migration scenarios. As we have already suggested, the number of 
migrants that a country receives does depend not only on the number of jobs 
that cannot be covered by the local Labor force, but also on the number of 
dependents that will accompany, or join in a second moment, the workers. 
We can, at one extreme, imagine that the number of migrants will be exactly 
equal to the amount of workers needed by the arrival country. This situation 
characterizes the initial phase of the immigration process and also 
subsequent phases if the migration quotas set by the arrival country are not 
coherent with labor markets needs and, therefore, a very large number of 
arrivals takes place in risky, illegal situations. Subsequently, when more 
proper quotas are decided or workers start to be legalized and the possibility 
of family reunion allowed by the local legislation, the number of dependants 
tends to increase. It has been estimated that at present in developed 
countries we can expect 1.5 arrivals
27
 for each job position that needs to be 
covered by an immigrant worker.  
Since Southeast Asia countries can be considered in the initial phase 
of the migration process, the number of immigrants has been computed, 
both for Scenario A and B, on three alternative hypothesis:  
i) B=1  
ii) B=1.15      
iii) B=1.3 
Considering the six cases reported in table 13, the number of 
immigrants will range: 
 In Singapore, from 3.6 million (B1) to 6.7 million (A3) 
 In Thailand, from 10.2 million (B1) to 18 million (A3) 
 In Malaysia, from a slightly negative value with positive inflows 
starting in 2025 (B1) to 2.2 million (A3)  
                                                                                                                            
of internal migration, including circular and seasonal migration. However, the highly dynamic nature 
of migration trends and patterns in Thailand makes the timely formation of comprehensive and 
coherent migration policies very challenging.” 






The net inflow in the three countries over the next 25 years is 
therefore forecasted between 13.5 (B1) and 27 million (A3). Since at this 
point of the game, the supply of local labor cannot be manipulated by state 
intervention and our Labor force forecast has been designed in such a way 
to represent an over-estimate, the amount of immigrants will depend on two 
variables: the development path chosen by each country and the growth in 
employment that will be generated.  
We can, moreover, observe that the amount of immigrants we are 
forecasting is basically on line with what has happened in the last 25 years 
once we take into consideration that local WAP was expanding at that time, 
while in the next 25 it will decline.  
It could be objected that the most important international Institution 
that provides demographic forecasts, the Population Division, has published 
much lower migration estimates. These data that we have reported in Table 




We observe, first of all that the Migration balance for ASEAN as a 
whole, with respect to the 2010-2035 period, is slightly higher in absolute 
value than that registered between 1985 and 2010 (-7.6 million versus -7.4 
million), but the overall mobility is forecasted to decline as a result of a 
sharp contraction of both the inflows in arrival countries and the outflows 
from departures countries. The firsts decline from 4.8 million to 3 million, 
the seconds from 12.2 to 10.7 million. More specifically for what relates to 
arrival countries, inflows are expected to decline in Malaysia (-1.3 million) 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2010-15 535 1,452 -43 1,944 615 1,670 -50 2,235 696 1,888 -56 2,527
2015-20 768 2,043 68 2,879 883 2,350 78 3,311 998 2,656 89 3,743
2020-25 1,026 2,775 358 4,159 1,180 3,191 412 4,783 1,334 3,607 466 5,407
2025-30 1,272 3,444 559 5,275 1,462 3,960 643 6,066 1,653 4,477 727 6,857
2030-35 1,587 4,138 788 6,512 1,825 4,758 906 7,489 2,063 5,379 1,024 8,466
Total 5,188 13,851 1,730 20,769 5,966 15,929 1,990 23,885 6,744 18,007 2,249 27,000
2010-15 743 1,233 -160 1,815 855 1,418 -184 2,088 966 1,603 -209 2,360
2015-20 623 1,588 -178 2,032 716 1,826 -205 2,337 810 2,064 -232 2,642
2020-25 698 2,064 -32 2,730 803 2,373 -37 3,140 908 2,683 -41 3,549
2025-30 763 2,457 10 3,231 878 2,826 12 3,715 992 3,195 13 4,200
2030-35 772 2,854 62 3,688 887 3,283 72 4,242 1,003 3,711 81 4,795
Total 3,599 10,196 -298 13,497 4,139 11,726 -343 15,522 4,679 13,255 -388 17,546
Source - Author elaboration on National data 
Table 13 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; number of migrants (thousand) in alternative scenarios of manpower needs and 






Arrival countr. Depat. countr. Balance 
1985-90 460 505 120 5 -265 -300 -330 -135 0 150 1,090 -880 210
1990-95 320 -1,110 230 5 -720 -695 -315 -125 -30 155 -555 -1,730 -2,285
1995-00 420 595 255 5 -775 -775 -285 5 -85 95 1,275 -1,820 -545
2000-05 395 1,105 230 5 -1,185 -1,130 -430 -1,000 -115 -120 1,735 -3,980 -2,245
2005-10 85 490 720 5 -1,295 -1,235 -430 -500 -75 -255 1,300 -3,790 -2,490
1985-2010 1,680 1,585 1,555 25 -4,240 -4,135 -1,790 -1,755 -305 25 4,845 -12,200 -7,355
2010-15 85 395 175 5 -1,005 -1,000 -210 -100 -75 -130 660 -2,520 -1,860
2015-20 85 390 125 5 -950 -940 -200 -50 -75 -65 605 -2,280 -1,675
2020-25 85 385 125 5 -895 -890 -200 -50 -75 -35 600 -2,145 -1,545
2025-30 85 385 120 5 -805 -800 -200 -50 -75 -10 595 -1,940 -1,345
2030-35 85 380 120 5 -720 -720 -200 -50 -75 -10 590 -1,775 -1,185
2010-2035 425 1,935 665 25 -4,375 -4,350 -1,010 -300 -375 -250 3,050 -10,660 -7,610
Diff. -1,255 350 -890 0 -135 -215 780 1,455 -70 -275 -1,795 1,540 -255
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 14 -ASEAN countries; number of migrants 1985-2010 and estimates 2010-35,  medium variant scenario of the Population Division; thousand; 1985-2035
Laos Malaysia Philippines Brunei
ASEAN 
Singapore Thailand  MyanmarVietnamIndonesia Cambodia
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and Singapore (-0.9 million), and to increase, although very marginally, in 
Thailand (+350,000). Outflows are expected to decline in all departure 
countries, but Vietnam.  
In order to understand these data, we must keep in mind that they are 
not a forecasts based on a model or an extrapolation of past values, but a 
hypothesis (an educated guess) made on the basis of two considerations:  1) 
past international migration estimates, and 2) consideration of the policy 
stance of each country with regard to future international migration flows. It 
is also evident that in the case of Singapore and Malaysia the policy stands 




7.3 The impact of migration on total population    
We have just seen that, over the next 25 years, the Population Division 
forecasts the arrival of 3 million migrants in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia 
and Brunei, while our scenarios suggest that the value will be between 13 
and 27 million, depending on the rate of employment growth. As a 
consequence, we also forecast very different demographic trends 
It has been stated (and the demographic scenarios proposed by the 
Population Division endorse this statement as shown in Table 15) that the 
drop in fertility below replacement level that is affecting an increasing 
number of developed and developing countries will produce a decline in 
Total population, an even more pronounced decline in Working Age 
Population and progressive ageing phenomena that will seriously threaten 
the sustainability of the present level of production and of the welfare 




This does necessarily happen in a closed population or in a situation in 
which the migration balance is not assumed (or allowed) to cover the 
manpower needs created by the contraction in labor supply and the 
expansion in demand generated by economic growth.    
The demographic forecasts for Singapore and Thailand, whose 
fertility is already below replacement level, are in line with this position. 
 0-14  15-64 65+ totale
2010 884 3,742 454 5,080
2060 854 3,196 1,962 6,012
2010 14,195 48,786 6,002 68,983
2060 9,900 39,871 18,357 68,128
2010 8,617 18,432 1,368 28,417
2060 8,421 29,032 7,924 45,377
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 15 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 
population by main age group;  Medium variant 






WAP (15-64) is expected to notably decline in both countries, while the 
percentage of elderly is expected to dramatically increase. The situation is 
obviously different for Malaysia where the TFR is still largely above 
replacement.   
The experience of developed countries does, on the contrary, show 
that the end result of fertility decline is to prompt unprecedented and above 
replacement net migration flows that increase WAP, raise fertility, and 
therefore determine significant Total population growth
28
.  
The model we have proposed, coherently with empirical evidence, 
brings to the conclusion that the WAP of ASEAN arrival countries will 
increase, the change being directly related to the rate of growth of 
employment and inversely related to the rate of natural decline of local 
WAP (Tables A5, A7, and A9).   
 
 
8 HUMAN RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Education and training have always been considered a fundamental 
factor in promoting economic growth and social development. However, 
alternative growth theories have given industrial policies as well as 
education and vocational training different importance and role
29
.  
Classical growth models focus on the productivity-enhancing role of 
technology and human capital. They assume that investments in education 
and training result in skills, competences and increased capabilities of the 
workforce and that developing countries have the same capabilities to 
absorb technologies as the developed countries. The process does 
automatically take place through spillovers, trade and FDI, learning and 
increased productivity being a function of the time spent in production 
(learning by doing). In this context industrial policies play a very limited 
role, liberalization of the product market representing the main drive to 
growth. No specific educational or vocational training policies are called for 
to foster economic growth, education and training being only functional to 
match the skills supply and demand. 
In the institutional approach
30
 the key factor to reach high growth is 
diversification of the production structure, a structural transformation from 
low productivity, traditional (rural) activities to high productivity, (urban) 
modern activities, mostly, although not exclusively, in the industrial sector. 
Productivity grows not because of productivity increases within sectors, but 
as a result of shifting resources from low productivity to high productivity 
activities
31
. It has also been argued that the product space and the structure 
of goods produced determine the capabilities a country has developed, and 
these capabilities indicate which products or industries a country may easily 
develop in the future
32
. Industrial policies are, therefore, called upon to 
                                                 
28 M. Bruni, 2009 
29 For the drafting of this paragraph I am strongly indebted to the following papers: I. Nubler, 2011; 
M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, and J.E. Stiglitz (eds), 2009, and the presentation of the same book by J. M. 
Salazar-Xirinachs and I. Nubler, 2010; pp 135-140. 
30 W. Lewis 1954; J. Fei and G. Ranis, 1964.  
31 D. Rodrik, 2009. 
32 C.A. Hidalgo, and R. Hausmann, 2009.  
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facilitate a “growth enhancing structural transformation”. The challenge is 
getting the policy approach right by adopting an experimental and creative 
approach to institutional reforms
33
. 
According to New evolutionary economics, economic development 
is defined as a process of technological upgrading, of diversification and 
structural change driven, on one hand, by the accumulation of capabilities 
and, on the other, by the transformation of the production structure. It is the 
accumulation of domestic capabilities (that include the development of 
workers competences, the accumulation of technological and organizational 
know how in firms, training institutes and governments), which allows 
moving from the existing knowledge clusters to new knowledge clusters. 
34
 
It is then evident that, according to this approach, not only industrial 
policies and educational policies can play a central role in fostering 
economic growth and social development, but they must be designed and 
implemented in a coordinated way.  
In every moment of time the Labor force of a country disposes of a 
given knowledge structure. The knowledge structure is the result of past 
formal learning processes inside the education and vocational training 
system and of the training on the job provided by the production structure. 
In any given moment of time, the knowledge structure defines, the dynamic 
capabilities of an economy, i.e. determines and limits the technologies the 
country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, and therefore 






                                                 
33 It is however been suggested that: “Although this approach recognizes the role of learning and 
capabilities they are not integrated into the analytical framework and therefore fail to raise policy 
issues”. I. Nubler, 2011; p.8. 





(On the job training) 
Knowledge base
It defines and limits 
Technologies  the 
country can adopt, 
the production 
structure that can 
evolve, the possible 
development paths  
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In a first phase economic development can be based upon the 
incremental diversification of production inside the existing knowledge 
clusters, i.e. producing more products that require available competences or 
complementary competences that can be easily acquired.  
However, this is not sufficient to speed up development or to start a 
process of rapid catching up. In order to do so, a country must be able to 
shift production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, to 
jump into new knowledge clusters. Empirical and theoretical arguments 
suggest that the evolution of the knowledge base can play a fundamental 
role in the catching up process and that successful countries have been able 
to drive productive transformation by deliberately driving their knowledge 
structure toward higher diversity and complexity.   
Some countries have been inspired by egalitarian principles and have 
focused on equal access to education, while others have produced polarized 
educational patterns. The countries of the first type have first increased the 
share of primary, then of lower and higher secondary and finally of post-
secondary education. More importantly they have developed a significant 
share of higher and post-secondary education even at low levels of 
economic development. In so doing they have been able to shift production 
into medium technology manufacturing, then diversify production within 
clusters and finally move to higher technology goods
35
. The second type of 
countries
36
 have generated an educational structure with high shares of 
people with no-schooling or primary education, on one hand, and of people 
with post secondary education, on the other. This educational structure 
provides options in the development of high technology products or 
advanced services, but limited options for the development of medium 
technologies. It is also evident that this kind of educational structure cannot 
produce a relevant economic middle class.   
 
 
9 THE EDUCATIONA ATTAINMENTS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES  
As we have just seen, it is the knowledge structure of the country that 
defines the options and the dynamic capabilities of an economy, 
determining which production structure can evolve. The education structure 
of the population can be used as a proxy of the available capabilities since it 
provides an indication of the technologies and of the level of complexities 
that the Labor force can manage.  
More specifically, we can assume that a country with a strong share of 
(young) population with lower or upper secondary education embodies 
strong options to shift its production structure into low and medium 
technology products since this educational level provides the basis for 
training craft people, machine operators, technician and clerks which are 
required by more complex manufacturing sectors. However, it is only a high 
share of post-secondary education that will allow developing the economic, 
administrative, technical competencies together with the managerial skills 
                                                 
35 China and Korea belong to this group. 
36 This group includes many Latin America countries including Argentina, Brazil and Chile, but also 
India and Thailand.  
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and business leadership required to shift the economy toward medium and 
high technology goods and advanced services 
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different educational 
attainment. Graph 9 reports for all ASEAN countries, with the exception of 
Brunei
37
, the percentage of men and women in the age group 15-44 with at 
least secondary education
38
. The ranking is lead by Singapore followed by 
Malaysia and Philippines. Intermediate positions are occupied by Indonesia 







Source – IIASA 2008 
 
Men register higher values in all countries with the only notable 
exception of Philippines where women percentage is 7 points higher than 
that of men. In Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam the 
gender differential is absent or extremely low. A gender differential equal or 
higher than 5 percentage points is registered by Indonesia, Laos and 
Cambodia.   
In order to better evaluate the knowledge structure of each country and 
the different options it opens for the future, it is important to consider 
separately the percentages of men and women with secondary and tertiary 
education (Graphs 10 and 11).  
The two rankings suggest that Singapore
40
 and Philippines (and in 
some measure also Laos) have been specializing in tertiary education, while 
Malaysia and Indonesia have directed their efforts mainly toward secondary 
                                                 
37 The source we have used (IIASA) does not provide data for Brunei and similar data are not 
available at the national level. 
38 More data for men and women, in 1970 and 2007, together with mean number of year of study is 
reported in table 10 of the Statistical Annex.  
39 The ranking of Vietnam is penalized by its gender unbiased approach to education. Laos and 
Cambodia are in fact characterized by a slight higher percentage of men, but by a much lower 
percentage of women with at least secondary education. 
40 To better evaluate the attainment of Singapore we recall that in Korea and Japan the percentages of 




Indonesia Thailand Myanmar Laos Cambodia Vietnam
Men 91 85 73 66 56 50 44 41 40












Graph 9 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with at least 
secondary education;  percentage values; 2007 
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education. Thailand and Myanmar are slightly behind, but seem to be 
proceeding in a balanced way, while Cambodia and Vietnam are still 
characterized by a heavy delay particularly relevant for tertiary education.  
In conclusion, these data suggest that in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam the Labor force is still characterized by capabilities that provide 
options mainly in low and medium technology clusters, while Malaysia and 
also, although in a more limited way, Indonesia have already shifted or are 
ready to shift to higher technology cluster. The educational attainment of 
Singapore and Philippines suggests that tertiary activities are the best 
options for both countries that however are also equipped for high 
technology manufacturing clusters. Finally, Thailand and possibly Myanmar 
seem to have the option to operate in services and manufacturing sectors adopting 












Laos Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Myanmar Vietnam Cambodia
Men 36 19 13 12 11 8 6 3 2










Graph 10 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with tertiary 










Men 74 58 55 54 44 44 39 37 31










Graph 11 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with secondary 
education;  percentage values; 2007 
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Although not too recent, UNIDO data on competitiveness and on the 
share of medium-high tech value added in manufacturing give support to 
this analysis (Table 16). Singapore (that is world leader in competiveness) 
has by far the largest share of high technology products, followed in both 
ranking by Malaysia. The next two countries are Philippines and Thailand, 
followed by Indonesia. It is of interest to observe that these ranking 




A final element to complete the picture of educational attainment and 
its future evolution is offered by public expenditure on education and its 
distribution by educational level (table 17). Malaysia is the country that at 
present devotes it largest share of GDP to education, followed by Vietnam, 
both countries boasting a percentage above 5 per cent. With percentages 
between 4 and 5 we find Indonesia and Thailand, the only two ASEAN 
countries that devote more than 1/5 of government expenditures to 
education.   
To appreciate the countries‟ perception of their educational needs we 
can also observe that Cambodia, whose primary schools are affected by a 
very high dropout rate, are giving high priority to this educational level.  A 
similar balanced vision of an education structure progressively built from 
the bottom, seems to be followed also by Indonesia and Philippine. Brunei 
and Malaysia are now concentrating their effort primarily on secondary 












high tech Value 
Added in 
Manufacturing 
Singapore 0.895 1 Singapore 77.58
Malaysia 0.474 19 Malaysia 49.85
Thailand 0.407 28 Philippines 40.09
Philippines 0.400 32 Thailand 37.84
Indonesia 0.264 47 Indonesia 29.79
Viet Nam 0.193 72 Viet Nam 21.86
Cambodia 0.155 90 Cambodia 0.26
Table 16 -  ASEAN countries; Competitive Industrial Performance Index 








10 SUMMARY AND POLICY SUGGESTIONE   
10.1 The main conclusions  
In the first part of the paper we have shown that the demographic 
revolution has already been affecting all ASEAN countries for a 
considerable period of time. The different intensity of economic growth, 
historical circumstances, prevailing values and customs have, however, 
interacted with demographic trends so that each country is at a different 
stage of this complex process. From our perspective the most interesting 
element is that Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei have already been 
characterized by a relevant lack of labor supply that has provoked -and has 
been compensated by- the arrival of at least 10 million migrants, many of 
them from other ASEAN countries. At the same time, other migrants have 
left ASEAN countries, mainly Indonesia and Philippines, for non-ASEAN 
arrival countries.  
We have also argued that in ASEAN arrival countries the need of 
foreign labor will progressively increase. This will depend both on the 
supply and on the demand side of the labor market. In the first place, the 
supply of local labor will necessarily decline for at least thirty, forty years. 
This will be caused by the decline in WAP brought about, on one hand, by 
the contraction in generational entries and, on the other, by the increase in 
generational exits. Both trends are unavoidable, being generated by 
structural phenomena, respectively the decline in fertility and ageing
41
. The 
exact dimension of the manpower needs and of the amount of migrants will, 
however, depend on the rate of growth of GDP that each economy will 
register and on the development path they will choose, which will determine 
the employment-income elasticity.  
                                                 
41 The young people that will enter the Labor force in the next 20 years are already born and not big 
changes in the number of births can be forecasted in the next 10-15 years. The age structure of the 
Labor force is known and therefore generational exits from the labor market can also be easily 
estimated. 
GDP Gov. Expend. Pre-primary Primary SecondaryTetiary Unknown
Malaysia 5.8 18.9 1 35 46 18
Viet Nam 5.3 19.8 5 38 26 22 9
Indonesia 4.6 26.0 1 57 32 10
Thailand 4.1 20.8 7 48 16 17 13
Laos 3.3 13.2 3 46 51
Singapore 3.1 11.6 0 20 33 36 11
Philippines 2.7 16.9 2 52 27 10 10
Cambodia 2.6 12.4 1 73 21 5
Brunei Darussalam 2.1 13.7 0 29 47 24
Myanmar 1.3 18.1 0 48 40 12
Source - IIASA
Public expenditure on 
education as % of 
 Percentage of Public Expenditure by 
Educational Level




Finally, we have shown that in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia the 
structural lack of labor supply: 
 In the short run, cannot be counterbalanced by absorbing 
unemployment or increasing labor market participation, since 
unemployment is very low and participation very high or not 
expandable for cultural reasons;  
 In the long run, it cannot be dealt with by delocalizing production 
and/or by increasing productivity, given the size and the expected 
duration of the phenomenon. 
On the basis of the previous line of reasoning we have proposed and 
estimated labor market and demographic scenarios in which the migration 
flows and the demographic evolution of the arrival countries depend on their 
manpower needs. The results project a demographic future very different 
from that proposed by the Population Division, whose estimates appear to 
be more sensitive to the political stance of the interested countries than to 
economic logic.  
The main conclusion is rather straightforward:  the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei, the higher their need of foreign labor, not only in absolute terms, 
but also as a percentage of the labor demand in terms of flow. 
42
 Our model 
shows that in a very near future the local supply of labor will not be 
sufficient even to offset Replacement demand. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within the ASEAN 
community will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth 
and social development.   
In the following section of the paper, a survey of the relevant literature 
has brought us to support the idea that economic growth is the result of a 
process of technological upgrading, of diversification and structural change 
driven by the accumulation of capabilities, on one hand, and the 
transformation of the production structure, on the other. In substance, 
according to this perspective, it is the knowledge base of a country that 
defines and limits the technologies a country can adopt, the production 
structure it may evolve, and therefore the possible paths to economic growth 
and social development. More specifically, speeding up economic growth 
and triggering successful catching up processes does require shifting 
production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, in other 
words to jump into new knowledge clusters. In order to do so a country 
needs to drive its knowledge structure toward higher diversity and 
complexity; in other words to endow its incoming labor force with the 
expertise and competences that will be required by the economic 
development triggered by industrial policies, and this in coordination with 
the necessary industrial policies.   
Finally the paper has provided some information on the educational 
attainment of the younger components of WAP in each ASEAN country. 
Data show that, also in this case, ASEAN presents a very articulated reality, 
                                                 
42 The labor demand in terms of flow is measured by the new entries in the labor market necessary i) 
to substitute the people that leave the Labor force for good and ii) to occupy the additional jobs 
generated by economic growth 
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but also a remarkable coherence between, on one hand, the educational 
attainment structure and, on the other, the level of development as well as 
the structure of the industrial and service sectors. The percentage of people 
between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education spans between the 
maximum of Singapore (around 90 per cent) and the minimum values that 
characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 per cent). 
Coherently, while Singapore has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance, Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their production 
structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster, or are ready 
to do so. On the other end, Cambodia and Vietnam are still attracting 
foreign investments mainly in labor intensive, low technology sectors.    
In conclusion, the paper contends that, in a very near future, workers 
mobility within ASEAN will not be a choice, but a necessity imposed by 
demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of economic 
growth and the typology of development will determine the amount of 
Labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills requested 
by the arrival countries. At the same time, the other ASEAN countries will 
have a structural excess of labor supply that will not be able to find a 
productive occupation in the national markets because the rate of growth 
requested to absorb it will remain out of reach.  
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong points. 
 
 
10.2 Some policy suggestions  
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, 
Thailand and, in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks.  
A correct migration policy can be based only upon a serious 
evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by the arrival 
countries
43
. It must be underlined that the more economically and socially 
developed economies do not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -
especially at the beginning of the migration process- they need mainly 
unskilled labor. The reason is quite obvious. As income per-capita increases, 
families will tend to provide more education to their children. The result is 
that the young generations that will enter the labor market in the near future 
in the most developed areas of ASEAN will not be willing to accept low-
paid menial jobs, which remain abundant also in developed economies, 
especially in the service sectors. However, with time, the percentage of 
qualified workers and university graduates needed by these economies will 
progressively grow, as the percentage of migrants requested in order to face 
local labor demand will increase
44
.  
                                                 
43  Another extremely important element will be represented by a system of recognition of skill 
certificates and credentials within and among countries in the ASEAN region. 
44 For Singapore, see Brenda S.A. Yeoh, 2007 
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The other side of the coin is that migrations have both positive and 
negative impacts on the socio-economic systems of departure countries. On 
one hand, it can reduce the pressure on the supply side of the labor market 
and provide remittances that could, if properly directed, support productive 
investments.  On the other hand, migration depletes the knowledge structure 
and the capabilities of departure countries because migrants are by 
definition the most dynamic elements of their societies.  
As it has already been suggested, a correct approach to economic 
growth and catching up requires that educational policies and industrial 
policies be called to play a fundamental role. At national level, this implies 
that education and training policies should have both a short-run and a long-
run objective: 1) in the short-run, provide a correct response to the local 
labor demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long-run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products. In order to 
avoid unemployment and frustrations, this second objective does however 
need a coordinated set of industrial policies that will create the demand for 
graduates with higher skills. In substance, education and vocational training 
policies should prepare the people for the production structure that is going 
to be promoted by industrial policies.  
 At ASEAN level the implication is that the educational policies of 
the departures countries should be coordinated also with the industrial 
policies of the arrival countries so that the unavoidable structural excess of 
labor of departures countries will find productive employment or in the 
arrival countries or in their investment in departures countries. These 




A basic element for designing and implementing the previous 
complex set of measures is information. Many ASEAN countries still lack 
the statistical information on demography, education, vocational training, 
labor market and migration
46
 that represents the necessary prerequisite to 
design and implement the policies we have just outlined. Moreover, this 
information needs to be comparable and based upon best international 
practices. 
This suggests that a fist important measure that could be implemented 
by ASEAN is the creation of an ASEAN Labor Market Information 
System
47
. As shown in Figure 2, a LMIS can be thought as: 
 A network of producers and consumers of Labor Market Information 
 A store of Labor Market Information  
                                                 
45  Already the “ASEAN Labor Ministers’ Work Program 2000 to 2005” stated that ASEAN 
countries need to enhance capacity for formulating and implementing a comprehensive and integrated 
human resource development (HRD) strategy on a continuous basis in order to adjust to global 
competition. This will include, among other things, a coordinated employment, manpower education 
and training programs, planning, labor policy measures and labor market information programs. 
46 The problem is fully recognized by the ALM last Work program that states: “Although human 
resource development planning and labor market information and analysis is a stated priority area for 
ASEAN, comprehensive information on the structure of ASEAN Member States‟ labor sectors 
remains of limited availability. 










The first element put the accent on the fact that the ASEAN LMIS 
should be the expression of its stakeholders, i.e. the national producers and 
consumers of data. The former will provide the necessary statistical 
information and support their correct interpretation; the latter will indicate 
their needs and cooperate in directing the collection of data and the 
management of the system.   
The second element indicates that the ASEAN LMIS should be the 
physical place where all the relevant national labor market information will 
be mapped, collected, evaluated, organized and stored.  
Finally, the real justification of the ASEAN LMIS is that of providing 
a flow of structural and short-run analyses needed to design, implement and 
monitor the educational, industrial, and migration policies of ASEAN 
countries. Between the more relevant areas of analysis we can indicate:    
 The education and vocational training systems of the ASEAN 
countries: in order to assess their structural characteristics and their 
evolution; estimate their production in terms of students outflows 
classified in regular and irregular, and by educational level;  
 The transition process from the Educational and Vocational Training 
System, on one hand, and the Labor Market, on the other; 
 The labor markets of the ASEAN countries in a comparative 
perspective; 
 Internal and external migration flows.  
 In a more specific way the LMIS should provide the necessary inputs  












 To design a framework of educational policies and industrial policies 
to be proposed to member countries for approval and 
implementation;  
 To create and up-keep labor market and demographic scenarios of 
the type we have just shown; 
 To design a map of the excess of labor supply in departures 
countries; 
 To define the manpower needs of arrival countries, by occupations 
and skills.  
In particular, the scenarios should provide estimates, over a 5-10 year 
sliding horizon, of the level and skill structure of the manpower needs of 
arrival countries, on one hand, and of the structural excess of labor supply of 
departures countries, on the other. 
 
 
10.3 The Education Migration Fund  
There is a final suggestion we deem relevant to advance on the eve of 
the creation of an integrated economic community that will progressively 
allow the free movement of capital and labor.  
A migrant bring with him a “capital” of capabilities that is the result 
not only of its personal investment, but also of the public investments of its 
country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant corresponds for the 
production system of the receiving country to the free acquisition of a factor 
of production. This is obviously true only if and when the migrant worker is 
needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have a substitute in the 
arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this situation will exist 
and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and for a number of workers 
largely in excess of those “forecasted” by international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being seen as people running away from misery and deprivation, if 
unskilled and with low education, and as people in search of a higher 
income and better life, if educated and skilled. This brings to stress the cost 
that the countries of arrival have to bear or to promote ideas of brotherhood 
toward the migrants and their needs.  
If we abandon this perspective to realistically accept that in an 
increasing number of countries labor internally produced is not sufficient to 
carry on and expand production, and therefore that these countries need to 
acquire labor from other countries in the same way as they need to acquire 
raw materials and capital goods, then it logically follows that arrival 
countries should pay for each migrant that is going to have a job position a 
price proportional to its education and skill level and at least equal to the 
cost the departure country has supported to educate and train him
48
.  
Keeping in mind that: 
 Migrants represent a depletion of the knowledge base of the departures 
countries; 
                                                 
48  This would also eliminate market distortion deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries.   
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 A more educated and better trained labor force is the key for economic 
growth;  
 The need for foreign labor will dramatically increase at least for the next 
forty years; 
 Population explosion will make more and more difficult if not impossible 
the development of the poorest countries in the world where the excess of 
labor supply will be progressively concentrated; 
the creation and correct utilization of an Education Migration Fund could 
activate a relevant, correct, and equitable transfer of money from the rich to 
the poor countries to be invested in the most important factor of economic 
growth and social development: education
49
.  
It is evident that even if accepted the implementation of this proposal 
would have to face a series of complicated issues that cannot be confronted 
in this paper. Here we can limit ourselves to a few suggestions.  
In a global perspective we could envisage the constitution of an 
Education Migration Fund (EMF) with UNESCO that could be in charge 
to collect the payments from arrival countries and route them toward 
departure countries. This should be done in a fast and efficient way, and 
following a plan agreed upon with departure countries. The money should 
be directed to build new schools, improve the existing building, train the 
teachers, provide equal opportunities, and promote gender equality, in 
coordination with the industrial and macroeconomic policies required to 
start effective catching up processes.  
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 
would benefit from as well as cope with the challenges of regional 
integration”
50
. It is evident that in the less developed countries the necessary 
improvement of the educational and vocational training system finds an 
upper limit in the existing, largely insufficient resources. The adoption of 
the previous proposal could provide a correct and equitable solution to this 
problem. Moreover it could be argued that in the growth perspective we 
have adopted, arrival countries would be a final beneficiary of the transfers 
because the same transfers would foster the process of catching up of the 
weaker economies, increase their level of per-capita income and therefore 
expand their market for foreign high quality products and services.  
In this perspective ASEAN could represent an ideal testing ground of 
this measure. A specific working group of ASEAN experts could be 
entrusted with the development and implementation of the idea. Also in this 
case, the final goal would be the constitution of a EMF to which arrival 
                                                 
49  What we propose is totally different from the so-called Bhagwati tax. In the first place, the 
argument advanced, almost 40 years ago by Bhagwaty and Dellafar (Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and 
Dellafar, 1973) calls for a tax on the incomes of “professional emigrants” from developing countries 
into developed countries. In the second place, the Bhagwati proposal refers only to the so called brain 
drain. Finally it is a typical expression of a supply side vision of the migration process. It can also be 
reminded that initially, also Bhagwati discussed methods for transferring income from developed 
countries to developing countries to compensate the latter for losses caused by the brain drain 
(Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, 1975). For a more detailed discussion of the Bhagwati tax, see Wilson 
John Douglas, 2005  
50 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 
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countries would transfer their payments that would then be directed toward 
the departure countries, in accordance with educational plans agreed upon 
by ASEAN and the individual countries and in coherence with the national 
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Departure countries Migration balance Arrival countries Migration balance
United Arab Emirates 3,857 India -4,923
Saudi Arabia 2,781 Bangladesh -4,401
Thailand 1,595 China -4,182
Qatar 1,027 Pakistan -3,750
Singapore 954 Indonesia -2,477
Afghanistan 585 Philippines -2,361
Syrian Arab Republic 492 Myanmar -1,500
Malaysia 481 Uzbekistan -1,274
Bahrain 473 Viet Nam -863
Kuwait 439 Iraq -730
Israel 377 Tajikistan -718
Japan 322 Georgia -459
China, Hong Kong SAR 165 Kyrgyzstan -381
Jordan 109 Cambodia -373
Azerbaijan 107 Sri Lanka -350
Cyprus 106 Occupied Palestinian Territory -280
Oman 103 Yemen -235
China, Macao SAR 93 Kazakhstan -214
Lebanon 88 Nepal -200
Bhutan 52 Lao People's Democratic Republic -190
Brunei Darussalam 7 Armenia -175
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 0 Turkmenistan -168
Maldives 0 Turkey -150
Total 14,213 Republic of Korea -128




Table. A3 - Asia;  arrival and daparture countries; migration balance;  2000-2010; thousand



















Rate of change 
in 
employment 
over a 5 year 











2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2,523 395 2,128 1,547 7.9 2,999 41,037 1,452 290
2020 57408 2015-2020 2,030 390 1,640 1,193 7.9 3,236 44,273 2,043 409
2025 58778 2020-2025 1,370 385 985 716 7.9 3,491 47,764 2,775 555
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 7.9 3,766 51,530 3,444 689
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 7.9 4,063 55,593 4,138 828
















Rate of change 
in 
employment 
over a 5 year 
period











2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2523 395 2128 1547 7.3 2780 40818 1233 247
2020 57408 2015-2020 2030 390 1640 1193 6.8 2780 43598 1588 318
2025 58778 2020-2025 1370 385 985 716 6.4 2780 46378 2064 413
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 6.0 2780 49158 2457 491
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 5.7 2780 51938 2854 571












Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 21.2 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,436 56,973 57,510 69,762 70,299 70,836 19.1 19.0 18.8 72.7 72.0 71.4
2020 12,359 60,119 61,208 62,298 72,478 73,567 74,657 17.1 16.8 16.6 73.6 72.3 71.1
2025 11,592 63,879 65,532 67,185 75,471 77,124 78,777 15.4 15.0 14.7 74.8 72.9 71.1
2030 11,093 67,766 70,002 72,239 78,859 81,095 83,332 14.1 13.7 13.3 76.0 73.6 71.3
2035 10,831 71,801 74,643 77,485 82,632 85,474 88,316 13.1 12.7 12.3 77.4 74.5 71.7
Diff. -3,364 18,945 21,787 24,629 15,581 18,423 21,265
Scenario B
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 18.9 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,216 56,720 57,225 69,542 70,046 70,551 19.2 19.0 18.9 72.6 72.0 71.3
2020 12,359 59,444 60,432 61,420 71,803 72,791 73,779 17.2 17.0 16.8 73.3 72.1 71.0
2025 11,592 62,493 63,938 65,384 74,085 75,530 76,976 15.6 15.3 15.1 74.2 72.5 70.9
2030 11,093 65,394 67,275 69,155 76,487 78,368 80,248 14.5 14.2 13.8 75.2 73.1 71.1
2035 10,831 68,146 70,440 72,733 78,977 81,271 83,564 13.7 13.3 13.0 76.2 73.7 71.4
Diff. -3,364 15,290 17,584 19,877 11,926 14,220 16,513
0-14



















Rate of change 
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 22.7 850 4590 768 154
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 22.7 1043 5634 1026 205
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 22.7 1281 6914 1272 254
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 22.7 1572 8486 1587 317
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 25.6 781 3828 623 125
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 20.4 781 4608 698 140
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 16.9 781 5389 763 153
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 14.5 781 6169 772 154
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 12.7 781 6950 795 159















Rate of change 
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 11.4 425 4165 343 69
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 5.7 237 4402 220 44
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 2.8 125 4527 116 23
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 1.4 64 4591 79 16








Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 17.4 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,820 6,064 6,307 6,592 6,836 7,079 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,869 7,270 7,671 7,690 8,091 8,492 10.7 10.1 9.7 82.0 77.5 73.4
2030 866 8,153 8,747 9,340 9,019 9,613 10,206 9.6 9.0 8.5 84.8 79.0 74.0
2035 886 9,720 10,548 11,377 10,606 11,434 12,263 8.4 7.7 7.2 87.3 80.4 74.6
Diff. 2 5,524 6,352 7,181 5,526 6,354 7,183
Scenario B
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 12.9 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 5,030 5,155 5,280 5,813 5,938 6,063 13.5 13.2 12.9 76.1 74.3 72.5
2020 772 5,838 6,085 6,331 6,610 6,857 7,103 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,625 6,989 7,353 7,446 7,810 8,174 11.0 10.5 10.0 81.3 77.1 73.3
2030 866 7,408 7,890 8,372 8,274 8,756 9,238 10.5 9.9 9.4 83.3 78.2 73.7
2035 886 8,184 8,782 9,380 9,070 9,668 10,266 9.8 9.2 8.6 84.9 79.1 74.1
Diff. 2 3,988 4,586 5,184 3,990 4,588 5,186
Scenario C
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 13.2 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,395 5,575 5,755 6,167 6,347 6,527 12.5 12.2 11.8 77.2 74.7 72.4
2025 821 5,638 5,854 6,070 6,459 6,675 6,891 12.7 12.3 11.9 78.1 75.2 72.5
2030 866 5,766 6,001 6,237 6,632 6,867 7,103 13.1 12.6 12.2 78.5 75.4 72.6
2035 886 5,825 6,069 6,314 6,711 6,955 7,200 13.2 12.7 12.3 78.8 75.6 72.7
Diff. 2 1,629 1,873 2,118 1,631 1,875 2,120
0-14


















Rate of change in 
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2000 14612 Scenario A
2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776.2 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 10.8 1201 12330 -43 -9
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 10.8 1331 13661 68 14
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 10.8 1474 15135 358 72
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 10.8 1633 16768 559 112
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 10.8 1809 18578 788 158
9545 425 9120 5718 7448 1730 326
66.9254611
Malaysia 
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2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 9.7 1084 12233 -160 -32
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 8.9 1084 13337 -178 -36
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 8.1 1084 14441 -32 -6
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 7.5 1084 15545 10 2
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 7.0 1084 16648 62 12




Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,310 20,601 20,892 28,981 29,272 29,563 29.9 29.6 29.3 60.7 59.9 59.0
2020 8,674 22,392 22,995 23,598 31,066 31,669 32,272 27.9 27.4 26.9 61.0 59.4 57.9
2025 8,848 24,530 25,454 26,378 33,378 34,302 35,226 26.5 25.8 25.1 61.7 59.5 57.4
2030 8,971 26,802 28,067 29,332 35,773 37,038 38,303 25.1 24.2 23.4 62.6 59.7 57.2
2035 9,006 29,219 30,847 32,474 38,225 39,853 41,480 23.6 22.6 21.7 63.6 60.2 57.2
Diff. 389 10,850 12,478 14,105 11,239 12,867 14,494
Scenario B
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,193 20,467 20,740 28,864 29,138 29,411 30.0 29.8 29.5 60.6 59.8 59.0
2020 8,674 22,028 22,577 23,126 30,702 31,251 31,800 28.3 27.8 27.3 60.5 59.1 57.7
2025 8,848 23,776 24,587 25,398 32,624 33,435 34,246 27.1 26.5 25.8 60.7 58.7 56.9
2030 8,971 25,499 26,568 27,638 34,470 35,539 36,609 26.0 25.2 24.5 61.0 58.5 56.2
2035 9,006 27,191 28,514 29,837 36,197 37,520 38,843 24.9 24.0 23.2 61.2 58.4 55.8
Diff. 389 8,822 10,145 11,468 9,211 10,534 11,857
0-14












































Departure countries Migration balance Arrival countries Migration balance
United Arab Emirates 3,857 India -4,923
Saudi Arabia 2,781 Bangladesh -4,401
Thailand 1,595 China -4,182
Qatar 1,027 Pakistan -3,750
Singapore 954 Indonesia -2,477
Afghanistan 585 Philippines -2,361
Syrian Arab Republic 492 Myanmar -1,500
Malaysia 481 Uzbekistan -1,274
Bahrain 473 Viet Nam -863
Kuwait 439 Iraq -730
Israel 377 Tajikistan -718
Japan 322 Georgia -459
China, Hong Kong SAR 165 Kyrgyzstan -381
Jordan 109 Cambodia -373
Azerbaijan 107 Sri Lanka -350
Cyprus 106 Occupied Palestinian Territory -280
Oman 103 Yemen -235
China, Macao SAR 93 Kazakhstan -214
Lebanon 88 Nepal -200
Bhutan 52 Lao People's Democratic Republic -190
Brunei Darussalam 7 Armenia -175
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 0 Turkmenistan -168
Maldives 0 Turkey -150
Total 14,213 Republic of Korea -128




Table. A3 - Asia;  arrival and daparture countries; migration balance;  2000-2010; thousand
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2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2,523 395 2,128 1,547 7.9 2,999 41,037 1,452 290
2020 57408 2015-2020 2,030 390 1,640 1,193 7.9 3,236 44,273 2,043 409
2025 58778 2020-2025 1,370 385 985 716 7.9 3,491 47,764 2,775 555
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 7.9 3,766 51,530 3,444 689
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 7.9 4,063 55,593 4,138 828
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2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2523 395 2128 1547 7.3 2780 40818 1233 247
2020 57408 2015-2020 2030 390 1640 1193 6.8 2780 43598 1588 318
2025 58778 2020-2025 1370 385 985 716 6.4 2780 46378 2064 413
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 6.0 2780 49158 2457 491
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 5.7 2780 51938 2854 571












Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 21.2 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,436 56,973 57,510 69,762 70,299 70,836 19.1 19.0 18.8 72.7 72.0 71.4
2020 12,359 60,119 61,208 62,298 72,478 73,567 74,657 17.1 16.8 16.6 73.6 72.3 71.1
2025 11,592 63,879 65,532 67,185 75,471 77,124 78,777 15.4 15.0 14.7 74.8 72.9 71.1
2030 11,093 67,766 70,002 72,239 78,859 81,095 83,332 14.1 13.7 13.3 76.0 73.6 71.3
2035 10,831 71,801 74,643 77,485 82,632 85,474 88,316 13.1 12.7 12.3 77.4 74.5 71.7
Diff. -3,364 18,945 21,787 24,629 15,581 18,423 21,265
Scenario B
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 18.9 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,216 56,720 57,225 69,542 70,046 70,551 19.2 19.0 18.9 72.6 72.0 71.3
2020 12,359 59,444 60,432 61,420 71,803 72,791 73,779 17.2 17.0 16.8 73.3 72.1 71.0
2025 11,592 62,493 63,938 65,384 74,085 75,530 76,976 15.6 15.3 15.1 74.2 72.5 70.9
2030 11,093 65,394 67,275 69,155 76,487 78,368 80,248 14.5 14.2 13.8 75.2 73.1 71.1
2035 10,831 68,146 70,440 72,733 78,977 81,271 83,564 13.7 13.3 13.0 76.2 73.7 71.4
Diff. -3,364 15,290 17,584 19,877 11,926 14,220 16,513
0-14
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 22.7 850 4590 768 154
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 22.7 1043 5634 1026 205
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 22.7 1281 6914 1272 254
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 22.7 1572 8486 1587 317
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 25.6 781 3828 623 125
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 20.4 781 4608 698 140
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 16.9 781 5389 763 153
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 14.5 781 6169 772 154
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 12.7 781 6950 795 159
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 11.4 425 4165 343 69
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 5.7 237 4402 220 44
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 2.8 125 4527 116 23
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 1.4 64 4591 79 16








Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 17.4 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,820 6,064 6,307 6,592 6,836 7,079 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,869 7,270 7,671 7,690 8,091 8,492 10.7 10.1 9.7 82.0 77.5 73.4
2030 866 8,153 8,747 9,340 9,019 9,613 10,206 9.6 9.0 8.5 84.8 79.0 74.0
2035 886 9,720 10,548 11,377 10,606 11,434 12,263 8.4 7.7 7.2 87.3 80.4 74.6
Diff. 2 5,524 6,352 7,181 5,526 6,354 7,183
Scenario B
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 12.9 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 5,030 5,155 5,280 5,813 5,938 6,063 13.5 13.2 12.9 76.1 74.3 72.5
2020 772 5,838 6,085 6,331 6,610 6,857 7,103 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,625 6,989 7,353 7,446 7,810 8,174 11.0 10.5 10.0 81.3 77.1 73.3
2030 866 7,408 7,890 8,372 8,274 8,756 9,238 10.5 9.9 9.4 83.3 78.2 73.7
2035 886 8,184 8,782 9,380 9,070 9,668 10,266 9.8 9.2 8.6 84.9 79.1 74.1
Diff. 2 3,988 4,586 5,184 3,990 4,588 5,186
Scenario C
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 13.2 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,395 5,575 5,755 6,167 6,347 6,527 12.5 12.2 11.8 77.2 74.7 72.4
2025 821 5,638 5,854 6,070 6,459 6,675 6,891 12.7 12.3 11.9 78.1 75.2 72.5
2030 866 5,766 6,001 6,237 6,632 6,867 7,103 13.1 12.6 12.2 78.5 75.4 72.6
2035 886 5,825 6,069 6,314 6,711 6,955 7,200 13.2 12.7 12.3 78.8 75.6 72.7
Diff. 2 1,629 1,873 2,118 1,631 1,875 2,120
0-14
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2000 14612 Scenario A
2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776.2 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 10.8 1201 12330 -43 -9
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 10.8 1331 13661 68 14
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 10.8 1474 15135 358 72
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 10.8 1633 16768 559 112
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 10.8 1809 18578 788 158
9545 425 9120 5718 7448 1730 326
66.9254611
Malaysia 
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2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 9.7 1084 12233 -160 -32
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 8.9 1084 13337 -178 -36
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 8.1 1084 14441 -32 -6
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 7.5 1084 15545 10 2
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 7.0 1084 16648 62 12




Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,310 20,601 20,892 28,981 29,272 29,563 29.9 29.6 29.3 60.7 59.9 59.0
2020 8,674 22,392 22,995 23,598 31,066 31,669 32,272 27.9 27.4 26.9 61.0 59.4 57.9
2025 8,848 24,530 25,454 26,378 33,378 34,302 35,226 26.5 25.8 25.1 61.7 59.5 57.4
2030 8,971 26,802 28,067 29,332 35,773 37,038 38,303 25.1 24.2 23.4 62.6 59.7 57.2
2035 9,006 29,219 30,847 32,474 38,225 39,853 41,480 23.6 22.6 21.7 63.6 60.2 57.2
Diff. 389 10,850 12,478 14,105 11,239 12,867 14,494
Scenario B
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,193 20,467 20,740 28,864 29,138 29,411 30.0 29.8 29.5 60.6 59.8 59.0
2020 8,674 22,028 22,577 23,126 30,702 31,251 31,800 28.3 27.8 27.3 60.5 59.1 57.7
2025 8,848 23,776 24,587 25,398 32,624 33,435 34,246 27.1 26.5 25.8 60.7 58.7 56.9
2030 8,971 25,499 26,568 27,638 34,470 35,539 36,609 26.0 25.2 24.5 61.0 58.5 56.2
2035 9,006 27,191 28,514 29,837 36,197 37,520 38,843 24.9 24.0 23.2 61.2 58.4 55.8
Diff. 389 8,822 10,145 11,468 9,211 10,534 11,857
0-14
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ASEAN countries have been moving at different speeds along the path 
of the so called Demographic transition and are at present at different stages 
of this complex process. As a consequence, starting in the very near future, 
some ASEAN countries will be affected by an increasing structural lack of 
labor supply, while in other a structural excess of labor supply will persist 
for at least 30-40 years. This situation has already contributed to divide 
ASEAN countries into two groups: departure countries and arrival countries. 
Data show that both departures and arrivals have been steadily increasing as 
well as labor mobility within ASEAN.  
Building on this demographic background, the paper proposes 
alternative labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-35. 
The scenarios outline manpower needs, migration flows and population 
growth on the basis of the trends in WAP and alternative hypothesis on 
employment growth. The main conclusion is that the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei (already relevant arrival countries), the higher their need of 
foreign labor. In fact, in a very near future the local labor supply of these 
countries will not be even sufficient to replace the workers that will leave 
for good the labor force due to retirement or death. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within ASEAN countries 
will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth and social 
development.   
A survey of economic growth model brings us to support the idea that 
economic growth is the result of a process of technological upgrading, of 
diversification and structural change driven by the accumulation of 
capabilities, on one hand, and the transformation of the production structure, 
on the other. It is the knowledge base of a country that defines and limits the 
technologies a country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, 
and therefore the possible paths to economic growth and social development. 
Speeding up economic growth and triggering successful catching up 
processes does require shifting production from low quality activities into 
“high quality activities”, to “jump” into new knowledge clusters. In order to 
do so a country also needs to drive the knowledge structure toward higher 
diversity and complexity, to endow its incoming labor force with new 
expertise and competences.  
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different knowledge base. The 
percentage of people between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education 
spans between the maximum of Singapore (91 per cent) and the minimum 
values that characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 
per cent).  A more detailed analysis of the national educational attainments 
shows that beside Singapore -that has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance- only Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their 
production structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster or 
are ready to do so. The more polarized education structure of Thailand and 
possibly Myanmar suggest that these two countries have limited options to 
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start the production of intermediate technology products, but could develop 
directly toward high technology sectors.  
In conclusion, the paper contends that in a very near future workers 
mobility within the ASEAN region will not be a choice, but a necessity 
imposed by demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of 
economic growth and the typology of development will determine the 
amount of labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills 
that will be required by arrival countries. At the same time, the other 
ASEAN countries will be characterized by a structural excess of labor 
supply that will not be able to find a productive occupation in the national 
markets, since the rate of economic growth requested to absorb it will 
remain out of reach. 
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong 
points. 
 
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, Thailand 
and, although in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks. 
In this situation the papers proposes a series of policy options.  
In the first place, a correct migration policy can be based only upon a 
serious evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by arrival 
countries. The paper stresses the fact that the more developed economies do 
not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -especially at the beginning 
of the migration process- they need mainly unskilled labor and only with 
time qualified workers and university graduates will become predominant.  
The other side of the coin is that the outflow of migrants presents both 
positive and negative aspects for departure countries. On one hand, it 
reduces the pressure on the labor market and provides remittances that could 
support productive investments.  On the other hand, it depletes the 
knowledge structure and the capabilities of the departure countries because 
migrants are always, by definition, the most dynamic element of their 
societies.  
A correct approach to economic growth and catching up suggests that 
educational policies and industrial policies can play a fundamental role. In 
order to do so educational policies must be designed and implemented in 
relations to the training needs of both departures and arrival countries, while 
industrial policies should provide a production structure capable of 
promoting economic growth and a labor demand coherent with the exits 
from the educational system. 
More specifically, at national level, education and training policies 
should: 1) in the short run, provide a correct response to the local labor 
demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products.  Moreover, the 
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educational policies of the departures countries should be coordinated also 
with the industrial policies of the arrival countries so that the structural 
excess of labor supply of departures countries will find productive 
employment or in the arrival countries or in their investment in departures 
countries.  
In order to face such complex set of task, ASEAN countries will need, 
as already clearly suggested by the last ALM Working Program, a Labor 
Market Information System providing comparable information on the main 
aspects of human resources management, from demography to education 
and vocational training, from macroeconomic to employment, 
unemployment and migration, together with a broad comparative view of 
their labor market legislation.  
Therefore, an extremely important objective of ASEAN could be the 
constitution of an ASEAN Labor Market Information System aimed to 
collects, store and analyze the data produced at the national level, better 
their quality, and promote their comparability.  
The paper proposes a second important measure that responds not 
only to principles of equity and competitiveness but could also foster 
economic growth and social development: the creation of an Employment 
Migration Fund.   
A migrant brings with him a set of capabilities that are the result not 
only of its personal investment, but also of the investment in education 
made by its country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant 
corresponds for the production system of the receiving country to the free 
acquisition of a factor of production. This is obviously true only if and when 
the migrant worker is needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have 
a substitute in the arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this 
situation will exist and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and will 
affect a number of workers largely in excess of those “forecasted” by 
international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being represented as people running away from misery and 
deprivation or just looking for higher wages and a better life. This 
perspective has brought to the proposal, almost 40 years ago, of the so-
called Bhagwati tax. 
If we abandon this point of view and more in tune with reality and 
empirical evidence we realize that many developed economies that have 
been affected already for long time by below replacement fertility do not 
have enough internally “produced” labor not only to expand, but even to 
keep the present level of production, then we have also to change our image 
of the migrants.  
The first obvious implication is that the arrival country should pay to 
the departure country for each migrant employed in a productive job a price 
proportional to the cost supported by the government of the country of 
origin for its education and training.  
The proposal is that  these contributions be collected in an  Education 
Migration Fund managed by ASEAN to be used only to improve the 
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education and training system of member countries by intervening on the 
infrastructures, training the teachers, providing equal opportunities, and 
promoting  gender equality, in coordination with the industrial and 
macroeconomic policies required to start effective catching up processes.  
This measure would not only respond to a principle of equity, 
eliminate market distortions deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries, but in the growth perspective we have 
introduced, it would also be beneficial to arrival countries by fostering the 
process of catching up of the weaker economies, increasing their level of 
income and therefore expanding the market for the products coming from 
the more developed neighbors.  
 
 
JEL Classification: F22, I25, J11, J24, 053  
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We shall work closely with workers, employers, 
civil society, and other organizations to provide a 
favorable environment for economic growth and 
employment creation, as a key strategy to 
accelerate economic recovery and growth. 
 
We shall give priority to capacity‐ building in 
order to develop a productive, competent, and 
competitive workforce. This will enable the people 
of ASEAN to meet the changing job demands and 
challenges in the face of the integration of regional 
and global labor markets. 
 
ASEAN Labor Ministers‟ Vision Statement, 2000 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 The Institutional background 
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 




Since 2000, ASEAN‟s activities on labor and human resources have 
been guided by ASEAN Labor Ministers (ALM) Work Programs. The first 
Work Program set five broad priorities in the areas of employment 
generation, labor market monitoring, labor mobility, social protection, and 
tripartite cooperation. In the ALM Joint Statement of 2006 a sixth priority 
area, namely occupational safety and health (OSH), was added to in the 
Work Program. Since then new areas of work have emerged, including 
protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, HIV prevention 
and control in the work place, employment and labor law, as expressed in 
the ASEAN community blueprints. 
A Ad-hoc Working Group on Progressive Labor Practices to Enhance 
the Competitiveness of ASEAN was established in 2006. In 2009, the 
ASEAN leaders adopted the Cha Am Hua Hin Declaration on Strengthening 
Cooperation on Education to Achieve a Caring and Sharing Community. 
The 17
th
 ASEAN summit, held in Hanoi in 2010, focused on skills 
development and life-long learning. In that occasion the Leaders of ASEAN 
adopted a Joint Statement on Human resources and Skills Development for 
Economic Recovery and Growth. 
The Joint Statement affirmed that: “HR development should be an 
integral part of a country‟s development strategy”, the rational being that 
“Human resources development correlates with productivity and higher 
productivity leads to higher economic growth.” It suggested that in the 
                                                 
1
 The paper has been written in the context of the project STVET (Strengthening Technical 
Vocational Education and Training) of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) 
financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB Grant Number: 0178-CAM) in which the author 
acted as Labor Market Information and Statistic Specialist. The views and opinions expressed in the 
paper are strictly those of the author. 
2 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint. 
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medium-and long-term regional countries should take measures, among 
others, to upgrade the quality of the workforce through improving the 
relevance and quality of education and training. It further suggested that the 
gradual shift from an export-oriented economy to a more internal 
consumption base economy that many ASEAN countries will experience 
will need a greater capacity to rapidly intervene in the development of HR. 
Finally it reminded that the social dialogue between employers and 
employees should be strengthened to better the matching between the skill 
needed by the employers and the training provided to the workers. The 
document concluded stating that the “ ... globalization, technological 
development and demographic change have added a sense of urgency to 
improving quality of HR as they change the workplace, the nature and 
organization of work.” 
According to the last ALM Work Program covering the period 2010-
2015: “ The overall objective of ASEAN cooperation on labor is to build 
towards the vision of a better quality of life, productive employment, and 
adequate social protection for ASEAN peoples through enhancing 
workforce competitiveness, creating a harmonious and progressive 
workplace, and promotion of decent work for all.” The work plan indicates 
four strategic priorities: i) Legal foundation; ii) Institutional capacity; iii) 
Social partners; iv) Labor market and workforce development. 
The first priority implies the protection of labor right and conditions, 
including those of migrant workers; the second the capacity of the 
Government bodies to oversee the enforcement of labor laws and regulation; 
the third the establishment of informed social dialogue among labor sector 
partners at the national and regional level. The fourth priority includes a set 
of goals that will be at the center of the present paper:  
1. Creating systems that will promote the mobility of skilled labor 
within ASEAN; 
2. Anticipating, analyzing, monitoring and communicating to labor 
sector stakeholders and the public the impact of trade liberalization 
and of other global economic challenges on employment, wages, 
working condition, skills demand, etc.; 
3. Promoting progressive labor practices with regard to workforce 
development, skills training and standards, labor productivity, and 
labor law in order to enhance the competitiveness of firms and 
workforces, and thus of the ASEAN Member States and the region 
overall; 
4. Generating, regularly updating, and effectively disseminating 
labor market information. 
 
 
1.2 The structure of the paper 
The paper is structured in four parts. The first part analyses the impact 
of the Demographic transition (that we will prefer to call Demographic 
revolution) on the demographic tendencies and indicators of ASEAN 
countries. It will document the fact that the members of ASEAN have 
proceeded at different speeds along the path of the Demographic revolution 
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and have reached different stages of this complex process. As a consequence, 
while some countries are already (or will be soon) characterized by a 
declining Working Age Population (WAP), in other WAP will continue to 
grow. This will create a structural lack of labor supply in some countries 
and an excess of labor supply in the others.  
In the second part of the paper a model is introduced that allows 
estimating manpower needs, migration flows, and population trends as a 
function of the evolution in WAP and alternative hypothesis on employment 
growth. The model is used to build alternative labor market and 
demographic scenarios for ASEAN arrival countries. The exercise clearly 
shows that the future economic growth of Singapore, Thailand, and 
Malaysia will hinge on the arrival of very relevant numbers of foreign 
workers. The results are discussed on the basis of the tendencies exhibited in 
previous periods by migration flows in the Asian continent and more 
specifically in ASEAN countries and of a critical appraisal of the 
projections made by the United Nations Population Division.  
The third part of the paper discusses alternative growth theories and 
their implications in terms of industrial and educational policies. It will be 
shown that according to the New evolutionary economics, growth is lead by 
the accumulation of capabilities that allows, in a first phase, to diversify 
production inside a given knowledge cluster, and then to jump to new 
knowledge clusters, i.e. to move to higher quality products. 
The fourth part of the paper reviews the educational attainments of 
ASEAN countries. It then discusses the relationship between their education 
structure and the stage of growth they have reached and outlines their 
present options for technology and product diversification. 
The conclusion will bring together the main results reached in the four 
parts of the paper and spell out a series of policy suggestions.  
 
 
2 THE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 In 1950 the total population of ASEAN countries amounted to around 
172 million; after 60 years it reached almost 593 million and by now it 
should have passed the 600 million mark
3
. The average growth of 7 million 
per year registered in this long time interval is the result of 11 million births, 
4 million deaths, and of around 150,000 net migrants per year (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
3 Percentage rates of growth above the regional average (243.7 per cent) have been registered by the 
four smallest countries (Brunei, Singapore, Laos and Malaysia), together with Philippines, that 
register an astonishing demographic growth of 407%. As a consequence, Philippines are now the 
second most populous country in ASEAN after Indonesia that remains the most populous one with 





Rather surprisingly, these long-run yearly average values are almost 
identical to those of the 2005-2010 period, the only notable difference being 
represented by the average number of net migrants that has soared to almost 




Between 1950 and 2010 the largest migration flows were originated by 
Philippines (more than 5 million), followed by Indonesia (4.6 million), Vietnam 
(3.2 million), Myanmar (1.8 million), Cambodia (0.8 million) and Laos (0.5 
million). Positive migration balances were registered by Thailand (2.6 million), 
Malaysia and Singapore, with 1.8 million each, and Brunei with 0.5 million
4
. 
Therefore, in 60 years six ASEAN countries have generated a little more than 16 
million migrants (267,000 per year); of these 6.8 million (42.6 per cent) have 
                                                 












Brunei 47 345 35 310 496 806 853
Cambodia 4,346 18,650 8,055 10,595 -803 9,792 14,138
Indonesia 74,838 271,095 101,475 169,620 -4,590 165,030 239,868
Laos 1,683 7,910 2,850 5,060 -540 4,520 6,203
Malaysia 6,112 26,105 5,670 20,435 1,855 22,290 28,402
Myanmar 17,156 58,600 25,970 32,630 -1,810 30,820 47,976
Philippines 18,395 102,395 22,400 79,995 -5,135 74,860 93,255
Singapore 1,025 3,010 815 2,195 1,865 4,060 5,085
Thailand 20,608 67,210 21,340 45,870 2,615 48,485 69,093
Vietnam 28,263 101,205 38,440 62,765 -3,170 59,595 87,858
Total 172,473 656,525 227,050 429,475 -9,218 420,258 592,731
10,942 3,784 7,158 -154 7,004
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 1 - ASEAN countries; population, births, deaths and migration balance; 













Brunei 809 40 5 35 9 44 853
Cambodia 13,358 1,605 565 1,040 -260 780 14,138
Indonesia 227,303 22,320 8,460 13,860 -1,295 12,565 239,868
Laos 5,753 720 195 525 -75 450 6,203
Malaysia 26,097 2,855 635 2,220 85 2,305 28,402
Myanmar 46,331 4,230 2,085 2,145 -500 1,645 47,976
Philippines 85,540 11,590 2,640 8,950 -1,235 7,715 93,255
Singapore 4,270 205 110 95 720 815 5,085
Thailand 66,668 4,365 2,430 1,935 490 2,425 69,093
Vietnam 83,168 7,360 2,240 5,120 -430 4,690 87,858
Total 559,297 55,290 19,365 35,925 -2,491 33,434 592,731
11,058 3,873 7,185 -498 6,687
Source - United Nations, 2011a





moved to other ASEAN countries
5
), while 9.2 million have left the ASEAN region 
(57.4 per cent).  
 
 
 Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
In the last 5 years, the yearly average number of migrants has grown 
to 759,000, 261,000 of which headed toward some ASEAN countries, while 
the other 498,000 left the region (Graph.1). The departure countries have 
remained the same, but out-migration is now very concentrated, with 
Indonesia and Philippines accounting respectively for 34.1% and 32.5% of 
the total. At the same time two countries, Singapore and Thailand, 
accounted for 92.8 per cent of the total positive migration balance.  It must 
also be underlined that the percentage of migrants that have moved within 
ASEAN has diminished from 42.7 per cent over the total period to 34.4 per 
cent in the last 5-year period. 
The demographic boom registered by all ASEAN countries has been 
the result of the so-called “demographic transition” that is also going to 
have a very strong impact on their demographic future. The demographic 
transition has been defined as the passage from a traditional demographic 
regime, characterized by high fertility and high mortality, to a modern 
demographic regime, characterized by low fertility and low mortality. The 
drop in fertility below replacement level that by now has already taken place 
in around 50 developed and developing countries puts in serious doubt that 
what we are witnessing is a transition, i.e. the passage from an equilibrium 
regime to another equilibrium regime. Therefore, from now on we will use 
the terminology demographic revolution that is much more suggestive of the 
creative demographic disorder that is presently affecting the world.  
In 1950-55, in all ASEAN countries, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) – 
that we can loosely define as the total number of children per woman- was 
well above world average (4.95) (Table 3). Only two countries, Laos and 
Indonesia, registered a TFR below 6, while in the Philippines the TFR was 
                                                 
5 In this context, it should be underlined that 62% of the extraordinary demographic growth of Brunei 
is due to immigration. 
1950 -2010 2005-2010 Diff.
Total migration flows 267 759 492
Within ASEAN 114 261 147










Graph 1 - ASEAN  countries; total migration flows by destination; 
1950-2010 and 2005-2010; yearly values; thousand 
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above 7 and in Brunei exactly 7. In the other six countries the TFR ranged 
from 6.61, registered by Singapore, and 6 registered by Myanmar. After 60 
years only Philippines and Laos register TFR above 3 and four countries 
(Myannar, Vietnam, Thailand and  Singapore) are already below 
replacement level
6
, while Indonesia and Brunei could reach this historical 
borderline during the present decade. In all these countries the TFR has 
dimished by more than 60%, with record values registered by Singapore (-




A declining trend has characterized also mortality. Life expectancy 
has increased in all ASEAN countries, the most spectacular results having 
being achieved by Vietnam and Indonesia whose life expectancy at birth has 
increased respectively by 6.8 and 5.8 months per year. The spread between 
the maximum value (80.6, Singapore) and the minimum value (61.5, 
Cambodia) remains, however, very large
7
 (Table 4).   
 
. 
                                                 
6 The replacement level is the level at which total population remains constant and is approximately 
2.1children per woman 
7 The main determinant of this large difference is represented by infant mortality.  
Table 3 - ASEAN countries; total fertility rate; 1950-55 and 2005-10
1950-55 2005-10 Abs. change % change
Philippines 7.42 3.27 4.15 55.9
Laos 5.94 3.02 2.92 49.2
Cambodia 6.29 2.80 3.49 55.5
Malaysia 6.23 2.72 3.51 56.3
Indonesia 5.49 2.19 3.30 60.1
Brunei 7.00 2.11 4.89 69.9
Myanmar 6.00 2.08 3.92 65.3
Vietnam 6.20 1.89 4.31 69.5
Thailand 6.14 1.63 4.51 73.5
Singapore 6.61 1.25 5.36 81.1








Cambodia 39.4 61.5 22.1 4.4
Myanmar 36.0 63.5 27.5 5.5
Laos 42.4 66.1 23.7 4.7
Philippines 55.4 67.8 12.4 2.5
Indonesia 38.8 67.9 29.1 5.8
Malaysia 55.4 73.4 18.0 3.6
Thailand 50.7 73.6 22.9 4.6
Vietnam 40.4 74.3 33.9 6.8
Brunei 57.7 77.5 19.8 4.0
Singapore 60.2 80.6 20.4 4.1
Max - Min -18.3 -19.1 0.8 0.2
Source - United Nations, 2011a





These data do clearly show that ASEAN countries have been moving 
along the path of the demographic revolution at different speed, due to the 
political, economic and social events that have characterized their history in 
the second half of the XX century and in the beginning of the XXI century. 
The different position of each ASEAN country along the path of the 
demographic revolution can be captured and further documented with the 
help of other demographic indicators such as the Infant mortality rate and 
the structure of population by main age group. 
The Infant mortality rate (IMR) plays a very important role in 
determining the level and the trend of life expectancy at birth (Table 5). In 
1950, the Infant mortality rate (the number of children that die before 
reaching one year of age per thousand) presented a wide range of values that 
were reflected by life expectancy data. The most dramatic situation was that 
of Myanmar, where more than one child out of 5 died before age one; 
Singapore presented the best situation, but also in Singapore 1 child out of 




In the following 60 years, all ASEAN countries have made substantial 
improvements so that the worst-case scenario registered in 2010 is similar to 
the best-case scenario in 1950. Infant mortality has been completely 
eradicated in Singapore, and values of the IMR below 10 per thousand are 
registered in Brunei and Malaysia, with Thailand at 12.4. Vietnam, 
Philippines and Indonesia present values between 20 and 30, Vietnam and 
Indonesia being between the countries that have accomplished the biggest 
improvements, and Philippines the one with the worst performance.  Laos, 
Myanmar, and Cambodia occupy the last three positions in the ranking.  
In a first phase, the demographic revolution generates waves of births 
of increasing magnitude and then waves of declining magnitude. The 
passage of time makes each cohort move orderly along the path of life, 
2010 1950 Dff.
Singapore 1.9 60.7 -58.8
Brunei 4.8 90.2 -85.4
Malaysia 7.7 96.4 -88.7
Thailand 12.4 130.3 -117.9
Vietnam 20.4 157.9 -137.5
Philippines 23.0 96.8 -73.8
Indonesia 28.8 191.9 -163.1
Laos 44.5 167.1 -122.6
Myannar 55.0 212.8 -157.8
Cambodia 62.4 165.1 -102.7
Max-Min 60.5 152.1 -91.6
Table 5 -ASEAN countries; Infant mortality 
rate; 1950 and 2010
Source - United Nations, 2011a
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determining first a huge expansion of the proportion of children and then an 
increasing proportion of people in working age.  
The different stage reached by each ASEAN countries along the path 
of the demographic revolution is therefore illustrated also by the percentage 
of young people and of WAP (Table 6). The percentage of the former is 
included between a minimum of 17.4 per cent in Singapore and a maximum 
of 35.5 per cent in the Philippines, with other three countries registering 
values above 30 per cent: Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. At the same time 
Singapore presents the highest percentage of WAP (73.6 per cent), and other 
three countries (Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei) are characterized by values 
above 70 per cent. At the opposite end of the ranking we find as expected 
the Philippines, where WAP weights only 60.9 per cent, preceded by Laos, 





3 THE EVOLUTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION  
3.1 ASEAN 
Given the scope of this paper, we will now concentrate our attention 
on the effects of the Demographic revolution on WAP that is the source of 
labor supply, a first necessary step to analyze labor mobility and the role of 
education and vocational training.  
As we have already seen, from this perspective, one of the first 
impacts of the Demographic revolution is that of provoking an extremely 
relevant increase in WAP
8
, a phenomenon that has initially characterized the 
                                                 
8 The first manifestation of the demographic transition is the reduction of the infant mortality rate that 
will then be translated into an increase in the size of the cohorts entering reproductive age, while the 
TFR is still at the traditional level. This will, in its turn, provoke a progressive increase in the number 
of yearly births, a trend that will continue also when the fertility rate will start to drop, due to the 
increasing dimension of the cohorts in reproductive age. This is the chain of events that has 
0-14 15-64 65+ 80+
Singapore 17.4 73.6 9.0 1.8
Thailand 20.5 70.6 8.9 1.7
Vietnam 23.6 70.4 6.0 1.2
Brunei 26.2 70.2 3.6 0.7
Myanmar 25.8 69.2 5.0 0.8
Indonesia 27.0 67.4 5.6 0.7
Malaysia 30.3 64.9 4.8 0.6
Cambodia 31.9 64.3 3.8 0.4
Laos 34.5 61.6 3.9 0.5
Philippines 35.5 60.9 3.6 0.4
Max - Min 18.1 12.7 5.4 1.4
Table 6 - ASEAN countries; total population; 
percentage composition by main age group; 2010
Source - author elaboration on United Nations data, 
United Nation,  2011a
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developed countries -the firsts to enter the demographic revolution in the 
XVIII and XIX century- then the developing countries from the middle of 
the XIX century, and is now starting to affect the least developed countries.  
Graph 2 shows the impact of the demographic revolution on the total 
WAP of ASEAN. Initially, the expansion in WAP has been driven by an 
extraordinary increase in generational entries
9
 that grew from an average 
yearly value of around 4 million in the fifties to record values of above 11 
million between 1995 and 2010. Generational exits have started to register 
relevant increases only at the beginning of the „90s when bigger cohorts 
have reached “retirement age”. As a consequence of these events as well of 
the migration flows we have previously documented, the WAP of ASEAN 
has increased from 100 million in 1950 to 398 million in 2010. We can, 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
At the beginning of the new century ASEAN WAP starts to exhibit 
the second effect of the demographic revolution: a progressive, but rather 
fast slowdown in its rate of growth, due mainly to the increase in 
generational exits, but also to the smaller number of young people reaching 
working age. According to the U.N. Population Division, in about 30 year, 
generational exits from WAP will begin to exceed generational entries and 
WAP will start to decline. On the basis of the hypotheses adopted by the 
Population Division for the Medium variant scenario, inclusive of the 
assumptions on migration that we will discuss in a later paragraph, ASEAN 
                                                                                                                            
determined the explosion of WAP in developed countries in the second half of the XIX century and at 
the beginning of the XX. 
9  Generational entries are equal to the number of people who become 15 in the time interval 
considered, while generational exits are equal to the number of people who become 65 in the same 













































































































































Graph 2 - ASEAN; Working age population; generational entries, generational 
exits and natural balance; 1950-55/2055-60 
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Graphs 3a and 3b present the evolution of the yearly average absolute 
change and of the yearly average rate of growth of WAP registered between 
1950 and 2010 and the values forecasted for the following 50 years.  
 
 
Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The absolute growth of ASEAN WAP did reach a maximum value of 
7.2 million in the 1995-2000 interval, and is now down to around 6 million; 
it is expected to decline to 3.5 million at the beginning of the 2020s, to 1.5 
million at the beginning of the 2030s, and to become negative in the 2040s. 
The percentage rate of growth did peak earlier, in the 1980-85 period, at 3.1 
per cent. It is now down to 1.4 per cent, and is expected to decline by 
around 60 per cent every ten years.  
These data show that the pressure to create additional jobs in order to 
accommodate the incoming generations is already declining and it will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This trend will, on one hand, 
facilitate the ongoing process of modernization, i.e. the substitution of 
employment in the agricultural sector with employment in the modern 
sectors, but on the other will make unavoidable a marked increase in the 
exchange of Labor force within ASEAN.  
 
 
3.2 The country level  
As we have already discussed, the ten countries that constitute 
ASEAN have been moving along the path of the demographic revolution at 
different speed and, therefore, they are presently located in different stages 
of this process. As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, this has very 
important implications with respect to internal and external mobility.   
WAP, net of migrations, is forecasted to continue to grow until 2060 
in only two of the ten ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Philippines. In all 
the other eight, an historical maximum will be reached at or before 2050. 
The first country whose WAP would peak in absence of migration is 
Singapore, in 2015; Thailand will follow in 2020; Myanmar, Vietnam and 
Indonesia in 2035; Brunei in 2040; Cambodia in 2045; Laos in 2050 (Table 
7).  
 
                                                 







































































































































































































































































































As a consequence, in absence of migration, these eight countries will 
register very substantial declines in WAP although over different time 
intervals, the duration of the interval obviously playing a central role in 
determining the amount of the decline. Singapore, the most advanced 
country along the demographic revolution and the first to register the 
historical peak of WAP, is forecasted to lose almost 50 per cent of its WAP, 
Thailand 27.1 per cent, Vietnam 17.3 per cent, Myanmar 10.7 per cent and 
the other countries percentages between 4 and 7 per cent (Graph 4) All 




Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
The most suggestive aspect is, however, that from 2015 ASEAN will 
start to include an increasing number of countries that will be characterized 
by a declining WAP and others where WAP will still be growing, but at a 
diminishing pace.   
Table 7 -ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute values; 1950 -2060
Singapore Thailand Myanmar Vietnam Indonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos Malaysia Philippines ASEAN
1950 585 11,257 10,704 18,063 42,561 29 2,395 966 3,305 9,717 99,582
1960 897 14,770 11,709 19,520 51,944 43 2,980 1,174 4,167 12,985 120,189
1970 1,202 19,395 14,241 22,891 63,349 68 3,746 1,481 5,666 18,085 150,124
1980 1,647 27,045 18,301 29,361 83,461 112 3,778 1,699 7,946 25,188 198,538
1990 2,200 37,259 23,418 38,242 110,202 157 5,086 2,209 10,796 34,334 263,903
2000 2,791 43,654 28,970 49,079 137,966 218 6,893 2,873 14,715 45,079 332,238
2005 3,068 46,417 31,053 55,554 150,282 247 8,058 3,287 16,572 50,877 365,415
2010 3,742 48,786 33,206 61,842 161,699 282 9,090 3,821 18,432 56,819 397,719
2015 3,783 49,935 35,428 65,930 173,599 302 10,083 4,389 20,191 64,315 427,955
2020 3,669 50,071 36,773 68,438 184,564 320 10,892 4,872 21,799 71,721 453,119
2025 3,421 49,211 37,799 70,570 192,514 335 11,641 5,296 23,044 78,505 472,336
2030 3,176 47,794 38,519 71,714 197,661 345 12,308 5,669 24,117 85,162 486,465
2035 2,898 45,855 38,792 71,924 199,921 353 12,884 6,004 25,203 91,690 495,524
2040 2,705 43,870 38,484 70,955 199,899 355 13,339 6,272 26,191 97,971 500,041
2045 2,529 41,918 37,950 69,193 198,032 352 13,775 6,440 27,031 103,607 500,827
2050 2,356 39,966 37,063 66,263 194,648 351 13,500 6,493 27,623 108,480 496,743
2055 2,201 38,084 35,827 62,866 190,939 345 13,275 6,408 28,010 112,377 490,332
2060 1,981 36,171 34,632 59,515 186,766 339 12,876 6,212 28,207 115,439 482,138
1950-2010 3,157 37,529 22,502 43,779 119,138 253 6,695 2,855 15,127 47,102 298,137
2010 -2060 -1,761 -12,615 1,426 -2,327 25,067 57 3,786 2,391 9,775 58,620 84,419
Max - 2010 41 1,285 5,586 10,082 38,222 73 4,685 2,672 9,775 58,620 103,108
2060-Max -1,802 -13,900 -4,160 -12,409 -13,155 -16 -899 -281 9,775 58,620 -18,689



















Graph 4 -ASEAN countries; Working age population ; percentage 








Source - Author elaboration on United Nations data, United Nations, 2011a 
 
Graph 5 shows how the progressive reduction in ASEAN WAP 
growth and its becoming negative starting in 2040 will be brought about by 
the fact that an increasing number of countries will register a negative trend 
in their WAP. 
 
 
4 THE CAUSES OF ECONOMIC MIGRATIONS  
International migration flows are largely explained by the co-presence 
of countries characterized by a structural lack of labor supply and countries 
characterized by a structural excess of labor supply
11
, the thesis being that 
migrations are demand driven, but take place only when excess supply is 
present in other countries
12
.  
                                                 
11 For a detailed presentation of the model and an application to a series of countries and areas with 
below replacement fertility see M. Bruni, 2009; for an application to China see M. Bruni 2013 and  
2011, and M. Bruni and C. Tabacchi, 2011.  
12 According to this perspective the Migration Balance of arrival countries are determined by their 
Total Manpower Needs. As a consequence the world total migration flows are largely determined by 
the need of labor in arrival countries.  
Singapore Thailand Myanmar VietnamIndonesia Brunei Cambodia Laos MalaysiaPhilippines ASEAN
2010-2015 8 230 444 818 2,380 4 199 114 352 1,499 6,047
2015-2020 -23 27 269 502 2,193 4 162 97 322 1,481 5,033
2020-2025 -50 -172 205 426 1,590 3 150 85 249 1,357 3,843
2025-2030 -49 -283 144 229 1,029 2 133 75 215 1,331 2,826
2030-2035 -56 -388 55 42 452 2 115 67 217 1,306 1,812
2035-2040 -39 -397 -62 -194 -4 0 91 54 198 1,256 903
2040-2045 -35 -390 -107 -352 -373 -1 87 34 168 1,127 157
2045-2050 -35 -390 -177 -586 -677 0 -55 11 118 975 -817
2050-2055 -31 -376 -247 -679 -742 -1 -45 -17 77 779 -1,282
2055-2060 -44 -318 -239 -670 -835 -1 -80 -39 39 612 -1,574
Absolute yearly change 
Table 8 - ASEAN countries; Working age population; absolute yearly change; 2010-2060; thousand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United Nations, 2011a
2010-15 2015-20 2020-25 2025-30 2030-35 2035-40 2040-45 2045-50 2050-55 2055-60
Balance 6,047 5,033 3,843 2,826 1,812 903 157 -817 -1,282 -1,574
Pos 6,047 5,056 4,065 3,158 2,255 1,599 1,416 1,104 857 652















We will say that a country is characterized by a structural lack of labor 
supply, when a relevant share of the available jobs cannot be covered by the 
local labor supply. Analogously, we will say that a country is characterized 
by a structural excess of labor supply when a relevant and growing share of 
its labor supply cannot find employment. The countries characterized by a 
structural lack of labor supply are potential countries of arrival, while the 
countries characterized by a structural excess of labor supply are potential 
countries of departure. 
Let‟s define Total Manpower Needs as the difference between the 
increase in labor supply and the increase in labor demand, over a given time 
interval. Taking an operational perspective, the change in labor supply can 
be identified with the change in the level of the local Labor force (ΔLF) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1). The increase in labor 
demand can be identified with the change in the level of employment (ΔE) 
registered or forecasted over a given interval (t, t+1).  
The absolute change in the Labor force is the results of two 
components, one of demographic origin, the second connected to the 
propensity of the people in working age to participate in labor market 
activities. The former is identified in the change of the level of the Labor 
force due to the change in the level of Working age population, keeping the 
participation rate constant. Therefore, it is equal to the product between the 
change in WAP (ΔWAP)
13
 and the rate of participation (rop) at the 
beginning of the period. The latter is the result of the change in participation 
behavior taking place during the interval considered, and it is equal to the 
product between the change in the rate of participation and the level of the 
Labor force at the end of the period.  
 
1] tTMN(t+1) = tΔLF(t+1)  - tΔE(t+1) 
                                 = [(ropt * tΔWAP(t+1)) +( tΔropt+1 * LF(t+1))] -  tΔE(t+1)   
 
All three components of [1] can be positive or negative, depending on 
the trends in Employment, Labor force and Rate of participation. This 
implies that also Manpower Needs can be positive or negative.  
A negative value of TMN implies that the growth in labor supply has 
been (or is forecasted to be) smaller than the growth in employment. As we 
have already stated, a negative difference between the change in labor 
supply and labor demand identifies a situation of structural lack of labor 
supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting phenomenon. In a first phase the 
difference can be, at least partially, satisfied by the unemployed, by an 
increase in Labor force participation, especially women, by internal 
migrations from more underdeveloped internal areas. Sooner or later, these 
additional sources of labor supply will necessarily be exhausted and 
international migrations will represent the only possible solution. 
By converse, a positive value does imply that the country is 
accumulating an excess of labor supply that cannot be satisfied by local 
                                                 
13 What we will consider is in fact the natural balance of WAP, which is equal to the difference 






. As in the previous case, this situation can be identified as 
Structural excess of labor supply if it is a growing, and long-lasting 
phenomenon. In this case, the situation initially can be dealt with by an 
expansion of the informal economy, a widening of the average dimension of 
the family and by a reduction in the participation rate, especially of women. 
However, in the long run, only massive migration flows can solve the 
problem. In their absence, a growing number of young people will find 
themselves without any perspective for the future, and could be willing to 
do anything because a life without job is also a life without value. Also in 
this case, in the long run only migration can provide a solution to the 
problem  
A few final considerations are needed. In the first place what we are 
considering are the very special situations that have been created, are 
created and will inevitably be created by the demographic revolution. They 
are characterized by changes in the level of WAP of such a dimension that 
cannot be dealt with, on one hand, by wage adjustments or increases in 
productivity and, on the other, by high rates of growth of employment.  
The declines in WAP brought about by the demographic revolution 
have often such a dimension and will span over such a long period that it is 
totally unrealistic to assume that labor productivity could grow enough to 
both offset the decline in labor supply and allow production to grow. Let‟s 
for instance consider the case of Japan. According to the Population 
Division medium variant scenario, between 2010 and 2060, the WAP (15-
64) of Japan is expected to decline by 34.8 per cent, from 81 to 53 million. 
The direct implication is that in order to avoid more immigrants than the 2.8 
million hypothesized by the UNPD, labor productivity should increase by 
34.8 percentage points more
15
 than the percentage growth in production
16
.  
Given that the increase in labor productivity does not represent a 
viable alternative to migration, do other alternatives exist? The only 
economically viable alternative is to move production abroad. However it 
has been rightly observed: “As its economy matured and its population aged, 
a country could safely become a rentier state, boosting its economic product, 
and in particular paying its pensions, with the income from its international 
investments. The more youthful countries on the receiving end would no 
doubt prefer the inflow of capital to an outflow of labor. In the world as it is, 
however, that may be a less prudent portfolio diversification by an ageing 
society of retirees than an hostage to fortune.”
17
 In practice, the 
delocalization of production is a viable economic solution, but it presents 
risks that a country could not be willing to take. 
                                                 
14 It should be obvious that in all the countries that find themselves in this situation the real wage 
already at or below the subsistence level cannot be an answer to the problem.  
15 In the last 50 years production has increased more than productivity in all industrialized countries 
as shown by the fact that in the long run employment has increased in all of them, declining only in 
periods of heavy restructuring of the production structure or of economic crisis.  It must also be 
recalled that the larger the service sector the more difficult is to achieve high rate of growth of 
productivity or, stated in another way, the employment-income elasticity tends to be low in post 
industrial economies.  
16 This is implicit in the fact that the growth in employment is identically equal to the difference 
between the rate of growth in production an the rate of growth in productivity.  
17 McNicoll, D. 2000 
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The situation of excess labor supply generated by the Demographic 
revolution normally takes place in countries still largely dominated by the 
agricultural sector and in which the process of modernization requires not 
only the expansion in the employment level of Industry and Services, but 
also a growth in the employment level of these two sectors sufficient to 
replace non productive jobs in agriculture. Initially, the most probable 
outcome is that agriculture absorbs the excess of labor supply determining 
the situation described in Lewis seminal article in which the real wage is at 
subsistence level. However, with time large migration flows could be the 
only available mean to avoid the spread of poverty and income inequality.  
The last point we have to consider is the relationship between 
Manpower needs and migration flows.  In general we can say that the level 
of migration is positively related to manpower needs: 
 
2] Migr = B TMN 
 
where B is equal to or greater than 1. At the beginning of any economic emigration 
process, only workers will move to the destination country. With time, they will be 
eventually reached by some members of the family. Therefore, at the initial stage B 
is equal to 1 and will then progressively increase. Previous analyses have shown 





5 ASEAN MIGRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
ASEAN includes countries like Philippines and Indonesia whose 
workers are migrating not only within ASEAN and to other Asian countries, 
but also to Europe, America and Australia, while Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia are becoming prominent arrival countries. To provide some more 
solid reference points to the forecasting exercise we are going to present in 
the following paragraphs, we deem relevant to present a concise overview of 
the tendencies in international migrations and project the migratory behavior 
of ASEAN countries against the general background of the Asian continent.  
Between 1950 and 2010, international migration flows have been 
characterized by three main trends: i) a substantial increase in the total level; 
ii) a notable increase in the percentage of intercontinental flows; iii) very 
relevant changes in the structures of both arrival and departures flows by 
area and continent.  
Between 1950-55 and 1990-95 international migration flows have 
increased almost fourfold, from 6 to 28.6 million, a value that still marks the 
historical maximum. After a small contraction registered in the last five 
years of the century, between 2000 and 2010, around 54 million people have 
left their native countries, bringing the total number of world migrants in the 
last sixty years above the 200 million mark (Table A1).  
Between 1950 and 1960, intercontinental migration flows represented 
48 per cent of total international migration flows (6.7 million out of 14 
million); between 2000 and 2010 the percentage has increased to 62 per cent 
(34 out of 54 million) (Table A1).  
                                                 
18 M. Bruni,  2009 
24 
 
In the former period, intercontinental migration flows were generated, 
in order of importance, by Europe, Africa and South America, while the 
main areas of arrival were the New World Countries (NWC: USA, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand) and Asia. In the latter period, departures were 
generated mostly by Asia, Central and South America, and Africa, while the 
main areas of arrival were Europe, NWC and Gulf Countries (GC). 
Therefore, in only sixty years, Europe has become the main area of arrival, 
while Asia has become the world major supplier of labor. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the NWC were the main pole of attraction of 
international migration flows. They received around half a million migrants 
per year, i.e. 36.4 per cent of total migration flows. Western Europe (with 
France and Germany, but also Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden) was the 
second pole of attraction. Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela represented the 
third pole of attraction (Table A2).  
Fifty years later the situation has radically changed. As we have 
already seen, Europe has become the main port of arrival, while the 
Countries of the Gulf have become the third largest pole of attraction after 
the NWC. Eastern, Central and especially Southern Asia, Central and 
Southern America, Northern, Eastern and Western Africa are now the areas 
that provide labor to the rest of the world. More specifically, on one hand: 
 Europe has received 20.1 million migrants 19; 
 Arrivals in the NWC have been in excess of 15 million; 72.8 per 
cent have chosen the US, 11.7 per cent Australia, 4.3 per cent 
Canada and 1.3 per cent New Zealand;  
 The GCs have attracted 8.7 million immigrants, 3.9 million of 
which went to the Arab Emirates and 2.8 million to Saudi Arabia.  
On the other hand, both Latin America and Africa had negative 
migration balances of respectively 11.2 million
20
 and 6.3 million
21
. 
Beside the six Gulf countries, other 15 Asian countries have registered 
positive migration balances so that the total number of arrivals has exceeded 
14 million, while 27 countries have been affected by negative migration 
balances for a total amount of 30.6 million. Therefore, the continental 
migration balance has been negative and equal to around 16 million (Table 
A3).  
After the two largest gulf countries (Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), 
the main arrival country has been Thailand, followed by Qatar and 
Singapore. The list of Asian arrival countries includes other 5 countries in 
                                                 
19 Of the 40 European countries 27 are arrival countries and 13 departure countries. The main arrival 
countries have been, in order of relevance, Spain, Italy, the Russian Federation, and the United 
Kingdom, followed by the more traditional arrival countries such as France and Germany, together 
with Sweden, Belgium and Austria. Exits from the departures countries have been only 1.8 million.  
20  Between 2000 and 2010 only 8 Latin America countries have registered a positive migration 
balance, and for a very modest total value of 0.4 million. Negative migration balances, for a total 
value of 11,6 million, have been registered by the other 28 countries. Mexico with 4.4 million (37.9 
per cent of the total) leads the ranking followed by Peru, Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
21 In Africa 16 countries have registered positive migration balances for a total value of almost 4 
million; 36 have registered negative migration balances summing to more than 10 million. South 
Africa (1.6 million) has been the most important arrival country followed by Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, both accounting for more than half a million immigrants. The ranking of arrival countries is 
lead by Zimbabwe, followed by Morocco, Ivory Cost, Guinea and Egypt.   
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Eastern Asia, (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon), but also 
Afghanistan and Bhutan, Hong Kong and Macao, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Japan. If the main country of departure has been India -that has generated 
almost half a million migrants per year- other 5 countries have registered 
more or about 250,000 departures per year: Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and Philippines. These six countries are between the seven most 
important departure countries, the other being Mexico, that ranks second 
after India (Table A2).  
In conclusion, of the 21 Asian arrival countries, 4 are ASEAN 
countries, Thailand and Singapore being respectively the third and fifth 
more relevant arrival countries in Asia. At the same time, other two ASEAN 
countries, Philippines and Indonesia, are fifth and sixth in the Asian ranking 





6 LABOR MARKET AND DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS  
We will now propose some Manpower Needs and Migration scenarios 
for the three ASEAN countries that have registered the largest positive 
migration balances during the 2005-2010 period: Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia
23
. The scenarios have been constructed on the basis of the model 
we have previously introduced.  
The scenarios are relevant not only because Singapore and Thailand 
are the two ASEAN countries that have reached the most advanced stage of 
the demographic revolution, but because they will be the firsts to register a 
negative natural balance of WAP (15-64) that will then progressively 
increase in absolute value. Malaysia, while having progressed a lot in terms 
of life expectancy and infant mortality is still characterized by a rather high 
TFR and, according to the Population Division, its TFR is expected to 
decline at much lower speed than those of the other ASEAN countries. 
However, as we have already seen, Malaysia has already been receiving a 
relevant, although smaller than in the past, number of migrants.  
 
 
6.1 Main tendencies of the labor market in Singapore, Thailand and 
Malaysia  
Between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered notable percentage increases in the level of employment (Table 9), 
the record value (34.4 per cent) being that of Singapore, followed by 
Malaysia (10.8 per cent), and Thailand (7.9 per cent). Despite the positive 
migration flows registered during the same period, in Singapore and 
Thailand the Labor force has grown less than employment. Therefore, both 
countries have registered a decline in the level of unemployment, and 
obviously an even more pronounced decline in the rate of unemployment. In 
Malaysia, Labor force has increased slightly more than employment, but the 
unemployment rate has declined. Taken together, the 3 countries have 
                                                 
22  The average yearly values have been: 144,000 (Singapore), 98,000 (Thailand) and 17,000 
(Malaysia).  
23 The other country to register a positive migration balance has been Brunei. 
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generated, over the five-year period, 4.6 million jobs, equal to a percentage 




As we have already seen, according to the United Nation Population 
Division, between 2005 and 2010, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have 
registered net migration balances of respectively 720,000, 490,000 and 
85,000 people, for a grand total of 1,295,000, a value that, as we will see 
later, does probably largely underestimate the real value. It is therefore 
evident that without migrants the growth in labor supply would have been 
insufficient to face the growth in labor demand: in Singapore migrants have 
covered almost the total increase in labor demand (95.2 per cent), in 
Thailand 17.6 per cent and in Malaysia around 11 per cent. Therefore, 
migrants have covered 30 per cent of the 4.6 million total increase in 
employment registered by the three countries taken together.  
 
 
6.2 Hypothesis and computational procedures  
In order to provide some indications on the probable trends in the 
number and typology of migrants that will be needed by Singapore, 
Thailand and Malaysia in the next 25 years, we have proceeded to build for 
each countries labor market and demographic scenarios for the period 2010-
35, articulated on five-year periods. As indicated in a previous paragraph, 
the future level of the Migration balance of these three countries will depend 
mainly on their Manpower needs that, in their turn, will be the result of the 
trends in labor supply and labor demand.  
We recall, first of all, that our scenarios will be based on population, 
employment and labor force 15 years and older. This choice has been 
imposed by the fact that all three countries are characterized by a large labor 
market participation of people above 64 years of age, and by the 
consideration that this segment of potential supply is going to increase 
enormously in the next 25 years, as shown in table 10.  
Due to its high TFR Malaysia has remained the youngest of the three 
countries we are considering with a percentage of elderly of only 4.8 per 
Table 9 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; main labour market variables and indicators; 2005 ad 2010
2005 2010 Abs. change % change 2005 2010 Abs. change % change 
Employment 2,267 3,047 781 34.4 35,257 38,037 2780 7.9
Unemployment 101 89 -12 -11.6 663 402 -261 -39.3
Labour force 2,367 3,136 769 32.5 35,920 38,440 2519 7.0
WAP (65 +) 3,376 4,198 822 24.4 48,942 52,856 3914 8.0
roa 70.1 74.7 4.6 6.5 73.4 72.7 -0.7 -0.9
roe 67.1 72.6 5.4 8.1 72.0 72.0 -0.1 -0.1
rou 4.2 2.8 -1.4 -33.3 1.8 1.0 -0.8 -43.3
Employment 10,045 11,129 1084 10.8 47,569 52,214 4645 9.8
Unemployment 368 388 20 5.4 1,132 879 -253 -22.3
Labour force 10,414 11,517 1104 10.6 48,701 53,093 4392 9.0
WAP (65 +) 16,451 18,369 1918 11.7 68,769 75,423 6654 9.7
roa 63.3 62.7 -0.6 -0.9 70.8 70.4 -0.4 -0.6
roe 61.1 60.6 -0.5 -0.8 69.2 69.2 0.1 0.1
rou 3.5 3.4 -0.2 -4.7 2.3 1.7 -0.7 -28.8





cent versus values of 8.9 and 8.7 per cent in Singapore and Thailand. 
According to the Medium variant projection of the Population Division, in 
the next 25 years, the percentage of elderly will reach 14.5 per cent in 




Coming now to our computations, the absolute change in labor supply 
for each of the five year period from 2010-2035 has been estimated by i) 
computing the absolute change in WAP for each period and ii) multiplying 
it by the 2010 rate of participation. We must point out that: 
 We have considered only one demographic scenario based on the 
Medium variant projection of the Population Division, the reason 
being that the other scenarios do not present notable differences 
since: i) the people who will enter WAP in the next fifteen years are 
already born; ii) those that will enter WAP in the following 10 years 
are those that will be born in the next 8 years and no dramatic 
changes in the TFR are at present foreseeable; iii) all the UN 
scenarios adopt the same hypotheses on mortality.  
 According to the previous model, another element that affects the 
trend in the level of labor supply is the rate of participation, or more 
specifically its changes over time. As we have already suggested, 
Singapore and Thailand boost extremely high participation rates 
(74.7 and 72.7 per cent) that have been increasing under the pressure 
of and expanding demand. In Malaysia the rate of participation is 
about ten points lower (62.7 per cent) due to the limited presence of 
women in the labor market. Are these national rates going to 
converge? Up to now, in developed countries the process of 
modernization has brought strong reduction in the labor market 
presence of the elderly; however, it is already evident that the 
lengthening of the training phase, the ageing process together with 
the improvement in health conditions and the restriction in the 
welfare system imposed by much tighter economic situations are 
going to push in the opposite direction and keep older people in the 
labor market longer than at present. This would seem to suggest that 
in Singapore and Thailand opposite forces could maintain the rate of 
participation at around the present value. In Malaysia the situation 
presents an additional factor, the behavior of the cohorts of young 
girls entering the labor market in the next years. If it is possible that 
Abs. value % Abs. value % Abs. value %
2010 454 8.9 6,002 8.7 1,368 4.8
2035 1,634 26.9 14,284 19.6 4,461 14.5
Diff. 1,180 17.9 8,282 10.9 3,093 9.7
Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Source - Author elaboration on  Population Division data, United 
Nations, 2011a




the rate of participation of the next cohorts will be higher than that of 
the previous generations, their contribution to labor market 
participation could be countered by the fact that both boys and girls 
will tend to remain longer in the training phase of life. In conclusion, 
due to the lack of strong evidences in one direction or on the other 
we have assumed a constant rate of participation.  
For Thailand and Malaysia, the absolute change in labor demand has 
been computed on the basis of two alternative hypotheses: i) a constant rate 
of growth equal to the one registered between 2005 and 2010 (scenario A); 
ii) a constant employment growth equal to the absolute growth registered in 
the same period (Scenario B). In scenario A the absolute change in 
employment increases progressively, in scenario B the percentage rate of 
growth declines progressively. In substance, the first scenario is more 
optimistic, but probably less realistic.  
In Thailand, in Scenario A, employment increases of around 17.5 
million (46.2 per cent) over 25 years, while in Scenario B employment 
grows by little less than 14 million (36.5 per cent) (Table A4). In Malaysia, 
in Scenario A, employment grows by 7.5 million (66.9 per cent), in 
Scenario B by 5.4 million (48.7 per cent) (Table A8). 
In the case of Singapore the construction of the scenario had to 
acknowledge the fact that between 2005 and 2010 employment has grown 
by an astounding 34.4 per cent. The adoption of such a rate would produce 
what appears as a totally unrealistic growth in employment (from a little 
more than 3 million in 2010 to around 11.5 million in 2035). For Scenario A 
we have therefore assumed a constant average growth rate equal to half that 
registered between 2000 and 2010. Such a rate, 22.5 per cent, is still more 
than the double of that adopted for Malaysia (10.8 per cent) and that adopted 
for Thailand (7.9 per cent). With this assumption Employment grows to 
around 8.5 million, i.e. 179 per cent. 
In analogy with what was done for Thailand and Malaysia, Scenario B 
assumes a growth in the level of employment equal to that registered 
between 2005 and 2010 (781,000). In this scenario the rate of growth 
progressively declines from an initial value of 25.6 per cent during the first 
five-year period, to 12.7 per cent between 2030 and 2035 and total 
employment increases from 3 to almost 7 million.   
Since in the long run both scenarios could be too optimistic, a third 
Scenario (Scenario C) is proposed. In this scenario the initial growth rate of 
employment, taken equal to the one used in Scenario A, is progressively 
halved down to a value of 1.4 per cent in the last five-year period. In this 
Scenario the growth in employment is obviously much more limited and 
equal to 1.5 million over the entire period, a value which however 
corresponds to a 51 per cent increase over the 2010 value.  
The following step has been that of comparing the increase in supply 
with the increase in labor demand proposed by each scenario in order to 
estimate whether and how much of the additional labor demand can be 





6.3 Manpower Needs 
The results of the exercise are summarized in table 11 that presents the 
Total Manpower Needs that Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia will have to 
face in the next 25 years in the two scenarios we have previously described. 
The detailed analysis is presented in the Statistical Annex (Table A4 for 
Thailand, Table A6 for Singapore, and Table A8 for Malaysia).  
Let‟s observe first of all that in both Singapore and Thailand the 
absolute changes in labor supply will progressively decrease to become 
negative in the 2030-35 period. The situation is totally different in Malaysia 
where the absolute change in Labor force will peak around 2020 and will 






                                                 
24 If we had used WAP (15-64) the change of sign in Singapore and Thailand would have taken place 
in the 2015-20 period. The difference we register is due to the ageing process we have previously 
discussed. 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2005-2010 -720 -490 -85 -1,295
2010-2015 -535 -1,452 43 -1,944
2015-2020 -768 -2,043 -68 -2,879
2020-2025 -1,026 -2,775 -358 -4,159
2025-2030 -1,272 -3,444 -559 -5,275
2030-2035 -1,587 -4,138 -788 -6,512
Total -5,188 -13,851 -1,730 -20,769
Yearly average values -208 -554 -69 -831
% distribution 25.0 66.7 8.3 100.0
2010-2015 -623 -1,233 160 -1,695
2015-2020 -698 -1,588 178 -2,108
2020-2025 -763 -2,064 32 -2,795
2025-2030 -772 -2,457 -10 -3,239
2030-2035 -795 -2,854 -62 -3,712
Total -3,652 -10,196 298 -13,549
Yearly average values -146 -408 12 -542
% distribution 26.9 75.3 -2.2 100.0
Sources - National data from various sources
Scenario A: Constant rate of employment  growth
Scenario B: Constant  employ.  growth






The growth in employment hypothesized in scenario A provokes very 
large and increasing Manpower needs that sum up to almost 21 million over 
the 2010-2035 period. Sixty seven per cent would be originated by Thailand 
(13.9 million), 25 per cent by Singapore (5.2 million), and 8.3 per cent by 
Malaysia (1.7 million). In Singapore the ratio between Manpower needs (in 
absolute value) and changes in employment surges from 77.2 per cent in 
2010-15 to 90.3 per cent in 2015-20, to then progressively increase to a 
value of 101 per cent in 2030-35 (Graph 6). In Thailand this ratio is always 
smaller than in Singapore until the end of the 2020s, but then leaps to 101.8 
in the 2030-35 period. As we have already underlined, in Malaysia the 
growth in labor supply will be relatively much more pronounced since the 
drop in fertility has been more limited than in Singapore and Thailand. As a 
consequence, the local Labor force should be more than sufficient to cover 
the additional jobs created in the 2010-15 period. Manpower needs become 
negative in the following interval and will then progressively increase to 
represent 43.5 per cent of additional employment in 2030-35.  
Scenario B (that assume a constant growth in the level of employment 
and therefore a declining rate of growth) generates a lower amount of 
Manpower needs (13.5 million) and some other qualitative differences. The 
distribution of Manpower needs between the three countries is more skewed, 
with Thailand accounting for 75.3 per cent, Singapore for 26.9 per cent and 




In the case of Thailand the results of Scenario B are very similar to 
those of Scenario A, the percentage of manpower needs with respect to 
labor demand progressively increasing to reach a value above 100 in 2035. 
In the case of Malaysia local labor supply appears to be sufficient to face the 
growth in employment outlined in Scenario B until 2030. Finally, in 
Singapore manpower needs represent around 95 per cent of the increase in 











Singapore 77.2 90.3 98.4 99.3 101.0
Thailand 48.4 63.1 79.5 91.4 101.8









Graph 6 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
A; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
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Source: Author elaboration on National data  
 
In Singapore, scenario C produces a much more conservative forecast 
of Manpower needs that would be equal to only around 1.3 million for the 
entire period. Moreover, they would be decreasing through time in parallel 
with the rate of growth in employment. Also in this case, however, 
manpower needs will end up being in excess of the increase in employment 
in the 2030-35 time-interval.  
  
 
6.4 A clarification of the previous results from a flow perspective  
Before summarizing the conclusion suggested by the previous analysis, 
it is important to clarify the exact meaning of the percentages of Manpower 
needs we have just presented and more specifically why this percentage can 
exceed 100 per cent and what does it mean. In order to do so we have to 
move from a stock to a flow representation of the labor market. This 
clarification provides some relevant inputs also for the analysis of the 
relationship between education and vocational training, on one hand, and 
economic growth and development, on the other.  
The increase in employment represents just one part of the number of 
“new” young people that are needed in any given interval by the labor 
market, the total number being equal to the sum of i) the people needed to 
substitute the employed that have definitely left the Labor force for one of 
the following three reasons: retirement, death, and migration, and ii) the 
people needed to cover the additional jobs created by the market as a 
consequence of the increase in production. In other terms, the Labor demand 
in terms of flows (LDF) (which is measured by generational entries, i.e. first 











Singapore 95.2 79.8 89.5 97.8 98.9
Thailand 44.3 57.1 74.2 88.4 102.7










 Graph 7 -Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; Scenario 
B; Manpower Needs /Additional Demand ratio 
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(RD) (that is measured by the number of people needed to substitute 
definitive exits from employment) and Additional demand (AD) (measured 
by the people needed to cover the Additional jobs created in the interval).  
  
3] LDF = RD + AD 
 
In substance, the ratio between Manpower needs and increase in 
employment tells us which quota of Additional demand cannot be covered 
by the local labor supply in terms of flows, i.e. by the people that have 
entered the labor market for the first time during the interval we are 
considering.   
To exemplify the previous statements, let‟s consider Singapore in 
Scenario A. As we have already seen, in the 2010-15 period manpower 
needs represent 77.2 per cent of the increase in the level of employment. 
This means that the local labor supply in terms of flow is sufficient i) to 
fully replace definitive exits from the market (RD), and ii) to satisfy 22.8 
per cent of the Additional demand. When we reach the 2030-35 interval, the 
ratio between the manpower needs and the growth in employment is equal 
to 101 per cent. In substance, at that time the local labor supply will not be 
sufficient even to fully cover Replacement demand.  
 
 
7 MANPOWER NEEDS AND MIGRATION FLOWS  
7.1 The stock of migrants in ASEAN countries  
The presence of a structural need of migrants is by now extremely 
evident in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei. Table 12 reports the 
data on the stock of migrants present in ASEAN countries according to the 






Malaysia 2,358 35.2 82.0 45.2
Singapore 1,967 29.4 83.4 56.0
Thailand 1,157 17.3 81.9 48.4
Philippines 435 6.5 57.1 51.1
Cambodia 336 5.0 62.9 51.7
Brunei 148 2.2 84.7 45.5
Indonesia 123 1.8 78.3 44.5
Myanmar 89 1.3 75.8 48.7
Viet Nam 69 1.0 72.1 36.6
Laos 19 0.3 72.0 48.0
Total 6,701 100.0 79.6 49.6
Table 12 - ASEAN countries; stock of migrants, 














According to this source, of the 6.7 million migrants present in 
ASEAN 84 per cent are in the four arrival countries and, more specifically, 
35.2 per cent in Malaysia, 29.4 per cent in Singapore, 17.3 per cent in 
Thailand and 2.2 per cent in Brunei. Since these migrations have been 
determined by economic reasons, the four countries are also characterized 
by the highest percentages (all well above 80 per cent) of migrants in 
working age. In Brunei and Singapore migrants (or more specifically 
foreign citizens in Brunei and foreign born population in Singapore) 
represent almost 50 per cent of the population in the 20-64 age group, the 
value for Malaysia being 11.2 per cent, while according to the same source 
in Thailand the foreign born population in this age group represent only 2 
per cent of the total (Graph. 8). It is also interesting to observe that Brunei 
has the highest incidence of foreign elderly (a fact that signal that 
immigration in this country is a old phenomenon), while Singapore has the 
highest percentage of children showing that recent immigration is made up 
mainly of young people in reproductive age.   
 As a matter of fact available information suggests that while estimates 
for Singapore are sufficiently correct, the data for Thailand and Malaysia 
largely underestimate the number of migrants.  
 
 
Source – our elaboration on Population Division 2011b 
 
According to the 2011 Thailand Migration Report
25
, the foreign 
population working and residing in Thailand is in excess of 3.5 million, 
three times as much as the Population Division estimate
26
. This would bring 
                                                 
25 “There are more than 3.5 million persons without Thai nationality living in the country, including 
many long-term residents and children of migrants born in Thailand. More than 3.0 million of them 
are working in the country; ”Jerrold W. Huguet and Aphichat Chamratrithirong (eds), 2011; p. XII  
26 According to the Report: “In recent decades Thailand has evolved into a regional migration hub in 
South-East Asia, and is concurrently a country of origin, transit and destination for large numbers of 
both regular and irregular international migrants. With a dynamic economy, there is also a great deal 
0-19 20-64 65+
Brunei Darussalam 15.9 48.3 32.1
Singapore 29.0 47.3 24.0
Malaysia 3.9 11.2 12.5








Graph 8 - Brunei, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 




the percentage of the foreign population to around 4 per cent. More 
specifically, according to the Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI), there are a 
total of 2.46 million low-skilled migrants from the three neighboring 
countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos). According to the same source, 
some two million migrants are currently enrolled at some stage of the 
country's complex registration process for migrant workers and an estimated 
one million migrants and family members are unregistered. Women account 
for around 45 per cent and children for 11 per cent of the migrant population. 
For what relates to Malaysia the figure presented above refers to legal 
immigrants. There is however a general consensus that at present Malaysia 
hosts around two million migrants that should be legalized by an ongoing 
procedure that started in July 2011. Also in this case the number of migrants 
would then double with respect to the official figures.   
 
 
7.2 The migration scenarios 
The previous data provide the necessary background for an evaluation 
of the migration scenarios. As we have already suggested, the number of 
migrants that a country receives does depend not only on the number of jobs 
that cannot be covered by the local Labor force, but also on the number of 
dependents that will accompany, or join in a second moment, the workers. 
We can, at one extreme, imagine that the number of migrants will be exactly 
equal to the amount of workers needed by the arrival country. This situation 
characterizes the initial phase of the immigration process and also 
subsequent phases if the migration quotas set by the arrival country are not 
coherent with labor markets needs and, therefore, a very large number of 
arrivals takes place in risky, illegal situations. Subsequently, when more 
proper quotas are decided or workers start to be legalized and the possibility 
of family reunion allowed by the local legislation, the number of dependants 
tends to increase. It has been estimated that at present in developed 
countries we can expect 1.5 arrivals
27
 for each job position that needs to be 
covered by an immigrant worker.  
Since Southeast Asia countries can be considered in the initial phase 
of the migration process, the number of immigrants has been computed, 
both for Scenario A and B, on three alternative hypothesis:  
i) B=1  
ii) B=1.15      
iii) B=1.3 
Considering the six cases reported in table 13, the number of 
immigrants will range: 
 In Singapore, from 3.6 million (B1) to 6.7 million (A3) 
 In Thailand, from 10.2 million (B1) to 18 million (A3) 
 In Malaysia, from a slightly negative value with positive inflows 
starting in 2025 (B1) to 2.2 million (A3)  
                                                                                                                            
of internal migration, including circular and seasonal migration. However, the highly dynamic nature 
of migration trends and patterns in Thailand makes the timely formation of comprehensive and 
coherent migration policies very challenging.” 






The net inflow in the three countries over the next 25 years is 
therefore forecasted between 13.5 (B1) and 27 million (A3). Since at this 
point of the game, the supply of local labor cannot be manipulated by state 
intervention and our Labor force forecast has been designed in such a way 
to represent an over-estimate, the amount of immigrants will depend on two 
variables: the development path chosen by each country and the growth in 
employment that will be generated.  
We can, moreover, observe that the amount of immigrants we are 
forecasting is basically on line with what has happened in the last 25 years 
once we take into consideration that local WAP was expanding at that time, 
while in the next 25 it will decline.  
It could be objected that the most important international Institution 
that provides demographic forecasts, the Population Division, has published 
much lower migration estimates. These data that we have reported in Table 




We observe, first of all that the Migration balance for ASEAN as a 
whole, with respect to the 2010-2035 period, is slightly higher in absolute 
value than that registered between 1985 and 2010 (-7.6 million versus -7.4 
million), but the overall mobility is forecasted to decline as a result of a 
sharp contraction of both the inflows in arrival countries and the outflows 
from departures countries. The firsts decline from 4.8 million to 3 million, 
the seconds from 12.2 to 10.7 million. More specifically for what relates to 
arrival countries, inflows are expected to decline in Malaysia (-1.3 million) 
Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total Singapore Thailand Malaysia Total 
2010-15 535 1,452 -43 1,944 615 1,670 -50 2,235 696 1,888 -56 2,527
2015-20 768 2,043 68 2,879 883 2,350 78 3,311 998 2,656 89 3,743
2020-25 1,026 2,775 358 4,159 1,180 3,191 412 4,783 1,334 3,607 466 5,407
2025-30 1,272 3,444 559 5,275 1,462 3,960 643 6,066 1,653 4,477 727 6,857
2030-35 1,587 4,138 788 6,512 1,825 4,758 906 7,489 2,063 5,379 1,024 8,466
Total 5,188 13,851 1,730 20,769 5,966 15,929 1,990 23,885 6,744 18,007 2,249 27,000
2010-15 743 1,233 -160 1,815 855 1,418 -184 2,088 966 1,603 -209 2,360
2015-20 623 1,588 -178 2,032 716 1,826 -205 2,337 810 2,064 -232 2,642
2020-25 698 2,064 -32 2,730 803 2,373 -37 3,140 908 2,683 -41 3,549
2025-30 763 2,457 10 3,231 878 2,826 12 3,715 992 3,195 13 4,200
2030-35 772 2,854 62 3,688 887 3,283 72 4,242 1,003 3,711 81 4,795
Total 3,599 10,196 -298 13,497 4,139 11,726 -343 15,522 4,679 13,255 -388 17,546
Source - Author elaboration on National data 
Table 13 - Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia; number of migrants (thousand) in alternative scenarios of manpower needs and 






Arrival countr. Depat. countr. Balance 
1985-90 460 505 120 5 -265 -300 -330 -135 0 150 1,090 -880 210
1990-95 320 -1,110 230 5 -720 -695 -315 -125 -30 155 -555 -1,730 -2,285
1995-00 420 595 255 5 -775 -775 -285 5 -85 95 1,275 -1,820 -545
2000-05 395 1,105 230 5 -1,185 -1,130 -430 -1,000 -115 -120 1,735 -3,980 -2,245
2005-10 85 490 720 5 -1,295 -1,235 -430 -500 -75 -255 1,300 -3,790 -2,490
1985-2010 1,680 1,585 1,555 25 -4,240 -4,135 -1,790 -1,755 -305 25 4,845 -12,200 -7,355
2010-15 85 395 175 5 -1,005 -1,000 -210 -100 -75 -130 660 -2,520 -1,860
2015-20 85 390 125 5 -950 -940 -200 -50 -75 -65 605 -2,280 -1,675
2020-25 85 385 125 5 -895 -890 -200 -50 -75 -35 600 -2,145 -1,545
2025-30 85 385 120 5 -805 -800 -200 -50 -75 -10 595 -1,940 -1,345
2030-35 85 380 120 5 -720 -720 -200 -50 -75 -10 590 -1,775 -1,185
2010-2035 425 1,935 665 25 -4,375 -4,350 -1,010 -300 -375 -250 3,050 -10,660 -7,610
Diff. -1,255 350 -890 0 -135 -215 780 1,455 -70 -275 -1,795 1,540 -255
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 14 -ASEAN countries; number of migrants 1985-2010 and estimates 2010-35,  medium variant scenario of the Population Division; thousand; 1985-2035
Laos Malaysia Philippines Brunei
ASEAN 
Singapore Thailand  MyanmarVietnamIndonesia Cambodia
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and Singapore (-0.9 million), and to increase, although very marginally, in 
Thailand (+350,000). Outflows are expected to decline in all departure 
countries, but Vietnam.  
In order to understand these data, we must keep in mind that they are 
not a forecasts based on a model or an extrapolation of past values, but a 
hypothesis (an educated guess) made on the basis of two considerations:  1) 
past international migration estimates, and 2) consideration of the policy 
stance of each country with regard to future international migration flows. It 
is also evident that in the case of Singapore and Malaysia the policy stands 




7.3 The impact of migration on total population    
We have just seen that, over the next 25 years, the Population Division 
forecasts the arrival of 3 million migrants in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia 
and Brunei, while our scenarios suggest that the value will be between 13 
and 27 million, depending on the rate of employment growth. As a 
consequence, we also forecast very different demographic trends 
It has been stated (and the demographic scenarios proposed by the 
Population Division endorse this statement as shown in Table 15) that the 
drop in fertility below replacement level that is affecting an increasing 
number of developed and developing countries will produce a decline in 
Total population, an even more pronounced decline in Working Age 
Population and progressive ageing phenomena that will seriously threaten 
the sustainability of the present level of production and of the welfare 




This does necessarily happen in a closed population or in a situation in 
which the migration balance is not assumed (or allowed) to cover the 
manpower needs created by the contraction in labor supply and the 
expansion in demand generated by economic growth.    
The demographic forecasts for Singapore and Thailand, whose 
fertility is already below replacement level, are in line with this position. 
 0-14  15-64 65+ totale
2010 884 3,742 454 5,080
2060 854 3,196 1,962 6,012
2010 14,195 48,786 6,002 68,983
2060 9,900 39,871 18,357 68,128
2010 8,617 18,432 1,368 28,417
2060 8,421 29,032 7,924 45,377
Source - United Nations, 2011a
Table 15 - Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia; 
population by main age group;  Medium variant 






WAP (15-64) is expected to notably decline in both countries, while the 
percentage of elderly is expected to dramatically increase. The situation is 
obviously different for Malaysia where the TFR is still largely above 
replacement.   
The experience of developed countries does, on the contrary, show 
that the end result of fertility decline is to prompt unprecedented and above 
replacement net migration flows that increase WAP, raise fertility, and 
therefore determine significant Total population growth
28
.  
The model we have proposed, coherently with empirical evidence, 
brings to the conclusion that the WAP of ASEAN arrival countries will 
increase, the change being directly related to the rate of growth of 
employment and inversely related to the rate of natural decline of local 
WAP (Tables A5, A7, and A9).   
 
 
8 HUMAN RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
Education and training have always been considered a fundamental 
factor in promoting economic growth and social development. However, 
alternative growth theories have given industrial policies as well as 
education and vocational training different importance and role
29
.  
Classical growth models focus on the productivity-enhancing role of 
technology and human capital. They assume that investments in education 
and training result in skills, competences and increased capabilities of the 
workforce and that developing countries have the same capabilities to 
absorb technologies as the developed countries. The process does 
automatically take place through spillovers, trade and FDI, learning and 
increased productivity being a function of the time spent in production 
(learning by doing). In this context industrial policies play a very limited 
role, liberalization of the product market representing the main drive to 
growth. No specific educational or vocational training policies are called for 
to foster economic growth, education and training being only functional to 
match the skills supply and demand. 
In the institutional approach
30
 the key factor to reach high growth is 
diversification of the production structure, a structural transformation from 
low productivity, traditional (rural) activities to high productivity, (urban) 
modern activities, mostly, although not exclusively, in the industrial sector. 
Productivity grows not because of productivity increases within sectors, but 
as a result of shifting resources from low productivity to high productivity 
activities
31
. It has also been argued that the product space and the structure 
of goods produced determine the capabilities a country has developed, and 
these capabilities indicate which products or industries a country may easily 
develop in the future
32
. Industrial policies are, therefore, called upon to 
                                                 
28 M. Bruni, 2009 
29 For the drafting of this paragraph I am strongly indebted to the following papers: I. Nubler, 2011; 
M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, and J.E. Stiglitz (eds), 2009, and the presentation of the same book by J. M. 
Salazar-Xirinachs and I. Nubler, 2010; pp 135-140. 
30 W. Lewis 1954; J. Fei and G. Ranis, 1964.  
31 D. Rodrik, 2009. 
32 C.A. Hidalgo, and R. Hausmann, 2009.  
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facilitate a “growth enhancing structural transformation”. The challenge is 
getting the policy approach right by adopting an experimental and creative 
approach to institutional reforms
33
. 
According to New evolutionary economics, economic development 
is defined as a process of technological upgrading, of diversification and 
structural change driven, on one hand, by the accumulation of capabilities 
and, on the other, by the transformation of the production structure. It is the 
accumulation of domestic capabilities (that include the development of 
workers competences, the accumulation of technological and organizational 
know how in firms, training institutes and governments), which allows 
moving from the existing knowledge clusters to new knowledge clusters. 
34
 
It is then evident that, according to this approach, not only industrial 
policies and educational policies can play a central role in fostering 
economic growth and social development, but they must be designed and 
implemented in a coordinated way.  
In every moment of time the Labor force of a country disposes of a 
given knowledge structure. The knowledge structure is the result of past 
formal learning processes inside the education and vocational training 
system and of the training on the job provided by the production structure. 
In any given moment of time, the knowledge structure defines, the dynamic 
capabilities of an economy, i.e. determines and limits the technologies the 
country can adopt, the production structure that may evolve, and therefore 






                                                 
33 It is however been suggested that: “Although this approach recognizes the role of learning and 
capabilities they are not integrated into the analytical framework and therefore fail to raise policy 
issues”. I. Nubler, 2011; p.8. 





(On the job training) 
Knowledge base
It defines and limits 
Technologies  the 
country can adopt, 
the production 
structure that can 
evolve, the possible 
development paths  
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In a first phase economic development can be based upon the 
incremental diversification of production inside the existing knowledge 
clusters, i.e. producing more products that require available competences or 
complementary competences that can be easily acquired.  
However, this is not sufficient to speed up development or to start a 
process of rapid catching up. In order to do so, a country must be able to 
shift production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, to 
jump into new knowledge clusters. Empirical and theoretical arguments 
suggest that the evolution of the knowledge base can play a fundamental 
role in the catching up process and that successful countries have been able 
to drive productive transformation by deliberately driving their knowledge 
structure toward higher diversity and complexity.   
Some countries have been inspired by egalitarian principles and have 
focused on equal access to education, while others have produced polarized 
educational patterns. The countries of the first type have first increased the 
share of primary, then of lower and higher secondary and finally of post-
secondary education. More importantly they have developed a significant 
share of higher and post-secondary education even at low levels of 
economic development. In so doing they have been able to shift production 
into medium technology manufacturing, then diversify production within 
clusters and finally move to higher technology goods
35
. The second type of 
countries
36
 have generated an educational structure with high shares of 
people with no-schooling or primary education, on one hand, and of people 
with post secondary education, on the other. This educational structure 
provides options in the development of high technology products or 
advanced services, but limited options for the development of medium 
technologies. It is also evident that this kind of educational structure cannot 
produce a relevant economic middle class.   
 
 
9 THE EDUCATIONA ATTAINMENTS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES  
As we have just seen, it is the knowledge structure of the country that 
defines the options and the dynamic capabilities of an economy, 
determining which production structure can evolve. The education structure 
of the population can be used as a proxy of the available capabilities since it 
provides an indication of the technologies and of the level of complexities 
that the Labor force can manage.  
More specifically, we can assume that a country with a strong share of 
(young) population with lower or upper secondary education embodies 
strong options to shift its production structure into low and medium 
technology products since this educational level provides the basis for 
training craft people, machine operators, technician and clerks which are 
required by more complex manufacturing sectors. However, it is only a high 
share of post-secondary education that will allow developing the economic, 
administrative, technical competencies together with the managerial skills 
                                                 
35 China and Korea belong to this group. 
36 This group includes many Latin America countries including Argentina, Brazil and Chile, but also 
India and Thailand.  
40 
 
and business leadership required to shift the economy toward medium and 
high technology goods and advanced services 
The different levels of economic development reached by ASEAN 
countries have been fostered and reflect their different educational 
attainment. Graph 9 reports for all ASEAN countries, with the exception of 
Brunei
37
, the percentage of men and women in the age group 15-44 with at 
least secondary education
38
. The ranking is lead by Singapore followed by 
Malaysia and Philippines. Intermediate positions are occupied by Indonesia 







Source – IIASA 2008 
 
Men register higher values in all countries with the only notable 
exception of Philippines where women percentage is 7 points higher than 
that of men. In Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam the 
gender differential is absent or extremely low. A gender differential equal or 
higher than 5 percentage points is registered by Indonesia, Laos and 
Cambodia.   
In order to better evaluate the knowledge structure of each country and 
the different options it opens for the future, it is important to consider 
separately the percentages of men and women with secondary and tertiary 
education (Graphs 10 and 11).  
The two rankings suggest that Singapore
40
 and Philippines (and in 
some measure also Laos) have been specializing in tertiary education, while 
Malaysia and Indonesia have directed their efforts mainly toward secondary 
                                                 
37 The source we have used (IIASA) does not provide data for Brunei and similar data are not 
available at the national level. 
38 More data for men and women, in 1970 and 2007, together with mean number of year of study is 
reported in table 10 of the Statistical Annex.  
39 The ranking of Vietnam is penalized by its gender unbiased approach to education. Laos and 
Cambodia are in fact characterized by a slight higher percentage of men, but by a much lower 
percentage of women with at least secondary education. 
40 To better evaluate the attainment of Singapore we recall that in Korea and Japan the percentages of 




Indonesia Thailand Myanmar Laos Cambodia Vietnam
Men 91 85 73 66 56 50 44 41 40












Graph 9 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with at least 
secondary education;  percentage values; 2007 
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education. Thailand and Myanmar are slightly behind, but seem to be 
proceeding in a balanced way, while Cambodia and Vietnam are still 
characterized by a heavy delay particularly relevant for tertiary education.  
In conclusion, these data suggest that in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam the Labor force is still characterized by capabilities that provide 
options mainly in low and medium technology clusters, while Malaysia and 
also, although in a more limited way, Indonesia have already shifted or are 
ready to shift to higher technology cluster. The educational attainment of 
Singapore and Philippines suggests that tertiary activities are the best 
options for both countries that however are also equipped for high 
technology manufacturing clusters. Finally, Thailand and possibly Myanmar 
seem to have the option to operate in services and manufacturing sectors adopting 












Laos Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Myanmar Vietnam Cambodia
Men 36 19 13 12 11 8 6 3 2










Graph 10 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with tertiary 










Men 74 58 55 54 44 44 39 37 31










Graph 11 - ASEAN countries; men and women (15-44) with secondary 
education;  percentage values; 2007 
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Although not too recent, UNIDO data on competitiveness and on the 
share of medium-high tech value added in manufacturing give support to 
this analysis (Table 16). Singapore (that is world leader in competiveness) 
has by far the largest share of high technology products, followed in both 
ranking by Malaysia. The next two countries are Philippines and Thailand, 
followed by Indonesia. It is of interest to observe that these ranking 




A final element to complete the picture of educational attainment and 
its future evolution is offered by public expenditure on education and its 
distribution by educational level (table 17). Malaysia is the country that at 
present devotes it largest share of GDP to education, followed by Vietnam, 
both countries boasting a percentage above 5 per cent. With percentages 
between 4 and 5 we find Indonesia and Thailand, the only two ASEAN 
countries that devote more than 1/5 of government expenditures to 
education.   
To appreciate the countries‟ perception of their educational needs we 
can also observe that Cambodia, whose primary schools are affected by a 
very high dropout rate, are giving high priority to this educational level.  A 
similar balanced vision of an education structure progressively built from 
the bottom, seems to be followed also by Indonesia and Philippine. Brunei 
and Malaysia are now concentrating their effort primarily on secondary 












high tech Value 
Added in 
Manufacturing 
Singapore 0.895 1 Singapore 77.58
Malaysia 0.474 19 Malaysia 49.85
Thailand 0.407 28 Philippines 40.09
Philippines 0.400 32 Thailand 37.84
Indonesia 0.264 47 Indonesia 29.79
Viet Nam 0.193 72 Viet Nam 21.86
Cambodia 0.155 90 Cambodia 0.26
Table 16 -  ASEAN countries; Competitive Industrial Performance Index 








10 SUMMARY AND POLICY SUGGESTIONE   
10.1 The main conclusions  
In the first part of the paper we have shown that the demographic 
revolution has already been affecting all ASEAN countries for a 
considerable period of time. The different intensity of economic growth, 
historical circumstances, prevailing values and customs have, however, 
interacted with demographic trends so that each country is at a different 
stage of this complex process. From our perspective the most interesting 
element is that Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei have already been 
characterized by a relevant lack of labor supply that has provoked -and has 
been compensated by- the arrival of at least 10 million migrants, many of 
them from other ASEAN countries. At the same time, other migrants have 
left ASEAN countries, mainly Indonesia and Philippines, for non-ASEAN 
arrival countries.  
We have also argued that in ASEAN arrival countries the need of 
foreign labor will progressively increase. This will depend both on the 
supply and on the demand side of the labor market. In the first place, the 
supply of local labor will necessarily decline for at least thirty, forty years. 
This will be caused by the decline in WAP brought about, on one hand, by 
the contraction in generational entries and, on the other, by the increase in 
generational exits. Both trends are unavoidable, being generated by 
structural phenomena, respectively the decline in fertility and ageing
41
. The 
exact dimension of the manpower needs and of the amount of migrants will, 
however, depend on the rate of growth of GDP that each economy will 
register and on the development path they will choose, which will determine 
the employment-income elasticity.  
                                                 
41 The young people that will enter the Labor force in the next 20 years are already born and not big 
changes in the number of births can be forecasted in the next 10-15 years. The age structure of the 
Labor force is known and therefore generational exits from the labor market can also be easily 
estimated. 
GDP Gov. Expend. Pre-primary Primary SecondaryTetiary Unknown
Malaysia 5.8 18.9 1 35 46 18
Viet Nam 5.3 19.8 5 38 26 22 9
Indonesia 4.6 26.0 1 57 32 10
Thailand 4.1 20.8 7 48 16 17 13
Laos 3.3 13.2 3 46 51
Singapore 3.1 11.6 0 20 33 36 11
Philippines 2.7 16.9 2 52 27 10 10
Cambodia 2.6 12.4 1 73 21 5
Brunei Darussalam 2.1 13.7 0 29 47 24
Myanmar 1.3 18.1 0 48 40 12
Source - IIASA
Public expenditure on 
education as % of 
 Percentage of Public Expenditure by 
Educational Level




Finally, we have shown that in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia the 
structural lack of labor supply: 
 In the short run, cannot be counterbalanced by absorbing 
unemployment or increasing labor market participation, since 
unemployment is very low and participation very high or not 
expandable for cultural reasons;  
 In the long run, it cannot be dealt with by delocalizing production 
and/or by increasing productivity, given the size and the expected 
duration of the phenomenon. 
On the basis of the previous line of reasoning we have proposed and 
estimated labor market and demographic scenarios in which the migration 
flows and the demographic evolution of the arrival countries depend on their 
manpower needs. The results project a demographic future very different 
from that proposed by the Population Division, whose estimates appear to 
be more sensitive to the political stance of the interested countries than to 
economic logic.  
The main conclusion is rather straightforward:  the higher the rate of 
economic growth that will be attained by Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Brunei, the higher their need of foreign labor, not only in absolute terms, 
but also as a percentage of the labor demand in terms of flow. 
42
 Our model 
shows that in a very near future the local supply of labor will not be 
sufficient even to offset Replacement demand. In substance, the paper 
supports the idea that growing workers mobility within the ASEAN 
community will represent an unavoidable precondition for economic growth 
and social development.   
In the following section of the paper, a survey of the relevant literature 
has brought us to support the idea that economic growth is the result of a 
process of technological upgrading, of diversification and structural change 
driven by the accumulation of capabilities, on one hand, and the 
transformation of the production structure, on the other. In substance, 
according to this perspective, it is the knowledge base of a country that 
defines and limits the technologies a country can adopt, the production 
structure it may evolve, and therefore the possible paths to economic growth 
and social development. More specifically, speeding up economic growth 
and triggering successful catching up processes does require shifting 
production from low quality activities into “high quality activities”, in other 
words to jump into new knowledge clusters. In order to do so a country 
needs to drive its knowledge structure toward higher diversity and 
complexity; in other words to endow its incoming labor force with the 
expertise and competences that will be required by the economic 
development triggered by industrial policies, and this in coordination with 
the necessary industrial policies.   
Finally the paper has provided some information on the educational 
attainment of the younger components of WAP in each ASEAN country. 
Data show that, also in this case, ASEAN presents a very articulated reality, 
                                                 
42 The labor demand in terms of flow is measured by the new entries in the labor market necessary i) 
to substitute the people that leave the Labor force for good and ii) to occupy the additional jobs 
generated by economic growth 
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but also a remarkable coherence between, on one hand, the educational 
attainment structure and, on the other, the level of development as well as 
the structure of the industrial and service sectors. The percentage of people 
between 15-44 with secondary and tertiary education spans between the 
maximum of Singapore (around 90 per cent) and the minimum values that 
characterize Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (between 40 and 45 per cent). 
Coherently, while Singapore has the world highest ranking in Industrial 
performance, Malaysia and Indonesia have already shifted their production 
structure to high quality activities and new knowledge cluster, or are ready 
to do so. On the other end, Cambodia and Vietnam are still attracting 
foreign investments mainly in labor intensive, low technology sectors.    
In conclusion, the paper contends that, in a very near future, workers 
mobility within ASEAN will not be a choice, but a necessity imposed by 
demographic tendencies and economic growth. The pace of economic 
growth and the typology of development will determine the amount of 
Labor force that will be needed and the competencies and skills requested 
by the arrival countries. At the same time, the other ASEAN countries will 
have a structural excess of labor supply that will not be able to find a 
productive occupation in the national markets because the rate of growth 
requested to absorb it will remain out of reach.  
 
It could be ASEAN goal to transform these weaknesses into strong points. 
 
 
10.2 Some policy suggestions  
The structural lack of labor supply that will affect Singapore, 
Thailand and, in a lesser measure, Malaysia can be faced only in two ways: 
migration and delocalization of production. The second approach, although 
viable from an economic perspective, can provide only a very partial 
solution to the expansion of production, given its risks and serious political 
drawbacks.  
A correct migration policy can be based only upon a serious 
evaluation of the amount and typology of workers needed by the arrival 
countries
43
. It must be underlined that the more economically and socially 
developed economies do not need only skilled labor, but on the contrary -
especially at the beginning of the migration process- they need mainly 
unskilled labor. The reason is quite obvious. As income per-capita increases, 
families will tend to provide more education to their children. The result is 
that the young generations that will enter the labor market in the near future 
in the most developed areas of ASEAN will not be willing to accept low-
paid menial jobs, which remain abundant also in developed economies, 
especially in the service sectors. However, with time, the percentage of 
qualified workers and university graduates needed by these economies will 
progressively grow, as the percentage of migrants requested in order to face 
local labor demand will increase
44
.  
                                                 
43  Another extremely important element will be represented by a system of recognition of skill 
certificates and credentials within and among countries in the ASEAN region. 
44 For Singapore, see Brenda S.A. Yeoh, 2007 
46 
 
The other side of the coin is that migrations have both positive and 
negative impacts on the socio-economic systems of departure countries. On 
one hand, it can reduce the pressure on the supply side of the labor market 
and provide remittances that could, if properly directed, support productive 
investments.  On the other hand, migration depletes the knowledge structure 
and the capabilities of departure countries because migrants are by 
definition the most dynamic elements of their societies.  
As it has already been suggested, a correct approach to economic 
growth and catching up requires that educational policies and industrial 
policies be called to play a fundamental role. At national level, this implies 
that education and training policies should have both a short-run and a long-
run objective: 1) in the short-run, provide a correct response to the local 
labor demand in terms of skills; 2) in the long-run, endow the incoming 
generations with the knowledge and the skills necessary to move the 
national production structure toward higher quality products. In order to 
avoid unemployment and frustrations, this second objective does however 
need a coordinated set of industrial policies that will create the demand for 
graduates with higher skills. In substance, education and vocational training 
policies should prepare the people for the production structure that is going 
to be promoted by industrial policies.  
 At ASEAN level the implication is that the educational policies of 
the departures countries should be coordinated also with the industrial 
policies of the arrival countries so that the unavoidable structural excess of 
labor of departures countries will find productive employment or in the 
arrival countries or in their investment in departures countries. These 




A basic element for designing and implementing the previous 
complex set of measures is information. Many ASEAN countries still lack 
the statistical information on demography, education, vocational training, 
labor market and migration
46
 that represents the necessary prerequisite to 
design and implement the policies we have just outlined. Moreover, this 
information needs to be comparable and based upon best international 
practices. 
This suggests that a fist important measure that could be implemented 
by ASEAN is the creation of an ASEAN Labor Market Information 
System
47
. As shown in Figure 2, a LMIS can be thought as: 
 A network of producers and consumers of Labor Market Information 
 A store of Labor Market Information  
                                                 
45  Already the “ASEAN Labor Ministers’ Work Program 2000 to 2005” stated that ASEAN 
countries need to enhance capacity for formulating and implementing a comprehensive and integrated 
human resource development (HRD) strategy on a continuous basis in order to adjust to global 
competition. This will include, among other things, a coordinated employment, manpower education 
and training programs, planning, labor policy measures and labor market information programs. 
46 The problem is fully recognized by the ALM last Work program that states: “Although human 
resource development planning and labor market information and analysis is a stated priority area for 
ASEAN, comprehensive information on the structure of ASEAN Member States‟ labor sectors 
remains of limited availability. 










The first element put the accent on the fact that the ASEAN LMIS 
should be the expression of its stakeholders, i.e. the national producers and 
consumers of data. The former will provide the necessary statistical 
information and support their correct interpretation; the latter will indicate 
their needs and cooperate in directing the collection of data and the 
management of the system.   
The second element indicates that the ASEAN LMIS should be the 
physical place where all the relevant national labor market information will 
be mapped, collected, evaluated, organized and stored.  
Finally, the real justification of the ASEAN LMIS is that of providing 
a flow of structural and short-run analyses needed to design, implement and 
monitor the educational, industrial, and migration policies of ASEAN 
countries. Between the more relevant areas of analysis we can indicate:    
 The education and vocational training systems of the ASEAN 
countries: in order to assess their structural characteristics and their 
evolution; estimate their production in terms of students outflows 
classified in regular and irregular, and by educational level;  
 The transition process from the Educational and Vocational Training 
System, on one hand, and the Labor Market, on the other; 
 The labor markets of the ASEAN countries in a comparative 
perspective; 
 Internal and external migration flows.  
 In a more specific way the LMIS should provide the necessary inputs  












 To design a framework of educational policies and industrial policies 
to be proposed to member countries for approval and 
implementation;  
 To create and up-keep labor market and demographic scenarios of 
the type we have just shown; 
 To design a map of the excess of labor supply in departures 
countries; 
 To define the manpower needs of arrival countries, by occupations 
and skills.  
In particular, the scenarios should provide estimates, over a 5-10 year 
sliding horizon, of the level and skill structure of the manpower needs of 
arrival countries, on one hand, and of the structural excess of labor supply of 
departures countries, on the other. 
 
 
10.3 The Education Migration Fund  
There is a final suggestion we deem relevant to advance on the eve of 
the creation of an integrated economic community that will progressively 
allow the free movement of capital and labor.  
A migrant bring with him a “capital” of capabilities that is the result 
not only of its personal investment, but also of the public investments of its 
country of origin. In substance, the arrival of a migrant corresponds for the 
production system of the receiving country to the free acquisition of a factor 
of production. This is obviously true only if and when the migrant worker is 
needed, i.e. his services are essential and do not have a substitute in the 
arrival country. The paper has strongly argued that this situation will exist 
and persist for at last four ASEAN countries and for a number of workers 
largely in excess of those “forecasted” by international Institutions.  
This aspect of migration has been largely overlooked by the literature 
because migrations are still predominantly explained from the supply side, 
migrants being seen as people running away from misery and deprivation, if 
unskilled and with low education, and as people in search of a higher 
income and better life, if educated and skilled. This brings to stress the cost 
that the countries of arrival have to bear or to promote ideas of brotherhood 
toward the migrants and their needs.  
If we abandon this perspective to realistically accept that in an 
increasing number of countries labor internally produced is not sufficient to 
carry on and expand production, and therefore that these countries need to 
acquire labor from other countries in the same way as they need to acquire 
raw materials and capital goods, then it logically follows that arrival 
countries should pay for each migrant that is going to have a job position a 
price proportional to its education and skill level and at least equal to the 
cost the departure country has supported to educate and train him
48
.  
Keeping in mind that: 
 Migrants represent a depletion of the knowledge base of the departures 
countries; 
                                                 
48  This would also eliminate market distortion deriving from the free acquisition of factors of 
production by arrival countries.   
49 
 
 A more educated and better trained labor force is the key for economic 
growth;  
 The need for foreign labor will dramatically increase at least for the next 
forty years; 
 Population explosion will make more and more difficult if not impossible 
the development of the poorest countries in the world where the excess of 
labor supply will be progressively concentrated; 
the creation and correct utilization of an Education Migration Fund could 
activate a relevant, correct, and equitable transfer of money from the rich to 
the poor countries to be invested in the most important factor of economic 
growth and social development: education
49
.  
It is evident that even if accepted the implementation of this proposal 
would have to face a series of complicated issues that cannot be confronted 
in this paper. Here we can limit ourselves to a few suggestions.  
In a global perspective we could envisage the constitution of an 
Education Migration Fund (EMF) with UNESCO that could be in charge 
to collect the payments from arrival countries and route them toward 
departure countries. This should be done in a fast and efficient way, and 
following a plan agreed upon with departure countries. The money should 
be directed to build new schools, improve the existing building, train the 
teachers, provide equal opportunities, and promote gender equality, in 
coordination with the industrial and macroeconomic policies required to 
start effective catching up processes.  
ASEAN countries are committed to “enhance and improve the 
capacity of ASEAN human resources through strategic programs, and to 
develop a qualified competent and well-prepared ASEAN labor force that 
would benefit from as well as cope with the challenges of regional 
integration”
50
. It is evident that in the less developed countries the necessary 
improvement of the educational and vocational training system finds an 
upper limit in the existing, largely insufficient resources. The adoption of 
the previous proposal could provide a correct and equitable solution to this 
problem. Moreover it could be argued that in the growth perspective we 
have adopted, arrival countries would be a final beneficiary of the transfers 
because the same transfers would foster the process of catching up of the 
weaker economies, increase their level of per-capita income and therefore 
expand their market for foreign high quality products and services.  
In this perspective ASEAN could represent an ideal testing ground of 
this measure. A specific working group of ASEAN experts could be 
entrusted with the development and implementation of the idea. Also in this 
case, the final goal would be the constitution of a EMF to which arrival 
                                                 
49  What we propose is totally different from the so-called Bhagwati tax. In the first place, the 
argument advanced, almost 40 years ago by Bhagwaty and Dellafar (Bhagwati, Jagdish N., and 
Dellafar, 1973) calls for a tax on the incomes of “professional emigrants” from developing countries 
into developed countries. In the second place, the Bhagwati proposal refers only to the so called brain 
drain. Finally it is a typical expression of a supply side vision of the migration process. It can also be 
reminded that initially, also Bhagwati discussed methods for transferring income from developed 
countries to developing countries to compensate the latter for losses caused by the brain drain 
(Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, 1975). For a more detailed discussion of the Bhagwati tax, see Wilson 
John Douglas, 2005  
50 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint 
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countries would transfer their payments that would then be directed toward 
the departure countries, in accordance with educational plans agreed upon 
by ASEAN and the individual countries and in coherence with the national 
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Departure countries Migration balance Arrival countries Migration balance
United Arab Emirates 3,857 India -4,923
Saudi Arabia 2,781 Bangladesh -4,401
Thailand 1,595 China -4,182
Qatar 1,027 Pakistan -3,750
Singapore 954 Indonesia -2,477
Afghanistan 585 Philippines -2,361
Syrian Arab Republic 492 Myanmar -1,500
Malaysia 481 Uzbekistan -1,274
Bahrain 473 Viet Nam -863
Kuwait 439 Iraq -730
Israel 377 Tajikistan -718
Japan 322 Georgia -459
China, Hong Kong SAR 165 Kyrgyzstan -381
Jordan 109 Cambodia -373
Azerbaijan 107 Sri Lanka -350
Cyprus 106 Occupied Palestinian Territory -280
Oman 103 Yemen -235
China, Macao SAR 93 Kazakhstan -214
Lebanon 88 Nepal -200
Bhutan 52 Lao People's Democratic Republic -190
Brunei Darussalam 7 Armenia -175
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 0 Turkmenistan -168
Maldives 0 Turkey -150
Total 14,213 Republic of Korea -128




Table. A3 - Asia;  arrival and daparture countries; migration balance;  2000-2010; thousand



















Rate of change 
in 
employment 
over a 5 year 











2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2,523 395 2,128 1,547 7.9 2,999 41,037 1,452 290
2020 57408 2015-2020 2,030 390 1,640 1,193 7.9 3,236 44,273 2,043 409
2025 58778 2020-2025 1,370 385 985 716 7.9 3,491 47,764 2,775 555
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 7.9 3,766 51,530 3,444 689
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 7.9 4,063 55,593 4,138 828
















Rate of change 
in 
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over a 5 year 
period











2010 52856 2005-2010 3914 490 3424 72.7 2490 7.9 2780 38037 290 58
2015 55379 2010-2015 2523 395 2128 1547 7.3 2780 40818 1233 247
2020 57408 2015-2020 2030 390 1640 1193 6.8 2780 43598 1588 318
2025 58778 2020-2025 1370 385 985 716 6.4 2780 46378 2064 413
2030 59607 2025-2030 829 385 444 323 6.0 2780 49158 2457 491
2035 59885 2030-2035 278 380 -102 -74 5.7 2780 51938 2854 571












Table A5 - Thailand; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 21.2 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,436 56,973 57,510 69,762 70,299 70,836 19.1 19.0 18.8 72.7 72.0 71.4
2020 12,359 60,119 61,208 62,298 72,478 73,567 74,657 17.1 16.8 16.6 73.6 72.3 71.1
2025 11,592 63,879 65,532 67,185 75,471 77,124 78,777 15.4 15.0 14.7 74.8 72.9 71.1
2030 11,093 67,766 70,002 72,239 78,859 81,095 83,332 14.1 13.7 13.3 76.0 73.6 71.3
2035 10,831 71,801 74,643 77,485 82,632 85,474 88,316 13.1 12.7 12.3 77.4 74.5 71.7
Diff. -3,364 18,945 21,787 24,629 15,581 18,423 21,265
Scenario B
2010 14,195 52,856 52,856 52,856 67,051 67,051 67,051 21.2 21.2 18.9 72.0 72.0 72.0
2015 13,326 56,216 56,720 57,225 69,542 70,046 70,551 19.2 19.0 18.9 72.6 72.0 71.3
2020 12,359 59,444 60,432 61,420 71,803 72,791 73,779 17.2 17.0 16.8 73.3 72.1 71.0
2025 11,592 62,493 63,938 65,384 74,085 75,530 76,976 15.6 15.3 15.1 74.2 72.5 70.9
2030 11,093 65,394 67,275 69,155 76,487 78,368 80,248 14.5 14.2 13.8 75.2 73.1 71.1
2035 10,831 68,146 70,440 72,733 78,977 81,271 83,564 13.7 13.3 13.0 76.2 73.7 71.4
Diff. -3,364 15,290 17,584 19,877 11,926 14,220 16,513
0-14
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 22.7 850 4590 768 154
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 22.7 1043 5634 1026 205
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 22.7 1281 6914 1272 254
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 22.7 1572 8486 1587 317
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 25.6 781 3828 623 125
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 20.4 781 4608 698 140
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 16.9 781 5389 763 153
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 14.5 781 6169 772 154
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 12.7 781 6950 795 159















Rate of change 
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2005 3426 353 230 123
2010 4196 2005-2010 770 720 50 74.7 37.3 781 3047 743.2
2015 4582 2010-2015 386 175 211 158 22.7 693 3740 535 107
2020 4817 2015-2020 235 125 110 82 11.4 425 4165 343 69
2025 4965 2020-2025 148 125 23 17 5.7 237 4402 220 44
2030 5097 2025-2030 132 120 12 9 2.8 125 4527 116 23
2035 5197 2030-2035 100 120 -20 -15 1.4 64 4591 79 16








Table A7 - Singapore; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 17.4 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,820 6,064 6,307 6,592 6,836 7,079 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,869 7,270 7,671 7,690 8,091 8,492 10.7 10.1 9.7 82.0 77.5 73.4
2030 866 8,153 8,747 9,340 9,019 9,613 10,206 9.6 9.0 8.5 84.8 79.0 74.0
2035 886 9,720 10,548 11,377 10,606 11,434 12,263 8.4 7.7 7.2 87.3 80.4 74.6
Diff. 2 5,524 6,352 7,181 5,526 6,354 7,183
Scenario B
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 12.9 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 5,030 5,155 5,280 5,813 5,938 6,063 13.5 13.2 12.9 76.1 74.3 72.5
2020 772 5,838 6,085 6,331 6,610 6,857 7,103 11.7 11.3 10.9 78.9 75.7 72.8
2025 821 6,625 6,989 7,353 7,446 7,810 8,174 11.0 10.5 10.0 81.3 77.1 73.3
2030 866 7,408 7,890 8,372 8,274 8,756 9,238 10.5 9.9 9.4 83.3 78.2 73.7
2035 886 8,184 8,782 9,380 9,070 9,668 10,266 9.8 9.2 8.6 84.9 79.1 74.1
Diff. 2 3,988 4,586 5,184 3,990 4,588 5,186
Scenario C
2010 884 4,196 4,196 4,196 5,080 5,080 5,080 17.4 17.4 13.2 72.6 72.6 72.6
2015 783 4,942 5,054 5,166 5,725 5,837 5,949 13.7 13.4 13.2 75.7 74.0 72.4
2020 772 5,395 5,575 5,755 6,167 6,347 6,527 12.5 12.2 11.8 77.2 74.7 72.4
2025 821 5,638 5,854 6,070 6,459 6,675 6,891 12.7 12.3 11.9 78.1 75.2 72.5
2030 866 5,766 6,001 6,237 6,632 6,867 7,103 13.1 12.6 12.2 78.5 75.4 72.6
2035 886 5,825 6,069 6,314 6,711 6,955 7,200 13.2 12.7 12.3 78.8 75.6 72.7
Diff. 2 1,629 1,873 2,118 1,631 1,875 2,120
0-14
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2000 14612 Scenario A
2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776.2 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 10.8 1201 12330 -43 -9
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 10.8 1331 13661 68 14
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 10.8 1474 15135 358 72
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 10.8 1633 16768 559 112
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 10.8 1809 18578 788 158
9545 425 9120 5718 7448 1730 326
66.9254611
Malaysia 














Rate of change in 
employment over 












2005 16451 1839 395 1444 63.3 857 776 10045 -81 -16
2010 18369 2005-2010 1918 85 1833 62.7 1103.8 10.8 1084 11129 -19.8 -4
2015 20438 2010-2015 2070 85 1985 1244 9.7 1084 12233 -160 -32
2020 22537 2015-2020 2098 85 2013 1262 8.9 1084 13337 -178 -36
2025 24402 2020-2025 1865 85 1780 1116 8.1 1084 14441 -32 -6
2030 26200 2025-2030 1798 85 1713 1074 7.5 1084 15545 10 2
2035 27914 2030-2035 1714 85 1629 1022 7.0 1084 16648 62 12




Table A9 - Malaysia; population by main age group and rate of employment in alternative scenarios of migration; 2010-2035 
Scenario A
B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30 B=1 B=1.15  B=1.30
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,310 20,601 20,892 28,981 29,272 29,563 29.9 29.6 29.3 60.7 59.9 59.0
2020 8,674 22,392 22,995 23,598 31,066 31,669 32,272 27.9 27.4 26.9 61.0 59.4 57.9
2025 8,848 24,530 25,454 26,378 33,378 34,302 35,226 26.5 25.8 25.1 61.7 59.5 57.4
2030 8,971 26,802 28,067 29,332 35,773 37,038 38,303 25.1 24.2 23.4 62.6 59.7 57.2
2035 9,006 29,219 30,847 32,474 38,225 39,853 41,480 23.6 22.6 21.7 63.6 60.2 57.2
Diff. 389 10,850 12,478 14,105 11,239 12,867 14,494
Scenario B
2010 8,617 18,369 18,369 18,369 26,986 26,986 26,986 31.9 31.9 31.9 60.6 60.6 60.6
2015 8,671 20,193 20,467 20,740 28,864 29,138 29,411 30.0 29.8 29.5 60.6 59.8 59.0
2020 8,674 22,028 22,577 23,126 30,702 31,251 31,800 28.3 27.8 27.3 60.5 59.1 57.7
2025 8,848 23,776 24,587 25,398 32,624 33,435 34,246 27.1 26.5 25.8 60.7 58.7 56.9
2030 8,971 25,499 26,568 27,638 34,470 35,539 36,609 26.0 25.2 24.5 61.0 58.5 56.2
2035 9,006 27,191 28,514 29,837 36,197 37,520 38,843 24.9 24.0 23.2 61.2 58.4 55.8
Diff. 389 8,822 10,145 11,468 9,211 10,534 11,857
0-14
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